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City Planning is an activity that seeks through conscious and selective intervention
to bring about desired changes in an equitable and just manner. Its theoretical
roots represent an amalgam of varied ideas and ideals, that have over time influenced
and directed city planning activity. This study addresses three important questions,
namely; 1) what constitutes city planning knowledge, 2) what are its basic premises
and 3) how can planning knowledge guide planning practice. The thesis maintains
that it is necessary to understand the intellectual roots of the dominant paradigms,
to effectively assess the present and the future direction of city planning knowledge
and practice. The protological questions that determine the nature of planning dis¬
course, are grounded in the belief that man acts rationally and for a purpose. The
rational behaviour of man and planners' avowed purpose of seeking the majority good
through the best course of action are basic guiding principles. The results of these
beliefs have at best been restrictive and at worst detrimental to the proper pursuit
of planning. Our realization, albeit, belated, that the city is both complex and
in a constant state of change, has challenged many of these beliefs.
The thesis attempts to seek out knowledge from both the western and eastern intel¬
lectual thought, in the hope of gaining a better understanding of the principles
that could guide our actions in making the city more habitable. It Is divided into
six chapters. The Introductory Chapter sets out the protological questions that
need to be understood and the parameters that define planning discourse. It presents
an overview of planning activity in historical context. Chapter II examines the
intellectual antecedents and the different paradigms that have influenced planning
thought. It concentrates on the role of reason and scientific method and their
exclusive and persistent domination of planning theory and practice. The influences
of the age of enlightenment and the subsequent explosion in intellectual thought,
that ranged from attempts to develop a science of society, to postulating a
utilitarian guide to action are examined. The third Chapter provides a critical
examination of the important contemporary planning theories. These theories are
discussed as subscribing essentially to the technical rational paradigm and leading
toward more humanistic theories in planning: theories such as social reconstruction,
social practice and epistemological anarchism. Chapter IV discusses the application
of theories to the practice of planning, some significant examples and critique of
their successes or failures. The nature of conflicts and contradictions inherent
in city planning are discussed in Chapter V. The final Chapter is concluding chapter —
it contends that the failure to recognize and understand the uniqueness of city planning
problems, and the forced attempts at moulding urban issues into scientific terms in
search for perfect or optimum solutions, have exacerbated and misdirected planning
activity. It argues for a new paradigm to guide planning thought and practice — a
paradigm that is consistent with the moral and social realities of city living.
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This thesis is about city planning theory. It is
about the ideas and ideals that have influenced planning
theory and planning practice. The thesis is exploratory in
nature and is an attempt at understanding some of the domi¬
nant paradigms that have over the years mandated planning
thought and directed planning activity in the Western indus¬
trial societies. It focusses in particular on the period
from the Renaissance to mid 1970s' coinciding approximately
with two United Nations Conferences. The UN Stockholm Con¬
ference (1972), that for the first time raised international
awareness to the plight of human environment and its impact
on the planet earth; and the UN Conference on Human Settle¬
ments in Vancouver (1976), that called for global efforts,
in planning human settlements to improve standards of living
of the people, and for a more equitable distribution of
wealth.
This particular period is significant in city plan¬
ning discourse. It represents the most productive years in
the development of planning thought and practice. It was a
period that gave birth to grand Utopian visions of cities,
industrial towns, new capitals, rebuilding of cities to new
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ideologies, development of new towns, suburban development
and urban renewal. Intellectual discourse ranged from theo¬
ries of city beautiful, to city efficient and practical, to
quest for greater rationality in the distribution of re¬
sources, to advocacy and equity planning. It saw the emer¬
gence of planning as a distinct discipline, institutional¬
ized and recognized as an instrument of change and social
action, culminating in the two international efforts to seek
solutions to improve the living conditions of the people in
urban and rural areas.
The intellectual antecedents and the protological
questions in planning are explored with a view to clarifying
the inherent dilemmas, conflicts and contradictions that
city planning is increasingly experiencing. At the outset
it must be assumed, that the generic nature of city planning
implies an interdisciplinary activity, concerned with de¬
scription, prediction and control. This interdisciplinary
construct raises the question of autonomy of knowledge
unique to planning. The synoptic perspective, comprehen¬
siveness, and the generalism that planning claims as the na¬
ture of its unique corpus of knowledge is often questioned,
since it too suffers both, a lack of unity of thought and a
clear definition or direction, of what planning is or ought
to be.
What needs to be recognized and critically examined,
are not the myriads of descriptive methodologies that domi-
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nate planning thought but rather the normative constructs
that constitute essential preconditions to effective plan¬
ning, and indeed, its critical paradigm.
Every historical era, according to Mumford, is domi¬
nated by what he calls a "dominant theme" and an "emergent
theme". This seems to be the case as well, in planning.
The domination of planning thought by positivism, technolo¬
gy, growth and development, is gradually being replaced by
an emergent theme whose nature and purposes appear - at the
present time at least, antithetical to planning, particular¬
ly if viewed in its historical context. But these emerging
directions in planning are critical and urgently needed.
Planning thought has evolved over the last century,
more in response to the crisis of the time, than to any spe¬
cific pursuit of a grand vision. It preoccupied itself to
removing the evil while disregarding any purposeful good.
The emergent theme, mentioned earlier, calls for recognition
of new consciousness, ecological awareness and qualitative
concepts, a process of sharing and participating, a de-em¬
phasis of materialism and the dogmatic teachings of Reason
and Enlightenment, with its over-adherence to the forces of
science and technology. This opens new possibilities to ad¬
dress the ever increasing contradictions and conflicts that
seem so endemic, particularly to the urban milieu, and that
have been the principal hurdle that presented the greatest
challenge to planning. In essence there is a need to free
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ones thought process from preconceived categories, from the
perennial search for universalities, causal relationships,
reasons and justifications, and move forward a search for
relevance, meaning and purpose, where planning in the end
will be judged by the successes or failures of its results,
rather than by its pure adherence to logical processes.
It can be argued that planning needs to always take
account of its past performance and precedences and recog¬
nize its evolving role by participating actively in the
change process, not only through physical, technical and ma¬
terial improvement, but also through the pursuit of qualita¬
tive ends.
It is not the moralistic ideologies or self-right¬
eousness that is required to deal with the ever increasing
conflicts and contradictions that attend social progress,
but the accepting, recognizing, understanding, and managing
of the inevitable conflicts and complexities that contempo¬
rary pluralistic societies generate in the process of
change, and growth. D. H. Lawrence noted that neither cre¬
ation nor universe depend on man for its survival, a point
worth recognizing.
The burden of choice has now increased both in quan¬
tity and complexity. The radical solutions of the 50's and
60"s so vehemently pursued in grandiose master plans, giant
motorways and huge urban and suburban malls are no longer
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desirable or feasible. The pressures from society are now
pressing hard and demanding the resolution of the ills that
represent the urban living. What in the end matters is not
some ephemeral truth, but what people believe about things
that affect their lives.
"In things human it is not what exists or what
happens or what is done that counts, but what is
believed about them; in other words, their myth,
their personification."1
1 Bernard Berenson, Aesthetics and History. New York:




"....two worlds, one dead, the other powerless to
be born."
Mathew Arnold.
The purpose of history according to Voltaire is nei¬
ther to satisfy human curiosity nor to accumulate facts
about the past, but to search for ideals useful for planning
the future.
The history of city planning thought, is not dis¬
similar to many other disciplines particularly the social
sciences, inasmuch as it has also experienced and is experi¬
encing varied phases in its development. These developments
have been influenced by a multiplicity of often competing
schools of thought, a few of which like the "comprehensive
planning theory" have even dominated the entire spectrum of
planning activity at various sporadic times since the begin¬
ning of the twentieth century.
These varied schools of thought emerged primarily
due to lack of any coherent paradigm or a generally accepted
view of the phenomena of what planning is or what its pur-
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poses are. Any attempts at definitions tended to be tautolo¬
gical, for example planning has been defined as "planning is
what planning does". Lack of focus, extreme vagueness and
over-extension of its domain of inquiry resulted in the ac¬
cusation often made that "If Planning is Everything Maybe
it's Nothing"1 or it's corollary "If Planning isn't Every¬
thing Maybe it's Something"2 This dilemma is of long stand¬
ing and has its roots in the dialectic between theory and
practice. If planning is a practice-based expertise, it can
be argued that any judgement as to its legitimacy of neces¬
sity has to be suspended; but if it seeks its roots in theo¬
ry, then its intellectual antecedents need to be well under¬
stood and reasons well formulated.
Planning is an activity that is inherent to man. In
generic terms, the word "planning" is defined as a scheme, a
method or a process designed to achieve desired ends. It is
rational thought applied to action. The term "city plan¬
ning"3 however presents a plethora of definitions. These
definitions range from the traditional physical land-use
planning, which was defined as an orderly and efficient de-
1 A. Wildawsky, "If Planning is Everything, Maybe it's
Nothing". Policy Sciences, Vol 4, No. 2, Summer 1973.
pp. 127-153.
2 E. Alexander, "If Planning isn't Everything, Maybe it's
Something". Town Planning Review, Vol. 52, No. 2, April
1981. pp 131-142.
3 A more appropriate term would be "Geotechnic", a word
first drawn to our attention by Patrick Geddes, and is de¬
fined in the Webster's Third International Dictionary, as
a science of making the earth more habitable.
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velopment of urban environment, to reconstructing and re-ed¬
ucating society through intervention and or innovation, or
even planning as being simply a liberating mechanism. These
theories emerged essentially as a result of social, economic
and political circumstances, prevailing at various places
and times in the history of city planning thought. They have
been products of a fiat, of intellectual inquiry in the pro¬
duction of planning knowledge, a concensus reached through
public debate and/or practical exigencies. They have been
attempts that ranged from self aggrandizement, to domination
and control, to maximizing the elusive public good in an eq¬
uitable and just manner, to safeguarding individual freedom,
to expanding choices and opportunities or even aesthetically
to create beautiful and ideal living environments. But un¬
derlying all these quests, has been the belief in the ra¬
tionality of man, and its supremacy over man and nature.
Rational action implied rational and just distribution of
the commodity called "happiness".
City Planning theory has been at the locus of this
ongoing discourse. In its formative years planning theory
sought refuge in the technical rationality and search for
ideal solutions. In its subsequent development, it ques¬
tioned its epistemological roots in trying to reconcile the
what "is" planning, to what planning "ought" to be. It at¬
tempted to legitimize its actions through seeking concensus,
through posturing public interest and through public partic-
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ipation. Today city planning theory is trying to understand
the fundamental moral principles that dictate and guide
planning actions, that is, it is trying to search for a
theory of action, that can fuse the world of facts with the
world of values.
This thesis is an attempt at examining three impor¬
tant questions that circumscribe city planning theory and
practice. They are 1) what constitutes city planning beliefs
and knowledge, and how are they organized; 2) what are its
basic premises and 3) how can planning knowledge guide plan¬
ning action. These questions have no doubt been addressed
by others, most notably by Friedmann (1971), Jantsch (1975)
and Churchman (1978). This study seeks to elucidate the in¬
tellectual roots, the various ideas and ideals that moulded
city planning thought over the years, and that have in turn
affected the practical discipline of city planning.
The contention of this thesis is that planning is,
in essence, an ethical question of judgement that needs to
be understood in its theoretical formulations, but not de¬
void of its practical implications. The objective of this
thesis is to seek ideas and ideals from the past to guide
the future, by examining the different paradigms that per¬
meated planning activity and to suggest some new directions
that planning ought to seek in its quest for creating a bet¬
ter living environment.
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One of the most serious dilemma, however, that plan¬
ning faces is the inadequacy of the dialectics to address
the critical question of the link between theory and prac¬
tice of planning. It has been an ongoing debate among aca¬
demics and professionals, whether theory should be devoid of
practice or whether in fact practice should inform theory.
If theory is an abstraction of reality and helps its under¬
standing, then of necessity practice must inform theory.
The problem however is that reality, particularly urban re¬
ality is not susceptible to theories which are essentially
scientific in nature. The critical question therefore is
whether scientific theories are amenable to social problems
particularly because the laboratory of planning activities
cannot be subjected to all the canons of scientific ration¬
ality or experimentation, a must in any respectable inquiry
and a must if it is to be endowed with the mantle of credi¬
bility.
According to the strict scientific cannons, all lab¬
oratory procedures must be able to be isolated, controlled
and be reproducible within the strict dictums of objectivi¬
ty. Such a rigid constriction imposes grave limitations on
planning activity and in fact distorts its real purposes,
which are more than mere problem solving or efficiency and
order. Planning is or ought to be equity, justice, freedom,
choice, purpose and action; it is a guide to their realiza¬
tion. Whatever the analogy to the biotic world may be,
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planning is not an organism, it is a purposeful and ongoing
activity of the human mind and belief-
Planning, unfortunately, having of necessity to con¬
tend with on the one hand with a high degree of abstraction,
and on the other, a high degree of precision mandated by the
scientific method, essentially lost its main "raison d'
etre". In the process, planning inquiry generated out of
necessity no doubt, a lingua of its own that is called
"planning jargon" conjured or borrowed mostly from allied
disciplines, and often applied out of context, or structural
premises, and simply used for want of credibility and scien¬
tific acceptance. "Jargon" according to Suzanne Langer is
"a special vocabulary for commonsense ideation". "Jargon"
she says, "is language which is more technical than the idea
it serves to express. In essence it is an artificial lan¬
guage that precludes any specific definition, but serves
well for scientific respectability."4
It is often argued that jargon is necessary in order
to establish the needed rules, vocabularies and procedures
in keeping with strict scientific inquiry, and particularly
in such interdisciplinary activities like city planning. The
danger however, is in the inability of such jargon to trans¬
late the more subjective issues that affect human living and
that are in the domain of common sense, feelings, and the
4 Susanne Langer, Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling. Vol. 1.
Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1967. p. 36.
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world of "sentience", as it is often referred to, into
pragmatic actions, and into significant results. It is the
separation of thinking and feeling, of reason and intuition,
of theory and practice, that lies at the root of this dis¬
cord and uncertainty. Successful planning is not an activity
that lies exclusively in the domain of rationality, but is
an amalgam of both reason and intuition that produces in¬
sights , the most essential ingredient for planning.
In the long development of planning thought, what
has emerged is neither a scientific discipline with its ep-
istemological rigour, nor truth that it dogmatically pur¬
sued, but scores of descriptive, functional methodologies
devoid of any sound theoretical foundations, save those un¬
critically borrowed from allied disciplines, generating in
the process, what in essence amounts to, methodological ec¬
lecticism. Ecclecticism that defines urban problems in
terms of techniques available for their solutions.
Theories in planning emerged in response to either
specific economic or social crisis or out of concern to
amend the wrong in the interest of the public good. They
intended at best to be remedial, highly constraining,
couched heavily in the scientific idiom and always directed
at causal concerns and the procedural aspects of planning
activity. In the process, they failed to account for the
substantive issues, they failed to reconcile the world of
facts with the dictates of values and they failed to under-
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stand the role of 'feelings', and the role of coramonsense
and intuition in the planning process. These were simply
abdicated in favor of so-called scientific objectivity and
truth; truth that was equated with good but was neither de¬
finable nor identifiable. It was a conflict between facts
on the one hand and reconciliation with values on the other.
This dichotomy between facts and values persisted throughout
city plannings' long history. Likewise the dichotomy be¬
tween ends and means caused a great many shifts in planning
theory - some emphasizing ends and others means or both.
City planning furthered its activity particularly in its
early phases by simply ignoring one in favour of the other.
It gained its legitimacy not by the profoundity of its theo¬
retical formulations but by its historical circumstances,
and by its mere "ingenui" for survival.
Most of the 20th., century planning theories born
out of crises, related to public health and unsanitary con¬
ditions of the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution and
persisted on the illusive promise of an Ideal City. This
pursuit of an ideal took many forms. Historically they be¬
gan with search for an Ideal Community and shifted to postu¬
late Ideal Forms.5
5 Gordon E. Cherry, Town Planning in its Social Context.
London: Leonard Hill, 1970. p. 9. See also Leonardo Be-
nevelo, The Origins of Modern Town Planning. London:
Routledge and Regan Paul, 1967. Benevelo contends that
the years 1830 to 1930 to be the significant period in the
development of planning theories.
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Although the two, namely the pursuit of Ideal Commu¬
nity and the Ideal Form, have developed interrelatedly,
their basic philosophical premise differed markedly. They
are both no doubt of long ancestry, originally sanctioned by
both Plato and Aristotle in their triad of eternal values -
the true, the good and the beautiful-reason, sentiment and
sensibility.
These theories were sparked either by the religious
zeal of the early thinkers, or by a vision of a new society.
The former postulated a kind of theocratic society, governed
by divine rule in pursuit of equality and common good for
the good life of its citizens. It was a kind of ethico-re-
ligious Utopia, amply enunciated, for example, by St. Au¬
gustine6 in De Civitate Dei (413-426 AD.); St. Thomas Aqui¬
nas', De. Reqimine Principum (c.1267); and Girotamo
Savonarola's, De. Politia et Regno Trattato (c.1480) - a
theocratic state in which charity and righteousness, liberty
and equality would predominate and public interest will
overrule private interests. Those that postulated a new vi¬
sion of society conceived it as an autocratic society sanc-
5 St. Augustine contrasts the Civitas Dei with Civitas Ter-
rem; the City of God with City of Men. The Civitas Dei is
not to be equated with the church nor should Civitas Ter-
rem be equated with the Government in the political sense.
The distinction St. Augustine makes is between the organi¬
zation of life and the morals or conduct of life. To him
man lives either according to the rules of God or to the
rules of man. The former he contends inevitably leads to
Civitas Dei. It is also interesting to note that Beauty
for St. Augustine was in 'Unum' the unity of nature and
man in a harmonious relationship.
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tioned by sacred rights, rigidly controlled and structured.
It was to be brought about by change in the socio-political
conditions. These were well enunciated in for example: Pla¬
to's The Republic (Politeia) (c.350 BC.), in search of a
just society ruled by a philosopher king in moral precepts
subsuming the individual for the good of the state; Aris¬
totle's Politica (C.330 BC), the state as the highest form
of community in pursuit of "endaimonia" human felicity; St.
Thomas More's, Utopia (1516), a perfect communistic common¬
wealth, a state wherein equal social opportunities will ex¬
ist through community of property and abolition of individu¬
al rights; Johann Valentin Andreae's Christianopolis (1619),
emphasizing education and training of youth, the pursuit of
equality peace and contempt of riches; Tommaso Campanel-
las's, Civitas Solis (1623) ruled by priest "Hobor Metaphy-
sicus" as head of temporal and spiritual matters, assisted
by "Power, Wisdom and Love", and in which all property is
held in common as a means of securing social unity, a com¬
plete reconstruction of existing social institutions to
achieve a just and progressive society; Francis Bacon's New
Atlantis (1627), a land of freedom and justice, a new socie¬
ty based on knowledge and discovery, and Abbe Morelly's Code
de la Natura (1755). Morelly who could well be considered
the forerunner of Utopian Socialism, maintained that man's
main end for existence was pleasure - man was by nature good
and had moral rectitude, and that evil in society arose from
secondary causes and could be eradicated through, for exam-
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pie, abolishing the institution of private property. He
sought a kind of social reconstruction using his basic prin¬
ciple "each is to labour according to his ability and share
according to his needs".7
The second equally important movement in the Ideal
City pursuits was the Ideal Form in which the Ideal City was
equated with the Ideal Form. This Ideal Form was always
moulded in geometric or some rigid mathematical rule. One
of the earliest in this school of thought who postulated an
ideal city form was Marcus Vitruvius Pollio (c100 B.C.) in
his treatise De Architectura Libri Decern (c.27B.C.). In his
treatise Vitruvius emphasized form and function as the main
considerations in planning of cities.
The Renaissance however saw the fullest development
of the Ideal Form by way of very elaborate geometric pat¬
terns, in works of men like; Leone Battista Alberti,
(1404-1472), in De Re Aedificatoria (1450); Leonardo da Vin¬
ci, (1452-1519), the great Renaissance master, who portrayed
the ideal city in geometric form in his ideal plan for the
city of Florence.6 Da Vinci even believed that painting was
science and like science was subjected to mathematical
laws; Antonio Filarete, in Trattato D'Architectura (1464);
Vincenzo Scamozzi, in Idea dell'Architectura Universale
7 See Morelly, Code de La Natura (1755) discussed in Guth¬
rie, Socialism before the French Revolution.
8 S. Giedion, Space Time and Architecture. Cambridge: Har¬
vard University Press, 1954. pp. 42-54.
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(1615); Francesco Giorgio (1439-1502) in Polygonal City
(1490). As a result we see the emergence of star-shaped
cities, polygonal and other geometric and gridiron patterns,
as "citta ideale", based on either the needs dictacted by
military exigencies or mere fancy of the designer.
The Eastern world interestingly perceived Ideal Cit¬
ies as a synthesis of Ideal Communities and Ideal Form, the
former, however, dictating the latter. Hindu literature,
abounds in Utopian thoughts that address the interrelation¬
ships between man and society, and man and nature, in seek¬
ing harmonious existence. The Ancient Sastras and Vidyas (c
600 B.C.) deal at length in physical, sociological, psycho¬
logical, and metaphysical aspects, of daily living in ritu¬
als and in the sciences and art of human habitation. Two of
the earliest Sastras of particular relevance to planning,
are found, one in Hinduism and one in Buddhism. They both
conceptualize the ideal city using ethical codes as determi¬
nants of ideal behaviour, and which in turn prescribed rigid
geometric forms for ideal cities. The Bhaqavad Gita (c 100
B.C.) which forms a part of the great epic Mahabharata is
perhaps the oldest treatise in ethics, purported to have
been written by the celebrated author Vyasa. The Gita de¬
rives its inspiration from the ancient Upanisads (c.800 BC),
and attempts to integrate into a code of ethics, the strug¬
gle between the forces of good and evil, by emphasizing love
and liberation of self through a new understanding of the
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unity and meaning of humanism. The Questions of King Milin-
da (Menander) (c .400 B.C.), a Buddhist text, likewise deals
in ethics and contains a chapter on "The City of Righteous¬
ness" which summarizes best the idealism of ancient Oriental
sages, and goes as follows:
"The Lord's City of Righteousness has virtue for
its ramparts, fear of sin for its moat, knowledge
for its gates, zeal for its turrets, faith for its
pillars, concentration for its watchman, wisdom
for its palaces. The Basket of Discourses is its
marketplace, the Supplementary Doctrines its
roads, the conduct its court of justice, and
earned self-control is its main street..."9
In Islamic philosophy, we find similar references to
ideal cities. Al Farabi (Abu-Nasr Muhammad, 873-950), a
Muslim philosopher, whom some claim as ranking with Plato
and Aristotle, wrote Al-Madinat-Al-Fadila, concerning the
Model City ruled by a philosopher king. Philosophy he be¬
lieved was the supreme intellectual activity and as such
plays a very dominant role in the ideal city. The head 'Ra-
Is' as the source of all authority, dictated the code, the
practice and form of the ideal city.10 It is interesting to
note that in Sufi beliefs the architect is called "muhandis"
the geometer who was also the planner of ideal city form.
9 The Questions of King Milinda (Menander) trans. T.W. Rhys
Davids. New York: Dover Publications, 1969. (c
400B.C.). There are a number of ancient treatises dealing
specifically in planning human habitations and architec¬
ture, and prescribing rigid geometric forms, such as Vas-
tu-Sastras, Silpa-Sastras, Manasara and Mayamatam being
the principal ones, all dating to circa 100 B.C to 500
A.D, and attributed to Goddess Visvakarma.
10 See Al-Madina Al Fadila. Trans, as Der Musterstadt von
Al Farabi, by Friedrich Dieterici. Leiden, 1895.
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All these ideal commonwealths were products of
latent realisation of dissatisfaction with the existing con¬
ditions, economic and political injustices. They were
grounded in the belief that physical and social conditions
including institutions, needed to be changed if an ideal
community was to be attained, through social justice and
freedom. Some saw the Community and Institutions as instru¬
ments of change and others saw Form as a means of achieving
ideal living.
Of the more contemporary Utopian experiments follow¬
ing the Industrial Revolution three different directions
were pursued. First there were those who believed in histo-
ricism, meaning return to the good life, that the past the
medieval city in particular, epitomized, and they sought to
reintroduce those forms and beliefs. Second were the remedi-
alists who sought ad hoc remedial solutions to the ills of
the urban fabric, through purely technical rational solu¬
tions such as health and social legislation, and by intro¬
ducing some drastic reforms in the field of public housing
and sanitation to improve the conditions of city living.
This movement generated a series of Public Health and Sani¬
tation Acts and Housing and Planning Acts, which in turn be¬
came the percursors of many of the planning practices of to¬
day.11 The third and one of the most influential groups, the
11 The basis for the new planning legislation and the new
awareness it generated came mainly from three Acts of
legislations enacted earlier, in the U.K.? namely The
Public Health Act of 1848 and 1875, the Public Utilities
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radicals, envisioned new forms coupled with social reform to
deal with the problem of rampant industrialization, popula¬
tion growth, inequalities and injustices in the social and
economic conditions of the people. The movement was sparked
by the French Revolution (1789-1815) which overthrew many of
the old beliefs and introduced new values and ideas of civil
liberty, equality and fraternity. Francois Noel Babeuf
(1760-1797) a French Journalist also known as Gracchus, was
the first "cause celebre" of the very influential movement
called Socialism, and the egalitarian ideas of equal distri¬
bution of land and income and peoples fundamental right to
live. This doctrine was central of latter Socialist think¬
ers, the Utopian Socialists. Babeuf also believed that a
perfect state must emerge not only from equality of rights
but also from equality of goods and service.
The Utopian Socialists, were not only idealizing a
community but were equally concerned with the realization of
these ideals in practice consistent of course with the pre¬
vailing nineteenth century Utopian thought. Utopian Social¬
ists were not only egalitarians but also believed in the
goodness of nature and the environment and were sympathetic
to it. This is evident in many of their ideal cities which
Act of 1868, 1875 and 1890; and the Housing Act of 1890.
The Housing Act of 1890 and the Town Planning Act of 1909
together, provided the framework for the eventual, relat¬
ed acts that controlled planning and development of land.
These were the beginnings of planning legislation and
legitimization of planning activity in U.K. and later in
Canada. See Desmond Heap, An_ Outline of Planning Law.
London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1973. pp.1-24.
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were set in natural surroundings with parks and gardens. Of
these later writings and experiments, we have Charles Fouri¬
er, the forerunner of Socialist thought who believed in the
basic goodness of man, and in his Theories des Quartre Move¬
ments (1808), he argued for the removal of rivalries between
the individual and clan interests, and suggested cooperation
to bring about harmony. His "Phalanstere" or "Social Pal¬
ace" gave ideal city a form in terms of zones and a Phalanx,
a single building for living for all types of people and oc¬
cupations. Robert Owen's A New View of Society (1817), with
emphasis on universal education, the formation of character
and the pursuit of happiness; Saint-Simon's Du Systeme In¬
dustrie! (1821), who believed in inequality of men and used
it as the very reason for social order, social religion and
the principle of fraternity as a precondition for ideal so¬
ciety, a society in which the workers in the Industries, for
example, assume positions of responsibility; Etienne Cabet,
French Socialist and an ardent disciple of Robert Owen, in
his book Voyage en Icarie (1840), outlined some strong taxa¬
tion measures and land reforms for communal property; James
Silk Buckingham published National Evils and Practical Rem¬
edies (1849), where he put forward an ideal community from
which ignorance, vice and disease would be abolished; Benja¬
min Richardson proposed "Hygeia", the City of Health (1875);
Tony Gamier in Une Cite Industrielle ( 1 904), proposed cre¬
ating an organic interrelationship between the various func¬
tions of the city, and was the first example of contemporary
17
town planning and one of the early attempts in Utopian so¬
cialism. Although not designed for any specific site, the
scheme was comprehensive and included many of the factors
associated with city living including forms of government,
cultural and educational aspects and residential and indus¬
trial needs of the city.12
Each of these tried to bring about social change es¬
sentially through physical disposition of buildings, strict
codes of conduct and organizational structure. Each be¬
lieved that either God or Nature mandated the happiness of
mankind. Each of these also placed their ideal cities in
rural environments but provided it with urban facilities and
each also attempted to order the lives of its citizens in
communal living to service the industrial productivity.
Each also believed that by creating fit environments man
could be led to perfection. They all believed in the abol-
ishion of private property and they all saw education and
some form of social religion as an essential component of
social reconstruction.
These ideas were, in part, fueled by the great so¬
cialist movement, beginning with the writings of Marx and
Engels (1848) and the belief that inequalities considered
inevitable had in fact to be removed, and that a classless
12 L. Benevolo, The Origins of Modern Town Planning. Cam¬
bridge: The MIT Press, 1971. See also Joyce 0. Hertz-
ler. The History of Utopian Thought■ New York: Cooper
Square Publishers, 1965.
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society was not only possible but inevitable. To realize
the improvement of the economic and social conditions of the
people, political intervention was not only necessary but
was, in fact, possible.
The Worlds Columbian Exposition (1893) gave birth to
the so called "City Beautiful Movement" in the U.S.A., that
caught both the planners' and the public's imagination and
raised great hopes of creating beautiful and orderly cities
of grand vistas, coherence and efficiency. It was rooted in
three ideas - the need for municipal art, civil improvement
and landscape as part of urban fabric. The movement had
considerable impact on planning both in the U.S.A. and Cana¬
da .
An attempt to fuse the remedial and the radical
ideas came from Ebenezer Howard's Garden Cities of Tomorrow
(1898). Influenced by Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward
(1889), Howard's ideas arose from his concerns of the poor
housing conditions of the working class and the different
social reforms that were emerging. The concept was based on
the belief that the human character could be changed by al¬
tering the conditions under which people lived and worked.
Howard attempted to fuse the benefits of the city and the
country in his Garden City ideal.
The year 1909 seems to be the decisive year for city
planning. It was the beginning of "Comprehensive Planning".
19
In U.K., the first comprehensive Town Planning Act was en¬
acted that called for more direct public intervention in the
shaping of British towns and the first International Confer¬
ence on Town Planning was held in London; in the U.S.A., the
first National Conference on City Planning and the Problems
of Congestion met in Washington, D.C. in 1909, and the Na¬
tional Housing Association was founded the same year. In
Canada the Commission on Conservation Act was developed and
enacted and in Germany and much of western Europe, it was
the year that gave planning, recognition as a distinct pro¬
fession. These forces collectively introduced a new ethic
in planning not unlike those of Fabian Socialism.13 They
tried to replace free enterprise and private property
rights, with public welfare, partially in response to the
conditions of the time and partially as a result of the
great disparities generated by the market system and its
"laissez-faire" policies.
From about 1910, and as a result of the National
Conference on City Planning, planning shifted its emphasis
from pure aesthetic vision of the city, the physical design
to a more utilitarian vision of efficiency and functionality
13 Fabian Socialism (1884) founded by Sidney Webb
(1859-1947) was characterized by its concern for facts,
facts that could describe the large forces inhibiting
progress, and was an attempt at reforming the administra¬
tive and economic mechanism through "measurements and
publicity". They sought to change society through per¬
suasion but without revolution; and attracted many intel¬
lectuals to the movement such as H.G. Wells, G.B. Shaw,
and Jawaharlal Nehru.
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which gave birth to the "city efficient" and "city
functional" movements. This was seen necessary as a means
of controlling the wastes of unplanned and uncontrolled de¬
velopment by the different administrative authorities.
Utilitarianism meant to maximize efficiency and thereby
utility, and as a result technique and engineering dominated
planning methods and the resultant product, the plans for
the cities.
Planning nationally now encompassed a much larger
sphere of concern and involvement. The government saw its
responsibility not only to deal with the forces of depres¬
sion, and to control unemployment, but as well to control
and direct the overall economic activity and the social well
being of the people. The formation of the Regional Planning
Association of America (RPAA) in 1923, represents the first
serious attempt of planning at regional scale of the city
and its environment. It was a distinct break from plan-
ning's hereto preoccupation with city and its housing prob¬
lem. The RPAA saw city planning on a broader scale as an
integral part of its region necessary to achieve a more bal¬
anced distribution of population, resources and institu¬
tions. It was influenced by Raymond Unwin's Nothing Gained
by Overcrowding (1912) that argued and attempted to prove
the desirability of low density housing and the need for
open spaces.14 In an earlier work Town Planning in Practice:
14 Roy Lubove, Community Planning in 1920: The Contribution
of Regional Planning Association of America. Pittsburgh:
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An Introduction to the Art of Designing Cities and Suburbs
(1909) Unwin had advocated for a proper system of town plan¬
ning as a deliberate activity to secure all the necessary
elements for a healthy condition of life and these ranged
from civic art to site planning and transportation. He ar¬
gued against hereto great preoccupation with street layouts
and excessive amount of land used for streets at great ex¬
pense and sacrifice to other land requirements of the town,
such as parks and open spaces. Unwin showed that it was pos¬
sible to for example build the same number of houses by cut¬
ting down on needless streets and devoting the area for gar¬
dens and playgrounds and for improving the surroundings of
the town.15
Another influential group to this new direction was
the "Congres Internationaux d'architecture moderne", (CIAM)
which made a series of attempts from June 1928 onwards, to
address some of the problems facing architecture and plan¬
ning. Dominated by some of the leading architects and ur-
banists of the period, Walter Gropius and Le Corbusier among
others, CIAM emphasized the need to address the social and
moral issues rather than purely stylistic. The Athens Char¬
ter (1933) for example identified what they called four pri¬
mary functions of the city, namely; dwelling, recreation,
work and transportation.
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1963.
15 See Raymond Unwin, "Nothing Gained by Overcrowding",
1 903.
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The crisis of the Great Crash of the 30's was to a
great extent the turning point for planning and gave it its
first mandate. It forged scientific management-efficiency
and zoning regulations for securing public interest. It
gained, for the first time, recognition as an important ac¬
tivity, urgently needed to regulate the market mechanism,
which at the time was in complete disarray, with depression
and widespread unemployment. Planning, it was felt, was
needed to bring about a more efficient and equitable distri¬
bution of resources. Although there was a cautious acknowl¬
edgement of planning in the beginning, it soon gained recog¬
nition at both national and local levels. It proved to be a
very significant period for planning activity. The period
also represented the beginnings of the New Deal Legislation,
in the U.S.A. Because of the economic turmoil of the period
and the need to coordinate economic and administrative poli¬
cies focusing on regional resources development, the U.S.
Congress created the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in
1933. TVA was given grand mandate to oversee the conserva¬
tion and development of a large region, the Tennessee Val¬
ley, whose people suffered poverty and its land was in woe¬
ful neglect. It was the first significant experiment in
regional planning and resources development. The Tennessee
Valley Development became a significant force in shaping
later policies related to resources planning, development
and conservation.
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Planning gradually became a tool, albeit of limited
nature, to intervene initially, only in certain markets,
rather than in the whole economy. It also shifted the em¬
phasis from the pursuit of order and efficiency that the
neo-classicists were strongly advocating, to a more objec¬
tive and effective rational scientific approach in dealing
with the growing uncertainties and irregularities of the
market place16
In the post World War II years and as a result of
the growth of science and postwar technology two strains of
thought persisted, namely: the control of the urban prolif¬
eration through dispersal and decentralization, and rectify¬
ing regional disparities through positive government inter¬
vention. The main focus seemed to be on control on the one
hand, and development on the other - control of the physical
forces that shape the form and design of the urban fabric
and its land uses, and the development of new infrastruc¬
tures and job creating opportunities.
One of the first reports to address the issue of
land planning and slum clearance was the Chamberlain Report
(1920) in U.K. Chamberlain as chairman of the Unhealthy
Areas Committee recommended dispersal and decentralization
as well as development of garden cities to be founded in the
countryside. The garden cities were to have a population of
16 Alan Budd, The Politics of Economic Planning. Glasgow:
William Collins and Sons Co., Ltd., 1978. pp. 47-57.
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30,000 to 50,000 and were designed to provide the best
working and living conditions.17
Three other important commissions followed which
strongly influenced future planning directions, both in the
U.K. and Canada. The Barlow Report (1940) commissioned to
study the problems of the distribution of the Industrial
Population, was the source of much of the postwar planning
policies, followed by the Uthwatt Report (1941) on Compensa¬
tion and Betterment and The Scott Report (1942) on Land Uti¬
lization in Rural Areas.18
These studies called for coordinated and comprehen¬
sive developmental efforts at both the national and local
levels to solve the various urban problems and bring about
desired changes. The Barlow Commission report was the first
official recognition by the Government of the need to exam¬
ine the distribution of population settlements nationally.
It was also the most influential in fostering the idea of a
comprehensive approach for town and country planning. The
study pointed to the weaknesses in the existing town and
country planning legislation and recommended the creation of
a centralized authority a Planning Board to ensure national
17 Chamberlain's report was influenced by Ebenezer Howard's,
Garden Cities of Tomorrow (1898).
18 The Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industri¬
al Population, Sir Montague Barlow, 1940; The Expert Com¬
mittee on Compensation and Betterment, Mr. Justice Uth¬
watt, 1941; and Report on the Committee on Land
Utilization in Rural Areas, Lord Justice Scott, 1942.
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action in dealing with the urban congestion. It called for
decentralization of industry and industrial population to
satellite towns/garden cities to ensure a more balanced de¬
velopment
No doubt influenced by Howard's "Garden City" idea,
the report was also influential in introducing the New Towns
Act of 1946 which advocated a number of new towns surround¬
ing the City of London and in other parts of the U.K. If
any criticism was levelled against the Committee, it was for
its mild approach and for not going far enough with much
stronger recommendations in dealing with urban population
congestion.
The post World War II years also saw a shift in em¬
phasis. Planning became more centralized and legalized with
the creation of planning units at the various levels of Gov¬
ernment, promulgating new controls in land uses and enact¬
ment of statutory planning legislation.
The 1950's and 60's in the UK and USA oscillated
from no planning to full intervention into the market sys¬
tem, generating new awareness for human rights and concerns
for the social costs that the expansive economic development
was generating through its growth inequities. Emphasis on
public interest and concern for public participation in the
decision making process at almost all levels of government,
was being increasingly recognized.
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There was also attempt made at the so called "Indi¬
cative Planning", to bring the private sector of the economy
into closer relationship with the policy-making structure of
the Government, which in the U.K. culminated in the prepa¬
ration of the first National Plan, in 1965.19 The Plan was
abandoned in the following year and emphasis was placed on
the decision-making processes, rather than on plan making.
In the U.S.A. the concern shifted to improving the decision¬
making techniques of the executive branch of the Government,
mainly through the development of systems analysis, which
later became the panacea in planning techniques.
The war on poverty in the 60's further expanded gov¬
ernment intervention from economic and physical spheres, to
social welfare and for more equitable distribution of public
goods and services. Such a large and complex mandate and
domain of concern generated a boom in planning and in urban
theories directed particularly at urban poverty and the in¬
creasing deterioration of the urban environment.
Planning theories, as a result, saw shifting empha¬
sis keeping up with the expanded mandate it now had. Moving
from the strictly physical planning theories to theories
modelled on social sciences with emphasis on procedural
aspects, developing complex urban taxonomies, systems analy¬
sis and varied scientific methodologies, borrowed often in-
19 The National Plan was not a physical plan but a policy
and budget plan allocating resources to different devel¬
opment sectors.
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discriminatedly from allied disciplines, particularly soci¬
ology, economics, and geography.
The introduction of the administrative and organiza¬
tional behavioural theories by H. Simon (1945), Dahl & Lind-
bloom (1953), Meyerson & Banfield (1955), and the emergent
emphasis on operations research, cost benefit analysis,
program budgeting and simulation models developed during
World War II, into the planning process, resulted in free
for all activity.20 The resultant planning activity was akin
to "bricoleur", a handyman who according to Levi-Strauss
(1962), assembles materials and tools with the hope that
they will be handy when problems arise.21
In principle, planning remained entrenched in the
scientific mode of thought processes, - in postulating hy¬
pothesis, designing efficient alternatives and selecting the
best course of action, as its routine activity. It remained
grounded in the tradition of utility function in economic
20 Herbert Gans, People and Plans. New York: Basic Books,
1968, p. 71. Melville Branch in his article "Delusions
and Diffusions of City Planning in the United States" in
Management Science, Vol. 16, No. 12, Aug. 1970, pp.
714-732, identifies three groups of theories-systems
analysis, scientific method and urban dynamics. In the
first group he includes general systems theory, opera¬
tions research, etc.; the second group covers decision
theories, organization and management theories and theo¬
ries related to planning processes such as advocacy plan¬
ning the the third group includes theories of location,
central place theories, concentric zone theories, etc.
21 Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind. London: Weiden-
feld and Nicolson, 1976. pp. 16-33. ("Bricolage" is a
kind of do it yourself science).
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terms, increasing aggregate social welfare in sociological
terms, and ordering preferences for optimum distribution of
resources in planning terms.
Although variations on the theme exist and in fact
some radical departures are fast emerging, the practice of
planning continues to play the subordinate role it has tra¬
ditionally, held in relation to the political system. In
essence it is deeply engaged in resolving its own inherent
conflicts and contradictions; conflicts between the real in¬
tentions of planning and the political realities between
ideal public good and diverse vested interest groups and be¬
tween the pursuits of social equity and the forces of ine¬
quality. These were and are the greatest challenges that
planning is faced with and thus the need for new directions
in planning that can address these issues in an effective
way, is becomming increasingly necessary.
Chapter II
EPISTEMOLOGY OF PLANNING
"Life can only be understood backward but it must
be lived forward".
Soren Kierkegaard.
2.1 REASON AND NATURE
One of the earliest and the most persistent influ¬
ences that has dominated planning, is the doctrine of Ra¬
tionalism and Empiricism which fused into what is generally
known as the "scientific method".
Briefly, the die was cast with the scientific revo¬
lution of the 17th century, when it eclipsed the former ep-
istemology of knowledge, the mysticism of St.Augustine
(354-430), and the medieval scholasticism of St. Thomas
Aquinas (1224-1274), and replaced the power of faith, in
favour of reason and experience to reveal truth.
Prior to this revolution man was the unchallenged
master, and the world moved round him. Protagoras, the most
famous Sophist (c 500 B.C.) stated that "Man is the measure
of all things, of things that are that they are, and of
- 29 -
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things that are not that they are not."1 It was a world of
harmony created by faith in God and by reason in nature -
everything revolved around man and his world. The scientif¬
ic revolution displaced man from this central position and
made him incidental to the cosmos, but at the same time gave
him powers through science to control and order the world in
service of mankind. It was the theories of Copernicus
(1473-1543), Kepler (1572-1630), and Galileo (1564-1642),
with the triumphant experiments by Newton (1642-1727), that
ushered in the scientific era. The world was now only a
satellite in the vast system of the universe.
Two of the principal proponents of scientific method
were the English empiricist Francis Bacon (1561-1626), and
the French rationalist Rene Descartes (1596-1650). Bacon
maintained that sense-experience is the source of all knowl¬
edge and formulated a method of experimentation and induc¬
tive logic. Descartes maintained that reason instead of ex¬
perience was the source of all knowledge and expounded a
method of deductive logic based on "a priori" beliefs. Ba¬
con saw the Universe in terms of sense-experience, while
Descartes saw it in terms of mathematical order. The Baco¬
nian empirical method resorted to experience and experimen¬
tation by inductive inferences as a means of arriving at
truth, while the Cartesian rationalistic method resorted to
logic of rationality, the use of reason and deductive infer-
1 See Plato's Protagoras and also Theaetetus (c 370 B.C.).
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ences as the source of truth. Both epistemologi.es embodied
an essential duality. The Cartesian dualism distinguished
between 'mind' and 'matter'. Both emanating from God, the
'mind' was endowed with freedom to act but only according to
the dictates of morality, 'matter' was fixed and acted only
according to the laws of nature. Baconian dualism empha¬
sized the power of 'knowledge' on the one hand and the mas¬
tery of 'nature' in pursuit of 'practice' on the other. Ba¬
con believed that deductive method was restrictive and could
only produce tautological inferences (in which the premise
necessarily entails conclusion). New knowledge according to
Bacon could only be derived by inductive method, based on
observation of experience, analysing and testing it experi¬
mentally, to produce a theory or law.
Bacon and the other empiricists like T. Hobbes
(1588-1679), J. Locke (1632-1704), G. Berkeley (1685-1753),
and D. Hume (1711-1776), believed that human knowledge was
essentially based on experience derived from observing the
surrounding environment and structuring it in the human
mind. This human knowledge would be limited to those
aspects gained from experiencing the environment - man was
not free to seek knowledge independent of the knowable envi¬
ronment, they argued.
Descartes and the other rationalists, B. Spinoza
(1632-1677) and Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) believed, that
knowledge emanated from the innate capabilities of man - it
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is a product of his mind and native capacity which he re¬
flected on the environment. Man was thus free from the con¬
straints of the environment and thus free from the controls
of nature. I. Kant (1724-1804) on the other hand argued,
that knowledge cannot originate from either the thought pro¬
cess or sense experience independent of each other, and as
such the two could not be differentiated. That is the "phe¬
nomena" and the "noumena", are in essence, only perceptions
and constructs of the reality; that is, knowlege is not re¬
ality itself, but the way in which reality appears to us.
Francis Bacon was also to an extent a rationalist
and he sought the synthesis of empiricism and rationalism in
what is generally known as the 'scientific method'2 which is
akin to 'rational method' since both subscribe to the same
logic of reasoning.
Basic to all these arguments is the existence of
'causal' relationships, which was later expounded on by D.
Hume (1711-1776), T. Hobbes (1588-1679), and J.S. Mill
(1806-1873). Causality presupposes that every event is nec¬
essarily conditioned by preceding cause, although the prin¬
ciple of causality, as Kant noted, does not necessarily
guarantee that a causal explanation is possible in every
case.3
2 It must be noted that the rationalist and the empiricists
school of thought are generally seen as separate and anta¬
gonistic to each other.
3 Kant maintained that causal order in the universe existed
33
Science always assumes that everything in existence
is rational and with a purpose - that the world is mathemat¬
ically discernable, and that it is thus deterministic and
possesses only objective discernable characteristics. Such
a tenet of course implies "reasoning from purpose" a teleo-
logical construct and as such believes that both the biotic
and the abiotic system has a reason and a predetermined
function. But what is not understood is that the science or
the mechanistic method does not explain the "WHY" or for
what purpose, but only "HOW" in causal terms.
Briefly the aims of science are twofold:
1. To describe physical phenomenon as it exists.
2. To explain its causal relationships.
The scientific method,4 as an instrument of science, follows
the logic of reasoning in an attempt to discern the causal
relationships and proceeds in the following sequence:
only because it was imposed by human minds.
4 Distinction is often made between the Scientific Method
and the Analytic method. The former uses scientific rea¬
soning, wherein hypotheses are formulated, measured and
tested and truth or falsity are drawn from evidence out¬
side the statement itself; while the analytic method uses
the logical reasoning of deduction and induction, wherein
the truth or falsity of the statement can be inferred from
the statement itself (see B. Lonergan. Insight: A Study
of Human Understanding. New York: Longmans Green & Co.,
Ltd., 1965).
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1. Observation and recording of data based on experi¬
ence .
2. Classification of data according to their similari¬
ties or dissimilarities, and distinguishing their
functions and causality
3. Constructing tentative explanatory hypothesis by in¬
ductive generalization.
4. Inferring theory by deductive inference.
5. Verification of theory with factual data by experi¬
mentation .
6. Formulation of theory or laws.5
This is essentially the basic formulation of scien¬
tific method that planning adopted in its methodological ap¬
plications. The thesis maintains that this adoption of sci¬
entific method in planning methodology was done without
adequate questioning of the validity of the premises, their
amenability to planning and the utility of the results
achieved.
Planning methods followed a similar sequence - ini¬
tially following Geddesian model (1915) of "Survey-Analysis-
Plan". Patrick Geddes, a biologist, attempted to link
thought to action by using socio-biological analogy to so¬
cial problems. He advocated the use of survey-analysis-plan
as a planning technique; survey of the existing social, cul-
5 See Leczek Kalakowski, The Allienation of Reason: A His¬
tory of Positivist Thought. New York: Doubleday & Co.,
Inc., 1968.
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tural and environmental conditions and their historical an¬
tecedents; analysing the data thus gathered, and preparing a
synoptic plan. By using the concept of "Folk-Work-Place", as
the key elements in planning methodology, Geddes maintained
that a more comprehensive and biologically organized under¬
standing of the place could be obtained. The basis of this
civic survey was his belief, that urban development was an
organic process. This idea of Folk-Work-Place was borrowed
by Geddes from the French sociologist, Frederick le Play
(1805-1882) who had suggested "Lieu-Travail-Farnille" Place-
Work-Folk in his Les Ouvriers Europeens ( 1855). Le Play-
combined statistical methods with the survey of living con¬
ditions not only to understand the living environment but to
plan the future. Later a more expanded version, became com¬
mon in planning practice:6
Determination of objectives
Identification of Alternatives
Selection of the best Alternative
Preparation of Master Plan
Implementation
Evaluation
Further modifications appeared over the years, but
in essence they all subscribed to the strict canons of the
scientific method.7
6 See Patrick Geddes, Cities in Evolution. New York: How¬
ard Fertig, 1958.
7 Michael Fangance, Citizen Participation in Planning and
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In science, what matters is causal relationships,
purpose is of little consequence. All science does is at¬
tempt to reduce the chaos of perception to an order, deter¬
mined by reason, and it is this transformation that formu¬
lates the laws of causality. Science cannot tell us what our
objectives are or how to select them or decide on their mer¬
it, importance or preference. It can, however, tell us how
to achieve them and the means to achieve them. In planning,
the reverse should be the important consideration, given
that the function of planning is both to determine the goals
to be achieved and the means of achieving them. The scien¬
tific method has an ingrained belief that it is seeking
truth and that this is possible through the use of empirical
scientific method. Pursuit of truth in itself is of little
help in planning, not only because it is illusive but be¬
cause it is of no significant value either in identifying or
solving planning problems nor in guiding change.
However these Baconian and Cartesian views of nature
and knowledge development still continue to dominate plan¬
ning thought, by emphasising order, uniformity and under¬
standing of the causal relationships, but for what purpose
is still not clear.
R.M. Sarly. The Planning Process. Working Paper No. 2,
Planning Methodology. Research Unit. School of Environ¬
mental Studies, University College London, 1972, provides
a good discussion on the various planning models and meth¬
odologies currently in use.
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2.2 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
Although the Age of Reason set the stage, the Age of
Enlightenment that followed produced the most dramatic
changes in intellectual thinking. While the Age of Reason
and its counterpart the Scientific Revolution were concerned
with the explanation of phenomenon "as is", The Age of En¬
lightenment was concerned with what "ought to be". It was a
shift from natural sciences to moral sciences. This is a
very significant distinction that becomes critical in city
planning discourse. It was an attempt at operationalizing
the laws of nature by seeking rational social order in the
behaviour and affairs of man.
The "philosophes" of the eighteenth century, - the
precursors of the Enlightenment, were not satisfied in mere¬
ly understanding the natural order that reason and nature
provided, nor simply in postulating a social political order
derived from the natural model. More importantly, they were
interested in promoting the new order and seeking its reali¬
zation. 8
"The eighteenth century was not only the Age of
Reason, it was the Age of Reason applied to con¬
duct, an age in which the messianic and the con¬
templative were more or less united in the 'philo-
sophe'."9
8 W. Langer, ed., Western Civilization. Vol.11. New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers Inc., 1968. pp. 185-207.
3 Everett Knight, The Objective Society. London: Routledge
and Kegann Paul, 1959, p. 19.
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Believing in the inherent goodness of man, they saw
no impediment to creating a whole new society through the
effort of human mind - the rational mind. Two essential el¬
ements of enlightenment were critical to planning - they
were Nature and Reason. Nature was a simple ordered ration¬
al (based on reason) system behaving according to mathemati¬
cal laws. This in turn was based on the belief that there
is reason in nature and therefore reason in man, because man
was part of nature. By discovering laws of nature, it was
then possible to apply the same laws to man.
Such a belief automatically sanctioned the pursuit
of "good", since "good", equated with truth on the premise
that whatever was rational or natural, was intrinsically
true and therefore good. This provided the rationale or
moral code to the era of the Enlightenment.
Planning adhered to this dictum as well, but sought
truth not in its purpose but in its method. This was based
on the rather simplistic assumption that objective truth was
in fact attainable, even if it was desirable. Objectivity
became dogma for the Age of Enlightenment and made scientif¬
ic truth the criterion for all truth. Objectivity says
Knight "is faith in the possibility of universal agree¬
ment".10 Objectivity thus becomes the end purpose and essen¬
tially the whole "raison d'etre" and was even regarded as
10 Everett Knight, The Objective Society. London: Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul, 1959. p. 20.
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"truth" itself.
A characteristic of the Age of Enlightenment was the
belief that man was, by nature, a social animal and the
thrust shifted from pure scientism to more humanism, partic¬
ularly as a result of the work of the Encyclopedists. The
Encyclopedists emphasized re-education of man, liberaliza¬
tion and social reform emanating from the people. They were
concerned with teaching men to act in an orderly and ration¬
al way. as Langer puts it
"For them, science was no mere technique for know¬
ing, but an ideal for living, a guide to lead men
out of ignorance and bondage."11
The giants of the period Voltaire (1694-1778) and Diderot
(1713-84) were convinced that a new social order was possi¬
ble, a social order that by far could surpass the existing
one, and they were convinced that this could be achieved
through a rational social and political order fashioned on
the scientific paradigm. Man is endowed with reason said
Voltaire "not that he may penetrate the divine essence but
that he may live well in this world". To enlighten the peo¬
ple they compiled the Encyclopedie (1750-1770), under the
editorship of Diderot, and with contributors such as d'Alem-
bert, Voltaire, and Rousseau. It became a document of pub¬
lic philosophy and it discussed many facets of human in¬
quiry, from theory of representative government, of
inalienable rights, to the guarantees of civil liberties. It
11 W. Langer, op.cit.,Vol. II, p. 185
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gave new impetus to social sciences - but only as a rational
science. Its basic intent was not only to communicate
knowledge but more importantly to bring about a change in
the prevailing thought pattern.
The Encyclopedists also set codes and reforms that
were to encourage despots and governments to adopt regula¬
tions and legislation to bring about human progress and bet¬
terment. But such was not the case; abuses were rampant and
the ultimate goal of happiness was reduced to the accumula¬
tion of wealth and the pursuit of pleasure by a few at the
cost of many.12
Although with a slight variation in emphasis, an¬
other important figure was Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) who
had also recognized the need for a science of society. In
his Scienza Nuova ( 1 728 ), 13 Vico rejected the Cartesian dis¬
regard for history and the belief that there is only one
valid method of inquiry. He explicitly noted that true
knowledge of nature was impossible, given the fact that na¬
ture was made by God and not man, and man could therefore
never fully understand true nature. The study of history he
argued was very important. Man can only be understood his¬
torically, because it is through the understanding of histo¬
ry, that one can understand the nature and evolution of hu-
12 W. Langer, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 202-205.
13 See G.B.Vico, The New Science of Giambattista Vico,
trans., T.G. Bergin and M.H. Fisch. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1948.
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man society, and thus better be able to change it. It is
through the works that men produce, such as the laws, liter¬
ature and other intellectual activities that we can under¬
stand man himself. Every theory Vico says " must start from
the point where the matter of which it treats first began to
take shape ".
In planning likewise, many Utopian thoughts emerged
as discussed earlier, to reform men, founded upon the phi¬
losophy of reason and humanity, seeking justice and welfare
for the community, with individual liberties subsumed in the
greater good. But all these had little effect in moulding
the practice of city planning, except in further entrenching
the scientific paradigm in almost all activities of men.
2.3 NATURALISM AND LIBERALISM
The Romantic period (19th century) that followed the
Enlightenment brought about a distinct shift in intellectual
thought. It represented a reaction primarily against rigid
canons of reason and mathematical formality. It was prima¬
rily a reaction against classical beliefs that moulded men
and nature in the idiom of natural order of regularity and
simplicity, and imposed that order on the conduct of man's
institutions and artifacts. It was a shift from society as
the prime focus to the individual and the place of the indi¬
vidual in society, nature and the universe.
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Inasmuch as the age of enlightenment was associated
with the rational individual, who voluntarily served the
common good, the romantic period sought to free man in pur¬
suit of his unique characteristics, and his individualism,
to seek new experiences and develop his feelings emphasizing
diversity in keeping with dictates of natural law. Hobbes
in Leviathan (1651) however perceived human nature differ¬
ently. According to Hobbes "it is war of all against all" -
the state of nature is a state of war, that can be brought
under submission only through contract and through planning
- contract of absolute submission and planning to safeguard
individual interests.14 Such contractual arrangements dif¬
ferentiate the individual from the society in the first in¬
stance, and then subjugates the individual in society as a
consequence. These various arrangements are more of a ra¬
tional gymnastics than a serious attempt at understanding
the individual as an entity and as part of the natural sys¬
tem.
The search for universally valid standards based on
truth in Nature, (Nature being right reason and men being
part of nature) was being slowly replaced by new idioms such
as "beauty without order" or "beauty in irregularity". The
Romantics sought to free themselves in search of freer
thought and freer actions. They stressed idealism, creative
freedom derived not through reason alone, but through self
14 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. Harmondsworth. Penguin
Books, 1976.
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fullfilment and human will. They sought to escape from the
industrial urban order and all it represented, to seek ref¬
uge in nature, in rural experiences.
"Return to Nature" became the rallying call. To imi¬
tate nature was to understand the free forms of nature, its
richness, its diversity and its complexity, removed from the
classical pursuits of symmetry and order, grounded in exact
mathematical proportions. "To want simplicity was to fail
in conformity with nature".15 It also meant to fail in un¬
derstanding nature. Irregularity was becoming the new vir¬
tue. Chaos now implied order misunderstood. Although, Pope
(1688-1744) believed that it was possible through science to
reveal the unity of nature, he also maintained that nature
was indeed complex and was governed by its own laws and be¬
haviour. In his "Essay on Man, Epistle 1", he expresses
these sympathies most eloquently.
"All nature is but art unknown to thee All chance,
direction thou canst not see, All discord, harmony
not understood; All partial evil, universal good
And, spite of pride, in erring reason's spite, One
truth is clear, whatever is, is right."16
In the affairs of men, Romanticism is epitomized in
works of Rousseau (1712-1778), a member of the Encyclope¬
dists of the Enlightenment era. Not because of "back to na¬
ture" or "the noble savage" ideas incorrectly attributed to
15 A.o. Lovejoy, Essays in the Hi story of Ideas. New York:
G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1960, p. 143.
16 Alexander Pope, Essay on Man, Epistle I, in Collected
Poems. London: Everyman's Library, 1975. p.189.
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him, but for the new idealism, new freedom and new pursuits
in restructuring men and society.
Perhaps one of the earliest theoretical constructs
that planning meant - restructuring society - is found in
Rousseau's book, Piscourse on the Arts and Science (1750).
In this book he argues that man is inherently good by na¬
ture, but corrupted by science and learning the "social
graces". In two subsequent famous treatises he expanded on
this idealism. In Emile (1762), he proposed to reverse the
entire educational system prevalent, by simply relegating
reason to the last faculty to be developed, and letting the
child grow in accordance to its own nature in a rural set¬
ting. Likewise in his Du Contrat Social (1762) he put for¬
ward a model for an Utopian society. A good society he ar¬
gued, is one in which the individual makes the laws he obeys
and as well assumes responsibility for them. It is "the du¬
ties of man and needs of nature" that are important. It is
the individual in society that constitutes the society; it
is the active participation of the individual in the affairs
of the society, in pursuit of the "General Will" that would
eventually endow the common man with powers to dictate and
create laws. "Consent" as the basis to govern and "con¬
tract" as a basis to safeguard the rights of the individual,
constituted essential elements in human conduct, according
to Rousseau.17
17 See J.J. Rousseau, Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts,
Paris, 1750.
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The roots to some of these Romantic beliefs are
derived from the Eastern ideas that became popular in Europe
in the 18th and 19th century. Eastern thought generally
perceived nature in its varied complexity, richness and in¬
tricacies. The word "sharawadgi", for example, is quite
unique to Chinese thought, with no equivalent in English.
It represents the idea of feeling, of surprises of excite¬
ment wherein nature is understood as a phenomenon that is
ever changing and manifesting itself in many surprising and
unique forms, as a "quality of being impressive or surpris¬
ing through careless and unorderly grace."18
Two basic themes emerge from Eastern schools of
thought - "unity" and "interrelatedness" among the various
phenomena in the natural system. These constructs are not in
any ordered form, but in a dynamic transcedent form. In Hin¬
duism, the unity is represented in the Vedic triad of "Kar¬
ma, Moksa and Samsara"; Karma meaning release from the laws
of cosmic forces; Moksa, is attaining the eventual freedom
(liberation) and deliverance, and Samsara, is the cycle of
transmigration, the process of change and eventual unity.
This is done by understanding and obeying the creative forc¬
es of life, the surprises of life which are seen as positive
elements. Zen likewise sees unity and interrelationships as
the one and same phenomenon. Man is perceived as an inte¬
gral part of the universe, whose basic principle is relativ-
18 See A.O. Lovejoy, Essays in the History of Ideas, New
York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1960, pp. 75-143.
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ity with no end or purpose to be attained. The search for
"Nirvana" in Buddhism, implies the existence of "Samsara".
The real "Nirvana" in other words cannot be desired, in as
much as "Moksa" cannot be a goal, simply because neither can
be conceived, a priori. A saying in Zen epitomizes these
thoughts best:
When one looks at it, one cannot see it? When one
listens for it, one cannot hear it. However, when
one uses it, it is inexhaustible.19
Such beliefs tend to present the natural system in
quite a different perspective - for one thing it is devoid
of any ordering or formalization to a set of rules conceived
by men.
The Romantic period infuenced not only Art, but Po¬
etry, Literature, Architecture, Landscape Architecture and
City Planning. It gave city planning a new idealism and re¬
lease from the constraints of the scientific paradigm. City
was returned to nature by way of parks, gardens and boule¬
vards, now often interspersed randomly to create surprises,
excitement and grand vistas. These parks and meadows were
treasured for their spiritual value as places for simple
virtues and pleasures and represented a positive attempt at
restoring the balance between the city dwellers and nature.
Frederick Law Olmsted (1822-1903) the father of this land¬
scape movement saw urban parks as indispensible for the sur-
1 9
Nancy Wilson Ross, Three Ways of Asian Wisdom. New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1966, p. 188.
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vival of the urban civilization. It would seem, however,
that unlike other arts, planning failed to capture the op¬
portunity to its fullest benefit. Here was an opportunity
for a new paradigm, a paradigm that could guide planning to¬
wards greater harmony with nature, that advocated the great¬
er use of commonsense. To plan with nature in essence meant
commonsense planning, at least to the Romantic naturalists.
It was an opportunity to reinstate the individual, to reins¬
tate humanism in city building.
Romanticism was arguably an escape, an escape from
the rigid cannons of science and technology that had threat¬
ened the survival of individual, of human feelings, and of
human freedom, all in the name of reason.
2.4 SCIENCE OF SOCIETY
2.4.1 POSITIVISM
One of the important schools of thought that had
some of its roots in the Enlightenment discourse discussed
earlier was Positivism. The Positivist philosophy was based
on the certainties of science and rejected anything in the
domain of metaphysics - to them, observable phenomenon con¬
stituted knowledge. One of the factors, they argued, that
determines true knowledge is practicability, the instrumen¬
tal utility of science. Two perspectives eminated from this
particular school of thought. The Mechanistic model follow¬
ing Comte (1798-1857) known as the French School that pic-
tured the world as an ordered, static, and deterministic
system; and the Organismic model, the German School follow¬
ing Hegel (1770-1831) that saw the world as a dynamic grow¬
ing and changing system.20
Saint-Simon (1760-1825) and Auguste Comte were the
two earliest exponents of the French school of Positivism or
the naturalist science of society called rational sociology
(a word Comte coined meaning science of society or social
physics). It represented the earliest attempts at quantify¬
ing and analysing society in scientific idiom with maximum
objectivity. They believed that social development could
indeed be guided by rational principles and that functional
antagonism could in the end be replaced by perfect equilib¬
rium.
The Enlightenment, the Positivist argued, had not
succeeded and the Romantics on the other hand, created chaos
and anarchy in society. There was a need for a new intel¬
lectual basis founded on the principles of science - science
they maintained was necessary and can provide the needed in¬
struments for order and progress for moral and social life.
The laws of social physics could guide society and identify
changes as and when needed. Principles of sociology or sci¬
ence of society would in the end dominate. It was an at-
20 Hegel and Comte were once considered the exponents of so¬
ciology. Hegel from the German Romantic school was dia¬
lectical and rational while Comte from the French En¬
lightenment was empirical and anti metaphysical.
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tempt at a comprehensive look at supposedly objective facts
in the idiom of scientific method.
Comte distinguished three stages of human develop¬
ment, namely the 'religious', the 'metaphysical' and the
last and the most productive, the "scientific". It was
through the last stage of development, according to Comte,
that any positive contributions to the problems of man and
nature could be realized. For Comte, knowledge meant pre¬
diction, to know was to foresee. It was a mechanistic model
that couched human behaviour in the mould of science and
technology, to analyse and organize for a purpose.
These two principal schools of thought the Mechanis¬
tic, and the Organismic schools, saw their fusion in the
works of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) and in the works of
Charles Darwin (1809-1882). Spencer believed in scientific
unity - the "Synthetic Philosophy", in the evolution, in
growth through increasing differentiation and integration.
He differentiated between commonsense knowledge and scien¬
tific knowledge and believed that the natural universe was
governed by both physical laws and by social phenomena. His
view of the society was one of organism - self generating
and evolving rather than mechanistic, and static.21 Dar¬
win's, The Origin of the Species (1859) fused the mechanis¬
tic and organistic world views into an evolutionary perspec-
21 See Russell Keat and John Urry. Social Theory as Sci¬
ence . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975. pp. 71-95.
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tive of growth and change, involving survival of the
fittest.22 Darwin perceived growth and change as a series of
adaptations, as an organizing, differentiating, and ordering
principle, what he called a process of "natural selection".
Another important social theorist in the Positivist
school of thought was Emiie Durkheim (1858-1917). He was a
functionalist and a naturalist who borrowed from the biolo¬
gical sciences in formulating his theories about society as
an organism. He believed that human behaviour could be
studied using methods and procedures of natural sciences,
examining cause and effect relationships. Durkheim's main
preoccupation was to develop a genuine science of society
and thus provide a guide for social action.
These intellectual developments no doubt influenced
planning thought. Analogical similarities between growth of
animals and city as an organism began to emerge. Patrick
Geddes (1854-1932), a biologist and town planner, talked
about the city as an organism, as a living entity in con¬
stant state of evolution and growth. Frank Lloyd Wright
(1869-1959), a foremost architect of this century, wrote on
"Living City" and on "Organic Architecture", to bring natu¬
ral form to architecture and the cities, by drawing inspira¬
tions from nature herself. Bruno Zevi in Towards an Organic
Architecture (1950), argued for organic architecture as
22 See Charles Darwin, The Origin of the Species. London:
Collier- Macmillan Ltd., 1967.
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against classical architecture which he maintained
represented an obsession with ideal forms at the expense of
change and function. Such ideas captured the imagination of
architects and planners, who rushed to apply biological
analogies to almost all aspects of city planning, and city
as a living entity became firmly rooted in planning thought.
2.4.2 LOGICAL POSITIVISM
The other important school of thought with similar
roots, that influenced planning is the school of Logical Po¬
sitivism which was eventually replaced by the Hypothetico-
Deductive Method and later the School of Pragmatism.
The School of Logical Positivism centered around the
Vienna Circle in late 1920* s and was associated with such
men as Ernst Mach, Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, A.J.Ayer,
et al., and had its roots in the ideas of David Hume and the
British Empiricists School. The main thesis of this School
of thought was that philosophy is not a doctrine but an ac¬
tivity and it is not a theory but an analytical method whose
function is not to formulate propositions but to explain
them. They were reponsible for formulating the 'principle
of verificability', that is 'the meaning of a proposition
consists in its method of verification'.
The positivist maintained that science was a ration¬
al, objective and empirically based activity, the aim of
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which was to explain and predict phenomenon in nature.
Philosophical propositions they argued were either analytic
or synthetic but not both. By analytic they meant "state¬
ments of formal logic" and by synthetic, they meant "state¬
ments of science", based on empirical evidence. All other
propositions were not knowledge. They rejected metaphysics,
psychology and deductive methods and believed that true
knowledge can only be obtained by observing phenomenon and
by understanding their interrelationships. Arguments based
on intuition or revelation was immaterial because they were
outside the realm of observation and experience. Metaphysi¬
cal positions they argued were products of meaningless com¬
binations of words, and as such did not constitute legiti¬
mate knowledge.
All knowledge according to the Positivist is then
ultimately derived from two important sources:
1. sense-experience.
2. logical analysis of language.
The Positivist generally rejected the notion of in¬
terrelating facts and values, since the latter were not de¬
rivatives of either sense experience or logical analysis.
Such knowledge could not therefore be subjected to the can¬
ons of scientific examination that required a rational pro¬
cedure for testing a hypothesis and either accepting it or
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rejecting it.23
Wittgenstein's "verifiability principle" which
states that the meaning of a proposition is in the method of
its verification, was adopted by the Logical Positivists in
their theoretical formulation. A.J.Ayer likewise noted that
if a proposition could not be verified empirically, it was
of little use, meant nothing or became a tautological propo¬
sition. These conditions rendered all theories based on sub¬
jective discourse or that could not be subjected to empiri¬
cal tests such as theories in morality, law, politics or
social theories, essentially useless. The movement however
lost its drive and by the 1930's the Circle had disintegrat¬
ed. It was nonetheless a bold attempt at unifying the sci¬
ences and eliminating metaphysical beliefs.
Karl Popper rejected this verifiability theory and
replaced it with "falsifiability criterion". Popper argued
that scientific theories are not derived through inductive
processes but through the creative process of imagination.
A theory cannot, therefore, be confirmed for truth, but can
only be subjected to falsification. A theory in other words
can only be proven false, but never true.
With the abuses of capitalism, the decay of the so¬
cial consciousness, exploitation and waste of the natural
resources, the wanton pursuits of the leisure class, excel-
23 See Richard Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and
Political Theory London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1979.
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lently portrayed by Veblen (1857-1929), there appeared a
shift from the rigid positivist thought.2" William James
(1842-1910), one of the intellectual forces of Pragmatism ,
recognizing the need to curtail the abuses, felt the neces¬
sity to establish certain positive controls, to direct soci¬
ety's energies in more constructive way, and as a result,
"positivism" gave way to "pragmatism".
Pragmatism enunciated by Charles Peirce (1839-1914)
was reformulated by William James and later developed by
John Dewey (1859-1952), both of whom contended, that knowl¬
edge was simply an instrument for action and that its valid¬
ity was based simply on function of its utility. A similar
argument was also enunciated earlier by F.S. Schiller
(1759-1805). Pragmatism as a philosophy attempted to har¬
monize morals with science and values, with experience and
intelligent action.
Schiller maintained that the "incomprehensibility"
of nature is a given, and that the "environment" is unknowa¬
ble. Our beliefs about nature are heuristic - that is we
continuously attempt to discover and interpret the world we
live in, and it is based on our beliefs, and on the viabili¬
ty and plausability of our perception. In other words the
world view is "made" and not "discovered", he maintained.
24 See T. Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class. New
York: Mentor Books, 1953.
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W. James argued that what was important and what in¬
deed mattered was experienced facts and results of actions.
It was the practical validity of knowledge that in the end
provided the testing ground. The truth is in the value,
usefulness and workability of any action or intellectual
thought. An idea or action is considered true and valid,
that is, it is good if it is useful. Dewey reformulated the
philosophy of pragmatism into "Instrumentalism", which he
noted as "a theory of general forms of conception and rea¬
soning". As a theory of logic and as a guiding principle
for ethical judgement, knowledge constituted power, and
truth constituted usefulness.
Instrumentalism was an attempt at reconstructing
philosophy into an instrument of conscious and deliberate
action toward improving human lives by modifying human be¬
haviour. Dewey believed that if these experimental methods
in philosophy were applied to pressing social and political
problems, a mere social change achieved gratuitously could
be transformed into consciously created and directed social
improvements. In other words it was a philosophy of action
and kind of user oriented planning.
The myth of objectivity is increasingly being chal¬
lenged and is slowly eroding. It is argued, that by employ¬
ing scientific methods, problems cannot be understood in
their true nature, nor can problems be viewed in their to¬
tality. Beginning with preconceived ideas and with errone-
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ous assumptions interposing themselves, the process of un¬
derstanding is often stultified, which in turn nullifies the
inquiry resulting in wrong or unrelated answers or solu¬
tions.
Roger Poole maintains that there are three major ob¬
jections to objectivity -
1. A tenacious and unquestioning grasp of the so called
'facts', represented by data and analysis of data.
2. A refusal to justify or even make public the actions
and decisions it arrives at.
3. A preoccupation with parts, often at the expense of
the whole.
This myth of objectivity associated with the scien¬
tific method did to an extent legitimize planning action and
absolved the planner of any responsibility for any planning
decisions.25 It gave planning a degree of credibility and
endowned it with a mantle of truth. Ouspensky suggests that
it is evident from scientific observations "that the seeming
rationality of human actions is an illusion and a self-de¬
ception". Man is an instrument of the natural forces, and
goes on to say that:
"Man does not perform a single action by himself.
He is merely a prism in which a line of action is
refracted in a certain manner. But just as the
beam of light does not proceed from the prism, so
25 Roger Poole, Towards Deep Subjectivity. New York: Har¬
per & Row Publishers, 1972, p. 46.
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action does not proceed from the reason of man".26
Reade on the other hand suggests that it is a con¬
tradiction and sociological naivity to believe that a plan¬
ner can be objective or neutral by merely responding to the
wishes of the public, or that one can indeed be value-free
and argues that
"...if planning movement is to have any role in
society, it must have the modesty to compete, as a
value system, with the other value systems..".27
In other words planning has to recognize the inherent bias
of the planner that will inevitably influence planning ac¬
tions, that planning is in fact an ethic, and a value-based
activity. A shift is now occurring away from the strict
traditional Positivist philosophy derived from the natural
science, toward a more Behaviouralist theory, that attempts
to study man from the pattern of his behaviour. It is based
on the belief that society can, in fact, be studied outside
the realm of natural sciences.
26 P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Orqanum. New York: Vintage
Books, 1970. p. 156.
27 Eric Reade, 'Contradictions in Planning'. Official Ar¬
chitecture and Planning Journal. Vol. 32, No. 10, Oct.
1969. pp. 1179-1185.
2.5 UTILITARIANISM, EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY
In as much as the Age of Enlightenment sought to de¬
termine human action through reason, (man being a rational
animal) and the Romantics displaced it with feelings as be¬
ing more akin to human nature, they did together, bring
about a new synthesis as a guide to human action.
The concept of "utility", particularly "marginal
utility"26 (rather than total utility"), was a key idea in
the late 19th century economic thought. It presented a more
comprehensive understanding of the workings of the competi¬
tive economics. It was a concept capable of not only influ¬
encing value but also of assigning value as a sole conse¬
quence of utility. In other words, the utility of a
commodity was directly related to its exchange value. Man
as a rational economic man would thus attempt to maximize
his utility factor, increase his pleasure and reduce his
pain. The Utilitarians sought a guide to action in the
"felicific calculus", a quantitative method (devised by
Bentham) of assigning values to pleasure-pain factors.
The philosophy of utilitarianism states that the de¬
termination of an action as right or wrong should be based
on the criterion of whether the consequences of such 'ac¬
tions' maximize the utility function and lead to "goodness"
or "badness". It was also called "act-utilitarianism" as
28 Marginal utility is the minimum level of utility below
which activity is not profitable.
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distinct from "rule-utilitarianism".29 The emphasis of the
utilitarians was in actions. It was the kinds of effects of
an action that, in the end, determined between right and
wrong decisions. This school of thought eminated originally
from Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) and was later enunciated
by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), J.S. Mill (1806-73) and Henry
Sidgwick (1838-1900). It is based on the belief that man
attempts to maximize pleasure and minimize pain in the pur¬
suit of happiness.
Thus, it is assumed that only those actions which
provoke general happiness are good, that those which engen¬
der the greatest good for the greatest number constitutes
right or good decision, and that in the process "quantity"
becomes "quality" and "majority" opinion constitutes
"right". Man is valued not for his intrinsic qualities but
for the worth in terms of his contributions and usefulness
to society. Inasmuch as it provided a rational guide and a
justification to human action, it also proved to be, in ef¬
fect, inconsistent in its purpose, and end results.
What constitutes good reason for action, and how the
utility of consequences are, in the end, to be determined,
remained some of the puzzling questions.
29 Distinction between "Act-Utilitarianism and Rule-Utilita¬
rianism is dependent on whether it is the consequence of
an action that determines the Tightness or wrongness or
whether it is based on the consequence of adopting some
general rule of action.
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The Utilitarians saw themselves as the guardians of
public good and they thought they could enforce it through
the powers of reason and legislation. This approach, of
course was not new; it was derived from other moralists such
as the social reformers, Utopian socialists, philanthrophic
experimenters and many of the evangelical movements, who
were coerced more by economic exigencies than by moral con¬
science.
Two schools of thought emerged. The "egoistic"
utilitarians believed that it was the duty of each individu¬
al to maximize his own utility, while the "universalistic"
utilitarians saw it as an individual's duty to maximize
everyone's utility as a benefit to others.
To deal with the dichotomy between individual happi¬
ness and general happiness, the Utilitarians proposed state
intervention through legislation to safeguard the public in¬
terest and constrain abuses in individual freedom. In fact,
to ensure that individual freedom coincides with public in¬
terest - and thus the public good - state interest thus be¬
came the public interest. Likewise "Efficiency and Equity",
the two concepts that saw their greatest adherants in the
Utilitarians and were so commonly used in city planning, be¬
came also the very mechanisms for the laissez-faire capital¬
ist economy. They were simply techniques, designed to organ¬
ize and order the urban morphology more efficiently and more
equitably. Efficiency meant essentially physical efficien-
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cy, using least energy and doing things more economically in
terms of costs and benefits, and equity meant greater utili¬
ty or usefullness of the individual in the society, and more
parsimonious distribution of goods and services.30
The impact of this doctrine, perhaps the first ethi¬
cal imprimatur for planning, was very significant,31 partic¬
ularly since the milieu of the time was characterized by the
failure of laissez-faire, and the negative effects of the
industrial revolution, which included poor housing condi¬
tions, rampant inequities, squalor, poverty and other ills
that plagued the city. This was viewed as being offensive
to human sensibilities and more importantly offensive to
reason, and to the rational economic man.
As a result, efficiency and pursuit of technical so¬
lutions as an extension of design determinism, provided the
new lexicon for planning and a new mandate, legitimizing its
function. The concepts of 'amenity' and 'progress' as well,
30 The concept of efficiency is also tied to the notion of
"vitalism", discussed in Chapter IV. Two meanings of ef¬
ficiency were posited. One is, an efficient machine that
converts the maximum of its energy into output of work
done, with least waste, while the other is more in an
utilitiarian sense which believes that a most efficient
machine is one that produces maximum output for least in¬
put .
31 The principle of utility became the basis of planning
legislation in Victorian Britain, beginning with the
planning legislation of 1912. But utilitarian planning
meant economic efficiency, majority opinion, right deci¬
sion and fairness. These variety of meanings evolved be¬
cause the term Utilitarianism was never well understood
nor meaningfully applied in city planning.
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made their way into planning vocabulary. An "amenity" was
something providing a good and healthy environment, and di¬
rected towards improving the quality of life while "prog¬
ress" was viewed as an inevitable requirement and meant any¬
thing that contributed to the public good. Although naive,
such postulations strongly affected planning practice.
Technical solutions from a rigid scientific paradigm were
put forward as answers to many urban ills. Slums, poverty,
unsanitary conditions, overcrowding, could be eradicated
through good aesthetics and efficient design and the social
and moral problems plaguing the city could be solved. By
creating well-planned urban surroundings, happy and healthy
homes could be made available to the poor. Social interc¬
ourse thus would be facilitated and economic and social ef¬
ficiency would be enhanced and general happiness would en¬
sue .
In practice however, technical solutions created
more problems than they solved. First, there was no consen¬
sus on the nature of happiness, nor what constituted prog¬
ress, that the many city plans were advocating. Neither was
it possible to determine whether it was individual actions
or aggregate actions that in the end were important. Nor
was it possible to determine how much pleasure or pain a
particular action might cause, and how these consequences
might be distributed. Most importantly, however, the prin¬
ciple of utility was not consistent with the principle of
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justice, particularly social justice or distributive jus¬
tice. What was needed was an ethical guide, that could op¬
erate, within the ambit of principles of justice, indepen¬
dent of the principles of utility which are by their very
nature, consequence and action dependent.
Welfare economics or the contractual theory of dis¬
tributive justice put forward by Rawls (1971), the theory of
entitlement enunciated by Nozick (1973), or the theory of
fairness by Varian (1974), attempted to address this dilem¬
ma. The welfare economics of the Utilitarian version re¬
mains vague inasmuch as it fails to address basic normative
questions such as the choice of the social welfare function.
Rawls' theory of justice attempts to redress these limita¬
tions in the distribution of welfare functions by seeking to
distribute both the positive and the negative effects of ac¬
tions.32 Nozick is critical of both these theories on the
grounds that they are concerned with present time only, and
ignore the procedural aspects - they are he argues "ahistor-
ical". Nozick suggests a procedural theory, in which the
means used to distribute justice become of critical impor¬
tance.
Varian's theory of fairness, on the other hand, is
based on what he calls "extended sympathy" for the fairness
or equity in the distribution of goods and services. Thus he
32 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford
University press, 1971.
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says that both equity and efficiency are necessary
ingredients and it is possible to have these properties in
the allocation of the welfare functions.33
An early critic of Utilitarianism was Nietzsche
(1844-1900) who disagreed with the Utilitarians on the
grounds that he believed that some people were inherently
more important than others and therefore could not be equat¬
ed with one unit of happiness per person - as the utilitari¬
an calculus posits. If the utility of the individual is im¬
portant to the state, his unit of happiness should measure
accordingly. This ofcourse implies discrimination by utili¬
ty function.
More recently, Kenneth Arrow questioned if it is
possible for collective choice to emanate from individual
preferences.34 In presenting his alternative called "ordinal
utilitarianism", Arrow argued that the individual plays a
central role in selecting his social choice from among al¬
ternatives. He uses his own preference or ordering system
which, in fact, constitutes his value system, whether based
on altruistic or selfish motives. The problem, however, is
how to amalgamate a personal preference ordering system into
33 Hal R. Varian, "Distributive Justice, Welfare Economics,
and The Theory of Fairness" in Philosophy and Economic
Theory. ed., F. Hahn & M. Hollis. Oxford: Oxford Uni¬
versity Press, 1979. see also Robert Nozick. "Distribu¬
tive Justice". Philosophy and Public Affairs. 3 No. 1,
1973. pp. 45-126.
34 See Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values.
New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1951.
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social welfare ordering for the benefit of both. This to
him constituted the "impossibility theorem".
One of the important questions that arises is how to
determine the resources allocation that would be socially
optimal. This, it is suggested, can be achieved only through
consensus or dictatorial rule. It has been argued for exam¬
ple that "Pareto Optimality", enunciated by Wilfred Pareto
(1848-1923), is not adequate, - since the conditions under
which a welfare maximum can be achieved, only occurs when a
shift or increment in welfare functions accruing to an indi¬
vidual does not cause a decrease in welfare function to an¬
other individual. This would constitute an optimal condi¬
tion. But since individuals cannot be made better off
without someone else being made worse off, such a proposi¬
tion is not very useful. Although the gains under the Pare-
to-Optimality measure are, by definition, greater than the
costs involved, the number of people who will gain from such
measures would be less than the number of people who stand
to lose. Sen argues further about the "Impossibility of a
Paretian Liberal",35 wherein he maintains that the condi¬
tions necessary for Pareto Optimality are impossible in lib¬
eralism where a social decision function is a collective
choice. The simple majority rule is limited both theoreti-
35 Amartya Sen, "The Impossibility of Paretian Liberal" in
Philosophy and Economic Theory, ed. F. Hahn and N. Hol-
lis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979. pp.
127-133.
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cally as well as practically.36 Further, Arrow37 maintains
that it is impossible in fact to distribute social welfare
in a way in which one desires, that is in the way in which
it can satisfy five desirable axioms:38
1. "complete ordering" - assumes social preferences must
be fully ordered in a way in which it satisfies all
the conditions of completeness, reflexivity and tran¬
sitivity;
2. "responsiveness to individual preferences" - assumes
that given a set of individual preferences A is so¬
cially preferred over B. This axiom would easily be
violated if the society discriminates against a cer¬
tain group for example;
3. "Non imposition" - restricts any imposition of social
preference on an individual preference;
4. "Nondictatorial" - an axiom that is self explanatory,
that an individual preference should not constitute
social preference; and
5. "Independence of irrelevant alternatives" - assumes
that given a set of alternatives A B & C, society
prefers A immaterial of B or C - even if C was not
available A would still be preferred.
36 See D.H. Vinch, Analytical Welfare Economics. Harmonds-
worth: Penguin Books, 1971. pp. 115-202.
37 Kenneth Arrow, op.cit.
38 Most of the information on the five points that follow is
taken from James M. Henderson and Richard Quandt, Micro-
Economic Theory. N.Y: McGraw Hill, 1980. pp. 308-321.
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Such diverse and conflicting intellectual discourse
does not in fact help planners. The planner is still left in
suspense dependent on mere numbers, on "felicific calculus",
to define a simple majority, and to legitimize his actions
as qualitatively good and as quantitatively right. Effi¬
ciency and equity, provide technical justification in terms
of benefits outweighing costs and as an action whose ben¬
efits will serve the majority good. But such tenets leave
out the oppressed minority whose interests are considered
wrong because they do not represent the majority interests.
2.6 LINGUISTIC THEORY, STRUCTURALISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY
"Knowledge of Language results from the interplay of
initially given structures of mind, maturational processes
and interaction with the environment", wrote Chomsky.39 He
talks about grammar of language and grammar of vision in in¬
terpreting the world or in organizing the various systems of
knowledge and beliefs. Wittgenstein likewise argued that a
word has meaning only inasmuch as someone has imputed a
meaning to the word.40 Semantics says Leech is central to
the study of communication as well as to the study of human
mind - 'thought processes, cognition, conceptualization -
all these are intricately bound up with the way in which we
39 See Noam Chomsky, Problems of Knowledge and Freedom.
London: Fontana Books, 1975. p. 26.
40 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books. London: Har¬
per & Row, 1958. p. 28.
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classify and convey our experience of the world through
language'.41 We are aware that there is a distinction be¬
tween the real world and the world of language. In our at¬
tempt to communicate our perception we might be resorting
for example to all the seven types of meanings that Leech
distinguishes,42 thus adding further to the complexity of
interpretation. However one might look at it, there is a
great deal of difference between understanding nature and
understanding society, particularly if both are perceived in
the language of the natural sciences since they are logic¬
ally incompatible.
The great linguist Ferdinand ae Saussure43
(1857-1913), in the series of lectures he delivered at the
University of Geneva (1907-1911) distinguished between 'syn¬
chronic' view of language, the system of language in its
present state, and the 'diachronic' or the historical view
of the language. For Saussure a word represents form rather
than substance and words constitute a system of relations,
41 Geoffrey Leech, Semantics. Harmondsworth: Penguin
Books, 1976. Introduction p. IX. (Semantics is the
study of the meaning of language and linguistics is the
scientific study of language.)
42 Leech distinguishes seven types of meanings namely: Con¬
ceptual meaning (sometimes known as 'denotative' or 'cog¬
nitive' meaning); connotative meaning; stylistic meaning;
effective meaning; reflected meaning; collocative meaning
and thematic meaning. These are discussed in his book,
and provide very useful insights in the context of mean¬
ings.
43 See Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics.
Trans. Wade Baskin, London: Fontana, 1974.
69
the understanding of which comes only through recognition
and differentials.44 The semiologists (theory of signs and
symbols developed by the European followers of Ferdinand de
Saussure), adopted an extreme rationalist position in con¬
ceptualizing the relationship between the world of ideas and
the real world by simply ignoring 'external objects' alto¬
gether in defining the real world.45
There is no denying that inasmuch as language poses
limitations in the interpretation of the external world, the
real world with its ephemeral characteristics, poses limita¬
tions in the constructs of man's internal perception of the
world. If we follow Descartes' dictum we could construct a
'true' model of the universe in our senses by simply follow¬
ing rational and logical argumentation. For Descarte, think¬
ing was linked to acting. But such, it is argued, is not
the real world - only a construct of the mind.
In an article in L'Architecture d'Aujourdhui (June/
July, 1967), Francoise Choay introduced the theory of sem¬
iology (science of signs) in planning. In "Urbanism and
Semiology"46 Choay contends that language intercepts between
man and his product in a kind of a reflexive relationship.
44 Jonathan Culler, Saussure. London: Fontana, 1976.
45 Edmund Leech, Culture and Communication. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 17.
46 Francoise Choay, "Urbanism and Semiology" in Meaning in
Architecture, ed. C. Jencks and George Baird. London:
Barrie and Jenkins, 1970.
70
She views the urban environment as a semiological system and
as such she argues that it can be studied using the methods
of general linguistics. This could help in eliminating
pseudo-problems from the real and the more current problems
of city planning. It can help define the problem in context
of the kind and amount of knowledge necessary to resolve it.
Wittgenstein (1889-1951), maintained that language
was only one form of culture, and that it helped shape our
perception of what reality is all about. It has its own
rules of behaviour (grammatical rules Wittgenstein main¬
tained were similar to rules of behaviour) and cultural
identity. The meaning of a word is therefore in its use and
there can be as many languages as there are forms of behav¬
iour. All truths of logic according to Wittgenstein are
tautological, wherein the contradiction is self-contradicto¬
ry in that they are analytical. The most important charac¬
teristic of a proposition, according to Wittgenstein, is
that it can be either true or false. It is true only if it
exists in the real world and if it can be empirically veri¬
fied. Language is a picture of facts and not of things
since the world represents a totality of facts and not of
things. The study of meaning thus becomes more important
than the study of truth since meaning is attributed to facts
and not to truth. It is like a "language game" where in,
the use of language is subjected to certain rules that must
be observed and certain restrictions within which the game
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can be played. 4 7
We must also recognize the fact that the logic of
rationality - the classical paradigm of knowledge used in
planning - is determined and constrained by the capacity of
grammar and language, which provide the framework for our
thinking and reasoning activity. It needs reason for its
justification. What we are looking for, therefore, is not
grammar or vocabulary but syntax - that is the way in which
images or thoughts are constructed in our mind, and the way
in which we interpret problems and create solutions. Mind
is a system of organizing principles according to Chomsky.
"Historically, symbolic logic has, in part, arisen
through philosophers', gradual discovery, that the
syntactic structures of language reflect only im¬
perfectly or indirectly the underlying structures
of meaning. Logicians have, therefore, seen an
advantage in abandoning ordinary language in fav¬
our of an artificial mathematical notation or
'calculus' which bears the same sort of relation¬
ship to speech and thinking, as the language of
arithmetic and algebra bears to ordinary English
utterances about numbers".46
Logic is very much a constructed language, purpose
made, and is amenable only to a fixed mode of thought or
structure. According to Henri Bergson, logic is simply a
convenient technique for dealing with experience. It cannot
describe reality in totality. The basic difference between
ordinary language (semantic structure) and the more formal-
47 See L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Loqico-Philosophicus.
London: Routledge and Regan Paul. 1961.
46 Geoffrey Leech, Semantics. Harmondsworth Penguin Books,
1976, p. 157.
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ized language of the logician (syntactic structure) is that
the former has the greater ability to describe reality which
comes closest to truth. Leech suggests that they each rep¬
resent a distinct level of representation. The objective of
both modes of expression is indeed to describe the reality
as well as possible. While the syntactic structure attempts
to order our perception of reality in formal logical sense,
the semantic structure attempts simply to describe the per¬
ception.49 Language says Chafe is a "system which mediates,
in a highly complex way, between the universe of meaning and
the universe of sound".50
Structuralist like Levi-Strauss in Anthropology and
Chomsky in Linguistics maintain that in order to understand
an idea or cultural phenomena, it is important first to un¬
derstand the underlying structures (deep structures as Chom¬
sky calls them) that might not always be directly observ¬
able. It is also important to study these ideas, they argue,
in their own terms, devoid of any conventional presupposi¬
tions or meanings that are imputed to them and are generally
derived from other cultures and beliefs. Such an approach
the Structuralist maintain helps unmask any false meanings
and begins to give new awareness and new insights into their
real nature and to the processes that affect our living en¬
vironment. Structuralism emphasizes form over content, ho-
49 Geoffrey Leech, op.cit. p. 201.
50 Wallace Chafe, Meaning and the Structure of Language.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, p. 15.
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lism over reductionism and underlying ideas over surface
structures.
In city planning, the role of language and the un¬
derstanding of the structures is very important. They help
shape planners' perception of reality, and define planning
problems, since recognizing and defining planning problems
is as important as solving them. Furthermore, the kinds of
solutions one posits are also a function of the language in
which the problem is defined and how close that definition
reflects reality. What is suggested is that the kind of
language one uses, whether "semantic" or "syntactic" will in
the end set the parameters for problem definition and solu¬
tion. But what is important at least in city planning prob¬
lems is not only the logical understanding in syntactic
structure of "how" and "why", but more importantly the
"what" of things. What is it that constitutes the problem?.
It is the definition of the problem that is critical.
To know 'what' of things is as important as to know
the 'how' of things. It is important in other words to un¬
derstand the meaning of things as much or more than simply
the workings of things or how things work. Phenomenologists
argued the need for experiencing, for constructing a belief,
based on direct experience. Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) who
first expounded the theory of phenomenology, defined pheno¬
menology as an interest in those things that can be directly
experienced by our senses, and distinguished between natural
74
sciences and human or social sciences. Natural sciences, he
maintained, can only deal with the science of the mind,
since mind is a construct of "meaning" and meaning can only
be understood subjectively. To understand human or social
sciences, he argued, we need to understand human behaviour
and in order to understand human behaviour, we need to un¬
derstand its meaning. Essentially, the theory of phenome¬
nology maintains that all knowledge is socially determined,
and peoples' beliefs and behaviours are based on taken-for-
granted assumptions about reality.51
Both Structuralism and Phenomenological theories
open new vistas and presents a new methodology, a methodolo¬
gy that is devoid of preconceived images or ideas. It puts
our traditional imaginations of the world in brackets to use
Husserl's phrase, and allows us to relearn to look at the
world, to generate new and genuine images rather than mere
repetitions of our past experiences. As Merleau-Ponty de¬
scribed the phenomenological experience as an experience in
which "perspectives blend, perceptions confirm each other
and a meaning emerges".52
51 See Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Con-
struction of Reality. New York: Doubleday Books, 1966.
52 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962.
Chapter III
THEORIES AND STYLES OF PLANNING
"The art of progress is to preserve order amid
change, and to preserve change amid order."
A.N. Whitehead.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
To date, debate on planning theories, has centered
around the distinction generally made between "theories for
or of planning" and "theories in planning". The former are
considered to be procedural or functional theories, dealing
with the methodological aspects and are applied and descrip¬
tive in nature. They generally addressed the "IS" aspects of
planning activity,- specifically, what planners do. The
latter theories, that is, "theories in planning", are con¬
sidered to be normative in nature, dealing with values and
ethical concerns of prescriptive planning. They generally
address the "Ought" aspects of planning activity, essential¬
ly what planners ought to do.1
1 For a detailed explanation see B. Harris, "The Limits of
Science and Humanism". JAIP., Vol. 23, 1967. pp. 324-325.
H.C. Hightower. "Planning Theory in Contemporary Profes¬
sional Planning Education." JAIP., Vol. 35, 1969, pp.
326-329; and A. Faludi. "The teaching of Planning Theo¬
ry", Conference at Oxford Polytechnic. Journal of Royal
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Likewise distinction is made between theories that
explain a phenomenon or conduct, and theories that describe
a situation or a problem. But such distinctions are of lit¬
tle use in dealing with planning issues. At best, they help
categorize or classify the activity in which planning engag¬
es: the means and ends, the goals and objectives of plan¬
ning, and the means of achieving them. But before attempt¬
ing a discourse on planning theories, it is best to gain an
understanding of what theories are and what their purpose
is.
Theory represents an abstraction of reality as it is
perceived. It is an explanation of a phenomenon, a body of
principles or propositions. A theory provides a point of
reference, a guide to our thinking, a context to relate and
organize knowledge in the field, and an organizing format
which facilitates testing and validating our knowledge.
Theories help formulate problems and assist in searching for
relevant information.
Brown distinguishes between three kinds of theories.
The first is based on the colloquial understanding of theory
as a proposition or explanation of a phenomenon which is un¬
tested and as such carries very little validity. The second
is based on principles or rules or propositions derived from
observations empirically tested, and which explain physical
phenomenon. These formal theories in turn can be subdivided
Town Planning Institute. Vol. 58, 1972, pp. 228-229.
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into two categories, one constitutes the construction of
calculi which can be transformed into empirical theories and
the other consists of empiricial theories which are suffi¬
ciently developed to admit formalization. The third kind of
theory is one used in the context of sets of procedural
rules or principles of classifications and have no explana¬
tory power.2 These represent the methodological and proce¬
dural theories designed essentially to answer the question
of 'how' rather than the question 'what'. It is in the pro¬
cedural - the 'how' theories - that planning has made most
progress, although perhaps at the expense of the more needed
normative theories.
In discussing the difference between theories in the
physical sciences and theories in the social sciences, Rap-
paport advances the following arguments:
"The trouble is that whereas a Newton could begin
with intuitively evident quantities (length as
measured by sticks, time as measured by clocks,
force as felt in the muscles), the social scien¬
tist cannot make such a beginning. The stuff from
which human relations and social structures are
made is not evident intuitively. It must somehow
be distilled, or abstracted from innumerable 'e-
vents' and the selection of these events depends
to a great extent on one's experiences, cultural
background and biases..."3
2 Robert Brown Explanation in Social Science. Chicago: Al-
dine Publishing Co., 1973, pp. 265-293.
3 A. Rappaport, "Uses and Limitations of Mathematical Mod¬
els in Social Science", L. Gross, ed., Symposium on So¬
ciological Theory. New York: Harper and Row. 1954. p.
351.
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Distinction must also be made between what is called
'general statements' and 'theories' as well as 'theory' and
'practice'. Gibson suggests that such distinction is very
important in social inquiry. In social sciences, Gibson
contends theories constitute a series of general statements
all interdependent.
"Any given statement can usually be deduced from
some combination of others, and if it itself is
taken in combination with others there are usually
further statements which can be deduced from it.
Because of these ramifications we often find that
we have at our disposal not single statements, but
sets or systems of statements logically intercon¬
nected in various complex ways. Such systems of
general statements are commonly spoken of as
'theories' ."
He clarifies the point further in a footnote "Any
general statements and in particular any law, may be called
a theory, in opposition to statements about particular
things and events, which are said to state facts".4 Accord¬
ing to Gibson the aim of the social scientist when perceived
in theoretical and practical context is not only to help ex¬
plain a phenomenon but also to produce changes. Thus theo¬
ries in the social sciences, he contends, must meet these
two basic requirements.5 This is analogous to planning in¬
tentions, which, as stated earlier, are not only to help ex¬
plain; but more importantly, are to help solve problems and
direct change. Theory needs to be descriptively realistic,
4 Quentin Gibson, The Logic of Social Enquiry. London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960, pp. 113-114.
5 Quentin Gibson, op.cit. 1960, pp. 197-198.
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and be a sufficiently good aproximation of the problem at
hand.
The principal aim of planning theories however
should be to construct general propositions or hypotheses
which can serve as instruments for the systematic explana¬
tion of urban phenomenon and resolution of urban problems.
In other words, planning theories must not only have expla¬
natory and predictive powers, but as Popper states they must
also be understood by others (even though not necessarily
accepted), and they must be theories that can lead to ac¬
tion. Most importantly planning theories must also reflect
reality more in its purpose than in the mere causal rela¬
tionships. Whether all these criterion can be satisfied by
planning theories or need be satisfied or whether such all-
encompassing theories are even possible, are some of the
questions that need to be resolved.
3.2 RATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING
3.2.1 RATIONAL PLANNING
The term rational is derived from the Latin "ratio"
meaning reason.It is a movement of ideas that pursues solu¬
tions to problems through a priori reasoning process. It was
believed particularly by the 18th., century Enlightenment
scholars that through this scientific inquiry and education,
indeed human happiness could be increased. Distinction
needs to be made however between "rationalism" and "empiri-
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cisra". The former uses the powers of reason while the later
depends on experience. It is the combination of both these
schools of thought that provided the basis for the "Rational
Planning Model.
The Rational Planning Model is the most commonly
used planning model, and is also known as the Rational Com¬
prehensive Planning or the Master Plan Model.
Lindblom maintains that the classical model of ra¬
tional decision-making follows a rigidly prescribed pattern.
A rational man first identifies and defines his goals and
values. He then organizes and ranks them in his mind and
lists all the possible ways for achieving his goals. He ex¬
amines all the important consequences that would follow from
each of the alternative means and compares the consequences
and selects the best alternative for achieving his goals.6
It is rational and comprehensive at least in intent and as¬
sumes an optimal solution or decision to a problem.
The theory of rational planning is based essentially
on the premise of Instrumentalism (Dewey, Popper), which
states that theories are only means or instruments in prob¬
lem-solving and directing social change. In city planning it
came to be known as the Rational Comprehensive Planning
method, meaning pursuit of means towards an end in a ration¬
al idiom. It is an instrument of calculation and of pre-
6 C.E.Lindblom, The Policy-Makinq Process, Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1968, pp. 12-14.
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diction used only to solve a given problem. Its validity
lies in its utility and not in its ability to explain reali¬
ty. It may, in fact, say nothing of reality. It assumes
the positivist attitude and as such rejects any variables
dealing with values.
Max Weber (1864-1920) and Karl Mannheim (1893—1947)7
the two great social philosophers, were the most influential
proponents of rational planning, and its earliest exponents.
Weber distinguished between 'value' and 'material' rational¬
ity, while Mannheim made similar distinctions between 'sub¬
stantial' and 'functional' rationality. The substantial ra¬
tionality which is akin to Weber's value rationality is
directed at rational (intelligent) pursuit of societal
'goals', while the functional rationality or material ra¬
tionality is directed at rational pursuit of 'means' to
achieve given ends or goals.
But how one goes about determining societal goals is
not clear either in Weber's or Mannheim's writings. They
both use global and instrumental models that are methodolo¬
gically adequate but lack theoretical specificity. They
meet the rigour of scientific enquiry but not the relevance
in dealing with the issues of planning particularly in an
urban context. Societal goals are indeed complex to identi-
7 See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organiza¬
tion . New York: The Free Press, 1947, see also Karl
Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction New
York: Harcourt Press, 1942.
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fy or define, and almost impossible to quantify, since they
are normative in nature. They are couched in such abstract
terms as freedom, equity, happiness, and are all value-laden
and incapable of quantification through the rational mode of
thought.
Some of the other earliest proponents of rational
planning,8 who enunciated theories in the area of social
planning and social reconstruction, were: Herbert Simon,
Martin Meyerson, Edward Banfield and Jan Tinbergen. Simon
(1945) contributed to the area of decision making and admin¬
istrative behaviour, Meyerson and Banfield (1955) to the
field of physical planning and Jan Tinbergen (1964) to the
area of economic planning. Each of these Rationalists em¬
phasized means over the ends, and believed in human ration¬
ality in resolving societal problems. They all believed
that the rational mind, devoid of bias could organize and
plan for social needs and change.
The Rational Comprehensive Model dominated and con¬
tinues to dominate planning thought - whether in seeking
means or in identifying goals, or both. It appeals to plan¬
ners, because it claims objectivity and in its approach it
is more akin to human perception - which is generally a sy¬
noptic perception, perceiving things as wholes better than
as parts.
8 Chester Barnard (1938), is considered the earliest propo¬
nent of rational theory of decision making.
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The Comprehensive Model assumes a single hierarchy
of values, and is based on a strong premise that comprehen¬
siveness or a synoptic perspective is desirable and in fact
feasible. It pursues single means towards a multiplicity of
goals that supposedly reflect the unitary public interest
and holds that they can be ranked by order of importance or
preference. It is centralist in its approach and indeed
very elitist, in trying to reconcile the pluralistic nature
of society through the imposition of elite class interests
and values, as imperatives.
Recognizing human limitations, variations to the Ra¬
tional Comprehensive Models were put forward by Herbert Si¬
mon in his later modified work, which he called "Bounded Ra¬
tionality" and further variations called "Instrumental
Rationality".9 In essence, the difference was between those
that advocated the 'maximizing' of utility function, and
those that advocated the 'satisficing'of the utility func¬
tion. The utility maximizers were of the belief that 'opti¬
mum' situations were possible and that in fact all knowledge
could be brought to bear in a rational and comprehensive
manner to seek the optimum or the best solution. This posi¬
tion was counteracted by those who argued that such an opti¬
mum solution was impossible and that at best one could
achieve a satisficing level. March and Simon (1958)10 pro-
9 See Herbert Simon, Administrative Behaviour. New York:
Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1965.
10 J.G.March and H.A.Simon, Organizations. New York: John
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posed the alternative "Satisficing Rationality Model" in
which the criterion of satisficing replaced the optimizing
requirements of the classical rational model. In other words
the satisficing model attempts to replace the goals of "max¬
imizing" with the goals of "satisficing" and seeks a course
of action that is 'good enough'.
All these theories of course have their limitations.
However one can argue that it is not possible to obtain per¬
fect information given the nature of constant change, or all
the information, necessary to make best decision. There is
also the question of man's capacity to absorb and effective¬
ly utilize the myriad of information that is often collected
in the name of comprehensiveness. Most importantly there is
the question of whether it is possible to even specify the
rational means to desired goals.
The logical rigidity of the model precludes recogni¬
tion of uncertainties inherent in many of the variables. As
well, it precludes incorporation of factors that cannot be
accounted for or accomodated within the logical construct of
Rationality. Whether one defines the 'best' course of ac¬
tion that the rational decision purports to arrive at, as
being high in the preference scale, or if it is simply log¬
ically expedient as one of the many choices with least neg¬
ative impacts needs to be clearly specified and understood.
Rationality cannot fully assist in judging the various cri-
Wiley & Sons, 1958. pp.169-182.
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teria for the decision, and, lacking purpose, it simply be¬
comes an objective instrument, for decision making. In sum
its main concern is in the process rather than in the pur¬
pose or the 'end result'.
A strong argument against the synoptic or comprehen¬
sive perspective came from Meyerson and Banfield (1955).
They argued that although "comprehensiveness" as an ideal is
still important, one could not ignore the high costs in¬
volved in information gathering for any comprehensive, ana¬
lytical strategy. Besides they argued that it is not always
even worth the costs, and as such one should at best try to
be only "as comprehensive as possible".11
The "Bounded Rationality" model in essence attempts
to maximize the very limitations it imposes, that is it rec¬
ognizes rationality as bounded in as much as neither all the
alternatives nor all the consequences can be considered and
as such it cannot be either, fully rational nor totally com¬
prehensive. It perceives the planning process as principal¬
ly a systematic synthesizing function. It recognizes the
tripartite division into social, economic and physical plan¬
ning. The task of planning is to synthesize policies of the
various authorities, both public and private in seeking de¬
sired changes.
11 See Martin Meyerson and Edward Banfield, Politics Plan¬
ning and Public Interest. New York: The Free Press,
1955.
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Simon discusses Bounded Rationality as the inherent
limited capacity of the human mind to conceptualize. He
states it as:
"The capacity of the human mind for formulating
and solving complex problems is very small com¬
pared with the size of the problem whose solution
is required for objectively rational behaviour in
the real world - or even for a reasonable approxi¬
mation to such objective rationality."12
The emphasis here is slightly different, it is on
the selection of the alternatives, and the advocating of the
choice of the first 'satisfactory' alternative as the pre¬
ferred 'alternative' or preferred rational choice.
"Instrumental Rationality", on the other hand at¬
tempts to relate more to real-world situations. It seeks to
pursue generally a single goal through a multiplicity of
means or through an open selection of "best means". Depend¬
ing on the nature of the problem, the selection of means and
their interrelationship could either follow an objective
scientific approach (objective instrumental rationality) or
a subjective approach (subjective/instrumental rationality),
wherein an attempt is made to incorporate the normative val¬
ues that could influence decision-making.
Dahl and Lindblom (1953) rejected these models in
favour of a modified version that would reflect practice
more accurately. They had earlier introduced the idea of
12 H. Simon, Models of Man. New York: John Wiley @ Sons
Inc., 1967. p. 198.
87
"Incrementalism" in their book "Politics, Economics and
Welfare". Although it was not fully developed at the time,
it did question the plausibility of making decisions through
purely rational method. The reality of decision-making
whether in social, economic or political fields they argued,
did not conform to the dictums of rationality. Decisions
were in fact made "incrementally".13
Similar arguments were put forward earlier by Karl
Popper (1945). Recognizing the limitations of the human
mind, the instrumental nature of inquiry, and given the na¬
ture of complexity of the problems, Popper argued in favour
of piece-meal social engineering, a piecemeal approach to
reform rather than any radical transformation.14 Braybrooke
and Lindblom contended that the Rational Model in its pure
form was both untenable and unrealistic. It was incapable
of accommodating any value preferences, and most important¬
ly, it did not account for its implementability, nor reflect
the reality of the decision-making process. In a later book
A Strategy of Decision (1963), they proposed a model which
purports to represent the decision making process as it ac¬
tually occurs. The strategy of "Disjointed-Incrementalism"
proposed therein came to be known as the art of "Muddling
Through" or "Incrementalism".15
13 See R.A.Dahl and C.E.Lindblom, Politics, Economics and
Welfare. New York: Harper and Row Publishing, 1953.
14 See Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies.
Vol.1. London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1962.
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Lindblom argued that because of wide variations in
human values, it would be hard to reach an agreement in de¬
fining either the ends or the means in a way that would be
acceptable to all. Simply aggregating values, generating
value consensus or positing a single value system is avoid¬
ing the problem. Facts and values he said were interrelat¬
ed, wherein values and policies are in reality determined at
the same time. Under incremental planning according to
Lindblom, plans are made by a combination of "intuition, ex¬
perience, rule of thumb, various techniques (rarely sophis¬
ticated) and endless series of consultations".16
The process of "Muddling-Through" is an on-going
process, they argue, of reacting to a set of immediate prob¬
lems and is held to be more realistic than attempting to
pursue some long-range unattainable goal. It is easier to
achieve consensus and deal with a limited number of alterna¬
tives, and consider only those alternatives that differ mar¬
ginally from current policies. It is directed at solving im¬
mediate problems in an incremental manner. Thus change,
being marginal, is more easily realized and monitored.
15 David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, A Strategy of De¬
cision . New York: The Free Press, 1970. See also
Charles E. Lindblom. "The Science of 'Muddling
Through'". Public Administration Review, Vol. 19,
Spring, 1959. pp. 79-88.
16 See Charles Lindblom, op cit. 1959.
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The fragmented nature or disjointedness of Incremen-
talism comes from the decision-making process it advocates
and the division of tasks that it recognizes. Policy-making
and analysis are undertaken by different groups, thus pre¬
venting centralized control or the imposition of a central¬
ist value framework. Lindblom suggests that this disjoint-
edness introduces freshness and distinctiveness and the
different facets of the problem can be exposed and high¬
lighted more advantageously.
There is less importance in identifying values ex¬
plicitly but rather the emphasis is that the decision re¬
flect stated policy or be in accord with it. The means and
goals are considered simultaneously, and the goals are de¬
pendent upon the means available. One of the most important
characteristics of Incrementalism is indeed its incremental
nature. The intent is not to reach a long-range goal but to
seek small changes as situations dictate and thus "incremen¬
tally" to achieve the stated objectives. The goal is re-e¬
valuated at each stage to assess its realization. Only
those alternatives considered feasible are evaluated and se¬
lected. The three important characteristics of the Incre¬
mental model are:
1. the incremental nature of the changes and policies
that are desired,
2. the acceptance of agreement as a criterion of quali¬
ty, and
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3. the maximization of the guarantee of achieving de¬
sired changes or conversely reducing risks through
"successive limited comparisons".
Incrementalism is, no doubt, an ad-hoc remedial ap¬
proach: it makes no pretence of either maximizing goals or
seeking an optimum situation. It is principally concerned
with removing the ills and constraints that hinder the
achievement of the stated goal. Accordingly it strongly re¬
lies on precedents and is dependent, for guidelines, on past
successes, failures and limitations in predicting the fu¬
ture. It is limited hence, to problems where past policy or
experience exists as a guide. Incrementalism nevertheless
claims some success in its attempt to meet the needs of a
stable society. It, however, represents a rather conserva¬
tive and cautious attitude towards social change, advocating
the 'status quo', rather than radical action. Lindblom con¬
tends that the incremental model is very compatible with
democratic policies as politics attempts to achieve change
through small steps, rather than by upsetting the status
quo. Incrementalism is characterized by its functional ra¬
tionality as compared to the substantive rationality of the
Rational Comprehensive Model.
Etzioni in an article entitled "Mixed-Scanning"
(1967) put forward an alternative theory that attempted to
combine the Rational and the Incremental models. In doing
so he tried to integrate the positive aspects of both while
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minimizing the restrictive nature inherent in each. He
tried to avoid the rigidity of the synoptic Utopian con¬
structs of the Rational Model and the more constrictive per¬
spective of the Incremental Model particularly its conserva¬
tive, limited approach. Thus, he puts forward two levels of
decision-making - a higher level which seeks a more synoptic
rational view of major changes, a kind of "meta-planning",
and a lower level dealing in more day-to-day incremental
changes. He attempts to distinguish between fundamental de¬
cisions and incremental decisions. The fundamental decisions
are goal oriented and give the overall direction, while the
incremental decisions, although derived from fundamental de¬
cisions. are more specific and problem oriented.17 A third
model put forward by Dror18 was "A Normative Optimum Model
for Policy Making", and was based on a series of assump¬
tions. Optimum policy making he argues involves maximizing
17 Amitai Etzioni, "Mixed Scanning". Public Administration
Review, Vol. XXVII. No. 5, Dec., 1967. pp. 385-392.
See also Amitai Etzioni. The Active Society. London:
Collier-Macmillan, 1968.
16 Yehezkel Dror, in his article "The Planning Process: A
Facet Design". International Review of Administrative
Sciences. Vol. 29, No. 1, 1963, pp.46-58, had also put
forward the Facet Design model, where he attempts at ex¬
amination of the various components or Facets of the Plan
as being of greater importance than merely looking at ob¬
jectives and purposes of the plan. Both the Optimal Mod¬
el and the Facet Design were attempts at accomodating the
rational and the extranational processes. The four Facets
of design are 1. The planning environment, the kinds of
information; 2. The subject matter of the plan; 3. The
planning unit and 4. The form of the plan. See his arti¬
cle "Muddling Through - Science of Inertia?. Public Ad¬
ministration Review, Vol. 24, 1964. No. 3, Sept., pp.
153-157.
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rationality so that a better explication of goals, values
and objectives is achieved.
It would appear that inherent in rational planning
models is the assumption that planning is a technical exer¬
cise geared either at rational selection of means or ration¬
al identification of ends. It also assumes that planning
problems can be conceived in terms of a comprehensive model
and analyzed and resolved accordingly. It sees planning as
an allocative process and the role of the planner as a pas¬
sive advisor performing a function, rather than as an advis¬
or or innovator of change, politically engaged in plan de¬
velopment and implementation.
3.2.2 COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING
The terms Comprehensive Plan or Master Plan conjures
an image of grand design and Utopian visions. In planning
it became a magic word that conscripted the entire planning
discipline, to the extent of becoming synonymous with the
word planning itself. For well over four decades it mono¬
polized planning activity. It was first used according to
Bassett in a document published in 1926 called "Recent New
York Legislation for the Planning of Unbuilt Areas, Regional
Plan for New York and Environs". Two of the earliest expo¬
nents of comprehensive planning were Frederick Law Olmstead
and Alfred Bettman who defined it as "A City Plan is a Mas-
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ter Design for the physical development of the city".19
The term Comprehensive Planning has since appeared
in a number of Planning Acts and Enabling Legislations, one
of the earliest being "A Standard City Planning Enabling
Act, published by U.S. Department of Commerce, in 1928. It
defined the comprehensive plan, perhaps most vividly as:
"...The plan shall be made with the general pur¬
pose of guiding and accomplishing a coordinated,
adjusted and harmonious development of the munici¬
pality and its environs which will, in accordance
with present and future needs, best promote
health, safety, morals, order, convenience, pros¬
perity and general welfare, as well as efficiency
and economy in the process of development; includ¬
ing among other things, adequate provisions for
light and air, the promotion of the healthful and
convenient distribution of population, the promo¬
tion of good civic design and arrangement, wise
and efficient expenditure of public funds and the
adequate provision of public utilities and other
public requirements".
19 Proceedings of the Third National Conference on City
Planning, Philadelphia, Pa. May 15 to 17, 1911. Boston
1911, pp. 12-13. Olmstead (1822-1903), was perhaps the
first to enunciate the concept of the plan "as a devise
or piece of...machinery for preparing and keeping con¬
stantly up to date, a unified forecast and definition of
all the important changes additions, and extensions of
the physical equipment and arrangement of the city which
a sound judgement holds likely to become desirable and
practicable in the course of time, so as to avoid so far
as possible both ignorantly wasteful action and ignorant-
ly wasteful inaction in the control of the city's physi¬
cal growth". See also Alfred Bettman's definition in
"Planning Problems of Town, City, and Region. Papers and
Discussions of the Twentieth National Conference on City
Planning, held at Dallas and Fort Worth, Texas, May 7 to
10, 1928. Philadelphia: William F. Fill Co., 1928, p.
142. Both these sources are quoted in Alan Black, "The
Comprehensive Plan" in Principles and Practice of Urban
Planning, ed William I. Goodman and Eric C. Freund.
Washington, D.C. International City Managers Association,
1968, pp. 349-378; and Edward M. Bassett. The Master
Plan: With a Discussion of the Theory of Community Land
Planning Legislation, New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
94
Farbman after having examined several hundred Master
Plans in the U.S.A. maintained that essentially they con¬
tained the following:




5. public Facilities and Services
6. public Utilities
7. designated Areas for Special projects
8. housing
9. implementation
The emphasis was on the comprehensive physical plan that
could integrate the above mentioned considerations into a
Master Plan. It was a fusion, Farbman suggests between the
tenets of the City Beautiful, the Public Works Program and
Zoning that created the Comprehensive Plan - it was a vehi¬
cle for communicating these ideas interrelatedly.20
Two characteristics of the comprehensive plan ap¬
proach emerged: a) the belief that the future is simply an
extrapolation of the present and b) the belief that compre¬
hensiveness is attainable. Grounded in Utilitarian dictum,
1938.
20 David Farbman, "A Description Analysis and Critique of
the Master Plan", prepared for Institute for Urban Stud¬
ies, University of Pennsylvania, 1959-60.
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the comprehensive planning movement sought its legitimate
role in the political arena, as an instrument that enunciat¬
ed the grand goals of public good, rationaly and efficiently
achieved. It is to the utilitarians says David Eversley
that "we owe the true origins of modern planning", both its
supposed rationality and comprehensiveness.21
Friedmann22 argues against the concept of comprehen¬
sive planning as being both restrictive and simplistic. The
points he makes are as follows:
1. The value frame and interest delineating objectives
tend to be very restrictive to a given social matrix;
2. It tends to express a single perspective-supposedly a
concensus point - that incorporates a multiplicity of
values and goals of a pluralistic society;
3. The restrictive nature of comprehensive planning pre¬
cludes dealing with conditions of uncertainties or
external influences;
4. It is basically impossible to amass all the pertinent
information, present or past, to deal with planning
problems either comprehensively or futuristically. It
is indeed beyond human capacity;
21 David Eversley, The Planner in Society. London: Faber @
Faber, 1973, p. 47.
22 John Friedmann, "The Future of Comprehensive Urban Plan¬
ning: A Critique" in Public Administration Review No. 3,
May/June 1971, "Symposium on Changing Styles of Planning
in Post Industrial America, pp. 315-326.
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5. It is a centralist model that purports to reflect the
public interest;
6. It assumes a balanced development, implying some
drastic institutional changes and monitoring mecha¬
nisms, and thus restricting any long range planning.
Friedmann contends that "the logic of comprehensive
planning is inconsistent with the imperatives for action".
The pursuits of comprehensive planning tend to be focussed
on limited objectives - often of the ruling class - and very
much directed at mobilizing and utilizing limited resources.
It is an opportunistic model dependent on availability of
immediate resources and or coalitions that can be set up to
accomplish the immediate objectives.
It is important to realize that such planning tends
to advance primarily the interests of the ruling elite and
the profession per se, but does not necessarily work toward
the public good.
Realizing the short-comings of the Comprehensive
Planning Model, a "Process Model" evolved. In essence, it
was simply a change in emphasis. Instead of concentrating
on a blue print or master plan as an end product, more con¬
sideration was given to the process of developing the plan,
including public participation. Process Planning likewise
suffered some set-backs. In eagerness to rectify some of
the shortcomings of the Master Plan approach, the proponents
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of the Process Model themselves fell into pitfalls. The
avowed interest in the means and the administration of the
means conflicted with the recognition of public interest and
plural interests. Fagin noted that
"This notion of mediation among different interest
groups rather than service to an abstraction
called public interest squarely recognizes and ad¬
dresses the fact of cultural, social and economic
diversity among people and the perpetual presence
of validly particular interests".23
One of the main limitations of the process planning
emerges from lack of specific long range direction - the end
is left vague and undefined. This emanates in part from the
fact that the objectives of interest groups are hard to rec¬
oncile in either identifying or defining the problem and
thus agreeing to any given solution. Likewise the time lag
that process-oriented planning can cause, mitigates against
efficient solutions. This time lag is additive in nature
and expands both in information base and in strategies that
can often lead to frustration and non-implementation. Costs
likewise tend to escalate due to long-range directions.
It must also be recognized that not all planning
problems are amenable to a process approach; some can be
better resolved by a blueprint approach, a point in case is
transportation network planning. The method also lacks the
holistic view that comprehensive planning purports to pres-
23 Henry Fagin, "Advancing the State of the Art" in Urban
Planning in Transition. ed., Ernest Erber. New York:
Grossman Publishers, 1970, pp. 125-141.
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ent rather than the atomistic approach that process planning
engenders.
The comprehensive and the process approach have one
thing in common - both see the future as an extrapolation or
extension of the present albeit a more orderly and tidier
version. Both see planning as a centralist activity of a
technical nature.24
3.3 PLANNING AND DETERMINISM
3.3.1 DESIGN DETERMINISM
In order to understand the theoretical basis of
planning, it is pertinent to examine the school of thought
called "Design Determinism" that has strongly influenced
planning in its early stages.
The idea that human nature could be interpreted and
that it behaves according to the laws of nature is almost as
old as philosophy. The Epicurians believed in atomism of
human nature, that everything is composed of matter, of im¬
penetrable atoms. This they argued was also true of human
thoughts and desires, and that all these behaved according
24 Martin Meyerson in an article "Building the Middle-Range
Bridge for Comprehensive Planning" (1956) proposed a com¬
plementary model to Comprehensive Planning. He identifies
five functions as pertinent to planning and they are: 1)
a central intelligence function; 2) a pulse taking func¬
tion; 3) a policy clarification function; 4) a detailed
development function and 5) a feedback review function.
These are designed to bring planning and policy closer
together and make planning more effective and responsi¬
ble.
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to the motions of atoms. It stands to reason, they argued,
that human nature can therefore be understood and in fact
moulded following the laws of physical bodies.25
Hobbes likewise maintained that human nature was
akin in behaviour to physical sciences and could therefore
be subjected to the laws of nature and be determined. Such
beliefs were manifested in planning, and physical determi¬
nism meant planning according to the rigid canons of science
more specifically of geometry. This gave rise to the so
called design determinism that Renaissance planners and ar¬
chitects fostered. Such a causal model became central to
planning.
The period 1870-1913 was the most remarkable period
for economic growth and planning in both Europe and North
America. It was a period of great industrialization and ur¬
banization, and the pressures upon the city and the city as
the metaphor of civilization represented a very powerful
force in arts, sciences, technology, architecture and plan¬
ning. This transformation in planning followed three direc¬
tions:
25 See Lucretius, De Rerum Natura. Trans., R.E.Latham, and
see also T. Hobbes On Human Nature. Harmondsworth: Pen¬
guin Books, 1951. Lucretius (c.99-55 BC.) believed in
chance, and as such could not be considered as strictly
mechanistic. It should be noted that Democritus (c.420
B.C.) was one of the earliest atomic theorists.
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1. The remedial approach that sought to correct the ills
in an ad hoc basis, seeking to create an efficient
and healthy urban environment.
2. The escapist approach that sought to recreate the
city in an Utopian idealism.
3. The physical design approach that equated beauty with
liveability.
The most dominant and manifest of the three was the
third - often called Physical Determinism or Design Deter¬
minism. This particular belief became a panacea for the
myriads of urban problems in a society that was rapidly
changing under the impact of technological forces, economic
growth and political tensions. It called for new forms, new
language and great idealism; - Utopian dreams were common¬
place, all designed in geometric patterns creating ideal
cities, analagous to beautiful, thus liveable cities. This
attitude of exploration and innovation was common in almost
all fields. This included for example: sociology, Weber
(1903), Mannheim (1929); art, Cezanne, Matisse, Klee, Picas¬
so; psychology, Freud (1895); science, Einstein (1905), and
literature Checkov (1896), Proust (1905), Hesse (1914),
James Joyce (1914), Ezra Pound, (1915), Kafka (1946), D.H.
Lawrence (1976), and many others. Art and aesthetics pro¬
vided the focus and the medium for the realization of these
ideas.
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In the Symposium for example, Plato postulates that
a man who loves beauty progresses sequentially from beauty
of form to beauty of ideas, to beauty of institutions, laws,
and finally to beauty itself. Beauty thus becomes the high¬
est good - an embodiment of truth, as stated by St. Thomas
Aquinas. Diderot in his treatise on the "The Beautiful"
(1752) contends that a thing is beautiful because of the
real relations discerned in it; real relations he says that
are actually there and which our imaginations can in fact
discern. St. Augustine in a much earlier treatise on beauty,
expressed his notion of beauty as unity of parts; - "omnis
porro pulchritudinis forma, unitas est", meaning that the
form of all beauty is in the unity. The exact or perfect in¬
terconnections of parts within a whole that renders it as
one unity, is what constitutes beauty. In "Greater Hippi-
as", Plato also disscussed the idea of beauty which he main¬
tained was identical with the pleasures of sight and hear¬
ing.
Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) in Inquiry Concerning
Beauty (1725), talks about uniformity amidst variety that is
the essence of beauty. There is vast uniformity in nature he
suggests, amidst almost equally infinite variety. George
Santayana (1863-1952) states that "We know from excellent
authority that beauty is truth, that it is the expression of
the ideal, the symbol of divine perfection, and the sensible
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manifestation of the good."26
Camus in his book The Myth of Sisyphus, observed
that art is the essence of life "Man cannot do without beau¬
ty", he said.27 John Dewey regarded art as the unifying
force, and Albrecht Durer noted that "For, verily, art is
inherent in nature; he who can extract it therefrom will
hold it". The period represented 'la belle epoque'.
Planning too indulged in beautiful Utopias, devoid
of realities. This was, of course, not new. Plato
(c.427-347 B.C.) in his Utopia The Republic emphasized the
influence of the beauty in nature and the environment in
shaping human minds.
"Our artists and craftsmen must be capable of per¬
ceiving the real nature of what is beautiful, and
then our young men, living as it were in a good
climate, will benefit because all the works of art
they see and hear, influence them for good, like
the breezes from some healthy country, insensibly
moulding them into sympathy and conformity with
what is rational and right."26
26 George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty. New York: Dover
Publications 1955. pp.14-52. It is also interesting to
note that the term "aesthetics" is of rather recent ori¬
gin having been coined by Alexander Baumgarten, in his
Meditations published in 1735. See also Karl Aschenbren-
ner and Arnold Isenberg. Aesthetic Theories. New Jer¬
sey: Prentice-Hall, 1965.
27 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus. Harmondsworth: Pen¬
guin Books, 1980. p. 137.
28 Plato, The Republic, Part III. Trans. H.D.P.Lee. Har¬
mondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971. p. 142.
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He argued that art was morally uplifting and conducive to a
happy living environment. It is also interesting to note
that Plato banishes the artist in his Republic because art
per se was immoral - it was not able to capture reality -
since reality was transcendent perfection. Aristotle like¬
wise emphasized the aesthetics, the beauty of the city in
terms of order and organization, as well as security, as a
positive consideration in city design.
The World's Columbian Exposition (1893) was the
turning point. It ushered the so called City Beautiful
Movement and gave Physical Determinism its first coherent
definition. The movement that lasted a little more than a
decade was, in a way, an outcome of the concern for social
order, but ended up being simply a recaption of the Renais¬
sance ideas of ordered cities, implanted on American soil.
The concept of City Beautiful per se remained very illusive
and insubstantial rather than a clear theory that guided the
form or morphology of the city any differently from the Ren¬
aissance ideals. Even the literature on the subject is very
scant, mentioning only the term "City Beautiful Movement"
and very little about its constructs.23
29 The City Beautiful Movement is associated with Daniel H.
Burnham who together with Edward H. Bennett prepared the
first model of City Beautiful. The first City Beautiful
plan was prepared by Burnham and Bennett for the City of
Chicago (1906-1908), and was ironically commissioned by
the Commercial Club of Chicago, whose interest lay in the
more pragmatic aspects of the city, such as functionali¬
ty, efficiency and utility. See The Plan of Chicago Pre¬
pared during the Years MCMVI, MCHVII, and MCMVIII, ed. by
Charles Moore. Chicago, Commerical Club, 1909.
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An ordered city was believed to be a beautiful city,
as well as an efficient city. This was however nothing new
in terms of theoretical principles, but simply a return to
the tenets of the Rennaisance planning that had originated
in Europe at the turn of 18th., century.
The origins of the City Beautiful movement lie not
only in the aesthetics but also in an amalgam of landscape
tradition, municipal engineering and civic design. The land¬
scape tradition came from Frederick Law Olmstead, whose park
designs became essential features of urban design. Parks
were considered necessary for public health and general
wellbeing, "a place for repose for simple virtues and pleas¬
ures". The municipal improvements were mainly an exercise
in city beautification, improvement of sanitary and health
conditions through improvements of housing, of streets and
other utilities. The City Beautiful movement also stimulated
a comprehensive approach to city building. The civic design
influences manifested themselves in visual and spatial
aesthetics in the manner of the Ecole de Beaux-Arts tradi¬
tion, of grandeur, monumentality and artistic unity.
The White City was simply a microcosm of the City
Beautiful, that Burnham postulated and that struck the imag¬
ination of those who came to see it. Building a city ipso
facto to a pre-established plan, the Master Plan , became
the raison d'etre of planning. With the fusion of archi¬
tecture, landscape architecture together with the influences
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from the German Rationalization Movement of the early
1890's, a new lingua in planning emerged. Urban design, com¬
prehensive planning, city efficient and city practical be¬
came "ipso facto" the accepted purposes in city planning.
This school of thought maintained that the design of
the city could influence if not determine the quality of
life of the people living in them. Acceptance of such a be¬
lief was quite widespread particularly among planners of the
time, whose own educational background was grounded on the
principles of aesthetics and design of physical form - ar¬
chitecture, landscape architecture and engineering. There
is no doubt that the environment in which people live influ¬
ences their behaviour. For example slum housing conditions
do, in fact, limit social possibilities. But to argue that
it, determines human behaviour is perhaps going to the ex¬
treme. That ordered cities do in fact create ordered lives
is extending the analogy more to fit a purpose, than to un¬
derstand the real nature of the city.
A number of people have examined these ideas. Jane
Jacobs in her book, Death and Life of Great American Cities
(1961), contends that order formulates social relations and
that urban forms cannot intrinsically be defined as good or
bad but as a series of experiences generating diversity of
behaviour patterns. She argues that planners have ignored
the lessons to be learned from the real life of the city and
have instead transposed theories derived in isolation or
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from superficial understanding of the city. There is no vir¬
tue, Jacobs argues, in making a city orderly, clean or less
dense, what a city needs is diversity and more intensive and
active development. Common good can occur only if the indi¬
viduals' opportunities are maximized to seek their individu¬
al ends.
Robert Goodman in his book After the Planners
(1972), believes that design determinism is an elitist and
rather simplistic argument,"a kind of dubious notion under
which many of our city design concepts still labour."30 Ar¬
chitectural unity or consistency Goodman goes on to argue,
are not necessarily appropriate models for complex urban
life, nor are they consistent with the democratic political
process. What is needed, he says, is search for forms that
can evolve from people themselves, rather than from the ex¬
perts - a kind of "Guerrilla Architecture" that can address
the real needs of the people.
Sociologist Richard Sennett in Uses of Disorder
(1970), contends that two changes are necessary in the
structure of the city to transform them into "survival com¬
munities" given the present predicament that the large urban
centers are increasingly facing; one is to change the bu¬
reaucratic structure of the city, and the other is to disre¬
gard the notion of order and harmony in favour of freedom
30 Robert Goodman, After the Planners. Harmondsworth: Pen¬
guin books, 1972, p.139.
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for communities to create their own patterns of life and
close-knit communities, by recognizing anarchy, diversity
and creative disorder. Sennett believes that the desire for
order and purified cities, is more from fear of disorder and
human diversity, than it is from any altruistic motives. It
is possible to argue that design does influence behaviour
and that design can bring about desired change in social be¬
haviour, but that would constitute social-engineering.31
The theory of City Beautiful, however, saw its ready
acceptance by the government because it appealed to the sen¬
sitivity of the ruling class bourgeois. As well, it was
timely in view of the fact that the urban environment was
fast deteriorating and in many cases completely destroyed in
the aftermath of the World War II. There was the urgent need
to rebuild the cities in a more efficient and functional
manner, guided by the strict canons of 'beauty' - geometric
order, harmony and scale - to provide civic grandeur, vari¬
ety and unity.
The Columbian Exposition represented not only eco¬
nomic success but also the triumph of classical capitalism.
Given that it ocurred during the Depression, the Exposition,
as J.K. Galbraith states in his book The Age of Uncertainty,
screened a harsher reality of poverty, slum and unemployment
that the city was experiencing. The Fair's success provided
31 Richard Sennett, Uses of Disorder. Harmonasworth: Pen¬
guin Books, 1973.
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the much-needed impetus for city planning. The canons of
geometry were the key ingredients in Design Determinism.
Both the Euclidian tactile geometry and the visual geometry
of perspectives played decisive roles in the design of cit¬
ies.32 Truth was equated with Beauty, and beauty was a genre
of geometry. The straight edge of the architect and the
compass further restricted the creation of urban form to ei¬
ther rectangular, linear or circular designs. The gridiron
pattern, so much imitated, epitomized order and aesthetic
principles, reflecting as well both hierarchy of uses and
ef fic iency.
The impetus given by the new role of the city, par¬
ticularly Chicago and New York in North America, as the cul¬
tural and artistic centres furthered the aims of aesthetics
as a principle of civic design. The art of Modernism that
evolved during the last years of the 19th century influenced
city design in the way in which it reflected the spirit of
the technological society and its pervasive influences on
urban living. It sanctioned a new social order based on
technique, rationality and efficiency; a new art that could
be tooled to precise designs - design that was a product of
the machine technique.
32 Morris Kline, Mathematics in Western Culture. Harmonds-
worth: Penguin Books, 1977, p. 189.
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The quintescence of the City Beautiful movement, the
White City, represented a metaphor of design and order in
the grand renaissance scale of avenues, boulevards and fic¬
titious perspectives. City became a machine for living, al¬
beit, a false one. It produced cities that were beautiful
perhaps but hardly liveable.
Ortega y Gasset in his book the Dehumanization of
Art points out this whole movement as "play" or "delightful
fraud" inflicted upon the society in the name of aesthet¬
ics.33 Although it did permeate the consciousness of the
time it did very little to hide the harsh realities of the
urban phenomenon. Depression, poverty, social anarchy, rap¬
id urbanization, were translated into order, rationality,
material well being, efficiency and freedom. Planning as¬
sumed a very positive attitude and with a creative force it
sought to remedy the ills by imposing some preconceived
ideas onto the urban fabric.
To control the development of land and its uses, to
contain the abuse of the laissez-faire, some rules and regu¬
lations became necessary. Zoning and subdivision regula¬
tions were enacted as legal devices that conformed with
aesthetic principles of order, segregation, and distribu¬
tion, as well as for implementing the land use plans. They
were a means to delineate urban areas into zones or dis-
33 M. Bradbury @ J.McFarlane, Modernism. Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books, 1978, pp. 27-28.
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tricts based on use, density, lot coverage, and other
easement controls. Being legal tools, they had to be pre¬
cise and definitive in detail.34 The regulations were to be
equitable as well as to portray the essence of the ordered
city. It was supposedly designed to safeguard the general
welfare of the people by protecting the individuals rights.
In reality they turned out to be simply mechanisms for pro¬
tecting the upper classes, containing urban growth from un¬
desirable encroachments, and above all for enhancing land
values. It was rational ordering of societal activity in the
final analysis.
Camillo Sitte's (1843-1903), Per Stadte-Bau nach
seinen Kunstlerischen Grundsatzen, a work published in 1889,
translated as City Planning According to Artistic Princi¬
ples, was one of the earliest influencial books in urban de¬
sign aesthetics. Two concepts were put forward: one was
aesthetic design with emphasis on visual form, and the other
was the experience of living the spaces created in the urban
environment through good design. He also conceived the form
of the city in rigid geometric design enclosed and organized
into public squares and streets following certain artistic
principles derived from careful observation of the past, in
34 E.Bassett defined zoning as "the regulation by districts
under the police power of the height, bulk, and use of
buildings; the use of land, and the density of popula¬
tion." This was the basis of the first comprehensive
zoning ordinance of 1916: "U.S. Department of Commerce,
Advisory Committee on City Planning and Zoning. A Stan¬
dard City Planning Enabling Act. 1928".
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particular medieval and renaissance examples. It was his
deterministic view that beautiful cities provided an essen¬
tial artistic education for the masses. The other equally
influential books, were Raymond Unwin's Town planning in
Practice: An Introduction to the Art of Designing Cities and
Suburbs (1909) which became a standard text in city design,
and of a latter vintage Frederick Gibberd's Town Design,
( 1953).
An important theory that influenced design determi¬
nism was the theory that "form follows function", commonly
known as the "Theory of Functionalism". Although this theo¬
ry is not based on any conclusive empirical studies, it does
however, have its basis on three strong premises. These
premises are the mechanistic analogy, the organic analogy
and the moral/ethical analogy35 The mechanistic analogy is
based on the basic principle of functionalism that beautiful
form 'per se' evolves from pure function or mechanical and
engineering efficiency; the purer or more truthful to the
nature of the material and its physical properties, the more
beautiful the product - meaning "form follows function".
The organic or biological analogy was, on the other hand,
based on the evolutionary theory following Darwin's work,
Origin of Species (1842).36 Its guiding principles came from
35 E.R. de Zurko, Origins of Functionalism. New York: Co¬
lumbia University Press, 1957. pp. 8-14.
36 An interesting observation known as Liebig's "Law of Min¬
imum" which suggests that the law of selection and adap¬
tation is reflected by its ability to respond to minimum
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the perfection and beauty of nature and from laws that gov¬
ern nature in its evolutionary process. Progress as we know
was intimately connected to the biological notion of evolu¬
tion. Imitating nature constituted the prime requisite of
good design and true design. It progressed by adaptation
and selection, that means "function follows form".
The moral or ethical analogy is rather vague in its
structure. In essence it suggests that the moral ethical
ideals of truth and utility (usefulness) should be reflected
in design. In other words a building should be "truthful"
and express its purpose and function, and should be devoid
of any pretence or false facade, being true to both form and
function. Scott in his book The Architecture of Humanism
states that good architecture should satisfy three require¬
ments, namely, "firmitas, utilitas and Veritas", meaning it
must be firm and strong, useful and truthful. By truthful,
Scott suggests something that meets the criteria of aesthet¬
ic judgement - essentially that it is beautiful. The proper
relationship between form and function is according to Scott
what in the final analysis determines beauty.37
rather than the maximum environmental conditions. In oth¬
er words the animals that survive best are those that can
cope with the minimum requirements or conditions imposed
by nature.
37 See G. Scott. The Architecture of Humanism. New York:
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956.
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Le Corbusier (Charles Edouardo Jeanneret-Gris)
(1887-1965), one of the most influential of the more contem¬
porary urbanists, perceived the City in geometric forms. Or¬
der was his prime concern. Free man he contended can create
cities in pure geometry. In Urbanisme (1924) he states "A
town is a - city. It is a grip of man upon nature - Geom¬
etry is the means".38 He maintained that engineering aesth¬
etic was superior to the eclectic approach to architecture
and that the house was in fact a machine for living, "ma¬
chine a habiter", and the city was the extension of the
house. Landscape paintings by artists such as John Consta¬
ble and many of the French Impressionist painters endeav¬
oured to likewise portray scientific truth on their canvass¬
es and drawings of nature. They saw order inherent in the
natural systems and they attempted to discover and imitate
this inherent geometric order in nature on their canvasses.
Aesthetics in the form of order and regularity seems
to have been a common thread linking all the urban Utopian
designs whether fused by belief, or need, or for protection
and fortification, or to redress social injustice or even to
seek an escape in a Utopian dream. The late Renaissance
period (1500- 1600) particularly saw a profusion of urban
design ideals centered mainly in Italy. The added criterion
of fortification to the geometric idiom, further enhanced
38 Le Corbusier, Urbanisme. Trans.,as The City of Tomorrow
and Its Planning, by F. Etchells. London: Architectur¬
al Press, 1929. p. 1.
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design possibilities. Vitruvius (100 B.C.) De Architectura
Libri Decern <c.26.B.C.), wrote that the fundamental princi¬
ples of architecture were order, arrangement, eurythmy
(beauty), harmony in proper propotions, symmetry, propriety
(perfection of style) and economy,39 and all related to hu¬
man proportion. He saw radical concentric form, as an ideal
city plan, and advocated the use of rectangles in designing
rooms in which one side is square times the other side. It
is interesting to note that all the Utopias, beginnings from
Plato's Republic were defined in rigid geometric form. "A
kind of mechanical rigidity afflicts all Utopias", says Mum-
ford. This is partly because of a belief among the Utopians
that there is only one method to achieving Utopia.
In Eastern thought likewise geometric forms consti¬
tuted sacred idiom. Square represented the basic form - the
"Vastu-Purusa-Mandala" ; Vastu representing the site, the
bodily existence, Purusa, the essence, the principle where
all things begin, and Mandala, the form of Purusa, the plan.
The principal form is always square and the knowledge of its
correct development constituted the ancient science and art
of architecture and town planning. Square as the fundamental
form in Hinduism could be converted into triangles, hexagons
or circles, but had to be of equal area to retain its Vedic
metaphysical symbolism. Square as the perfect form presup¬
poses the circle and results from it. It represents static
39 See Marcus Vitruvius Pollio, The Ten Books on Architec¬
ture. Trans., M.H.Morgan. New York: Dover Book, 1960.
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order, the permanent, the eternal. The shape of the Vastu
the abode of the Gods, and its size is always determined by
Vedic rituals and religious codes.40
Alberti (1404-1472), in his book De Re Aedificatoria
(1452) sets out theoretical urban design concepts notably
the centralized square and radiating streets.41 Da Vinci the
giant of the Renaissance included among his works, ideas on
town design and ideal cities, including proposal for new
towns, not too dissimilar to the form later postulated by
Ebenezer Howard,for his famous Garden Cities. Palladio
(1570) resorted to the Golden Ratio as the "Divina Propor-
tiones". Scamozzi,(1615) perhaps the only Renaissance ur-
banist to have his ideas of Utopian design in fact imple¬
mented, designed the fortified town of Palma Nova (1593) a
polygon with a gridiron pattern imposed on a radial street
layout. These were some of the more notable earlier attempts
at designing ideal cities in geometric idiom.42 In fact both
the Greek word for city 'polis' which means 'ring wall', and
the Roman word 'urbs' which means 'circle' derived from 'or-
40 For an excellent treatise on the subject see Stella Kram-
risch, The Hindu Temple, 2 Vols. Delhi: Motilal Banarsi-
aas, 1976. See also B.B.Dutt, Town Planning in Ancient
India. Delhi: New Asia Publishers, 1977, and also
P.K.Acharya, An Encyclopaedia of Hindu Architecture.
Bhopal: J.K.Publishers, 1978.
41 See Leone Battista Alberti, De Re Aedificatoria. London:
Tiranti Press, 1955.
42 A.J.Morris, History of Urban Form. London: George Good¬
win Ltd., 1972.pp.121-154; and Dan Pedoe, Geometry of the
Liberal Arts. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976. p.
108.
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bis', in essence indicate the geometric perception of the
city even in the ancient times. In Hinduism, likewise the
word 'mandala' the basic form of the city, literally means
'circle' .
Similar activity was also evident in the period fol¬
lowing the Industrial Revolution. Ideal Towns were designed
to seek social redress or justice, to house the working
class people and generally to create better and healthier
living environments. Social Reformers, as they came to be
known, sought to create ideal communities through ideal city
forms, and to escape from the existing problems facing the
Industrial cities. Always geometric in design, the plans
reflected discipline, order and a hierarchial structure. It
was communal living framed in common good and common goals,
and couched in political and philosophical ideology. Claude
Ledoux (1736-1806), designed "Salines at Chaux"(1776), in
strict geometric form for salt workers in France. Necessity
was the criterion in his design for self-sufficient communi¬
ties. Robert Owen's (1771-1858), industrial village of "New
Lenark" (1797), was also self-sufficient with facilities for
educational and recreational pursuits, in an agricultural
village conceived as a large rectangular place surrounded by
housing. Charles Fourier (1772-1837), proposed "Phalanstery"
(1829), to house industrial workers in a palacelike complex.
J. Buckingham (1786-1855), designed the city of "Victoria"
(1849), to seek as he put it greatest degree of order, sym¬
metry,space and healthfulness.
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Titus Salt (1803-1876), built the city of "Saltaire"
(1851), inspired by the writings of Disraeli, particularly
the book Sybil (1845), and many others followed with propo¬
sal for Ideal Communities to be achieved by means of Ideal
Forms sanctioned by "Design Determinism". Dr. Benjamin W.
Richardson's (1828-1896) "Hygeia" (1881), a spacious city
for fresh air and health, and Tony Garnier's (1869-1948),
"Une Cite Industrielle" (1904) where some of the earliest
attempts at zoning land uses, appear to have been proposed,
were all based on rigid geometric form. Others in the group
included Arturo Soria Y Mata's (1844-1920), "La Ciudad Li¬
neal" (1894), octagonal in form, and Ebenezer Howard
(1850-1928) outlined his design for "Garden Cities" in his
book Tomorrow, A Peaceful Path to Real Reform (1898), as a
result of which two garden cities were built: Letchworth
(1902) and Welwyn (1920). These two towns later became the
percursors of new towns movement in U.K., and in U.S.A.43
Of the more contemporary giants of new cities in
ideal design were Le Corbusier's La Ville Radieuse (1935)
and the capital city of Chandigarh (1953); Frank Lloyd
Wright's "Broadacre City" which he elaborated in The Living
City (1958), and Niemeyer's "Brasilia" (1956) perhaps best
represent fusion of ideology and rigid geometric design as
metaphors for ideal cities, strewn with some a posteriori
philosophical and political idealism for credence.
43 Leonardo Benevolo, The Origins of Modern Town Planning.
Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967.
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The post World War II years however, challenged this
faith in City Beautiful theory. It was felt this faith was
too inclined towards elitist interests and too simplistic in
dealing with real urban problems and moreover that it was
ineffective in alleviating any of the ills that the city was
increasingly experiencing.
The City Beautiful Theory no doubt created grand de¬
signs but failed to make them function. It was an attempt
to fit society to the mould of the planner, to the dictates
of his own aesthetic and moral principles. It catered well
to the tastes and needs of the bourgeois, to the automobile
of the industrial mandarin, to the parks and gardens of the
leisure class and to the boulevards and avenues for military
exigencies. It created a mechanical city beating to the
same tempo, to the same pattern, that the urban fabric re¬
flected. It was a city of_ a few elite people, a testament
to their power, but hardly a city for the people.
3.4 URBAN EMPIRICISM AND ECOLOGICAL TRADITION
As early as 1908, The Chicago School of "Civis and
Philantropy" was engaged in empirical studies and this tra¬
dition was carried further by the Department of Sociology at
the University of Chicago (1920-1932), on a more critical
basis, with emphasis on empirical methods in the study of
urban phenomenon.44 The Chicago School that was also known
44 E.W.Burgess and D.J.Bogue, ed., Urban Sociology. Chica-
119
as The Chicago Human Ecology School, was influenced by the
German school. One of the founders of the Chicago School of
Sociology, Robert Ezra Park (1864-1944), was greatly influ¬
enced by Simmel and Tonnies as well as by the works of Os¬
wald Spengler. The School was also associated, with such
names as E. Burgess, R.D. McKenzie, and a number of other
empirical researchers.
An article by Robert E. Park The City "Suggestions
for the Investigations of Human Behaviour in the City Envi¬
ronment" published in 1915 in American Journal of Sociology,
set the stage for social analysis of the city and the eco¬
logical study of human community. Many contemporary urban
theories evolved from this school of thought and were best
enunciated by Louis Wirth in his essay "Urbanism as a Way of
Life", published in 1938. Wirth argued the city represents
a particular form of human organization characterized by
size, density and heterogeneity. Further he maintained that
the city could be analyzed from three interrelated perspec¬
tives: as an ecological system; as an organizational sys¬
tem; and as a way of life.
Park, in a later article "Human Ecology" (1936),
maintained that human society was organized at two levels:
the biotic and the cultural. The biotic followed evolu¬
tionary theory, applicable to man as a species in his strug¬
gle for survival through competition, and the cultural was
go: University of Chicago Press, 1967. p. 4.
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superimposed on the biotic in seeking common understanding
in the process of organizing the natural social order.
The study of the urban millieu followed two interre¬
lated paths:
1. the study of impersonal materialistic elements of the
city as determinants of its density and the competi¬
tive elements of the community.
2. the study of social and cultural forces that shape
the spatial organization and thus the future of the
city, and the communicative elements of the society.
The first group drew its inspiration from Social
Darwinism and the concept of the "struggle for existence".
They saw the city as a social living organism and as a sys¬
tem functioning on the basis of the competitive market
structure, "survival of the fittest" to use Herbert Spenc¬
er's phrase.45 Human societies, they argued, could similarly
be studied using the evolutionary approach and the biologi¬
cal concepts particularly in terms of the methods and proce¬
dures.
So strong was the influence of Urban Ecology or Hu¬
man Ecology as it eventually came to be known, that many
theories were expounded on urban structure, processes and
psychology. Studies that followed attempted to study the
45 See Herbert Spencer, Social Statics or The Conditions Es¬
sential to Human Happiness. New York: A.M.Kelley, 1969
(1851).
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land uses of the city, the morphology and the demographic
characteristics, differentiating between aspects related to
the community and those related to society. In the study of
social pathology, one of the classic examples of application
of human ecological theories, was Burgess's The Growth of
the City (1925), in which using the classical economic theo¬
ries, he showed that the city developed in concentric zones
from the center to the periphery. The central area is the
business district surrounded by a belt of slum area called
the transition zone and the working-class homes located in
the periphery. That is, the pattern of land uses and socio-
demographic characteristics are functions of the distance
from the city center.
Another theory, following Park's and Wirth's work,
saw the cultural, moral and political order as determining
the spatial organization of the city. Such a process, they
argued, attempts to control and provide a kind of equilibri¬
um in the struggle for existence with the human ecological
system. The residential land use pattern thus becomes a
manifestation of biotic forces.
The Human Ecology School concerned itself not only
in quantifying and studying the nature of urbanism, but, as
well, in trying to find solutions to the problems it uncov¬
ered.46 They believed that the ecological approach not only
46 A.W. Small (1854-1926) the founder of the Dept. of Soci¬
ology at the University of Chicago was one of the fore¬
most exponents of this idea that sociology should concern
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provided for a more objective information base, but also a
better understanding of the physical factors of the urban
system.
The core distinction that the Chicago School made
between the biotic (the Community) as they called it and the
cultural levels (the Society) of social organization re¬
mained the principal underlying idea.
Firey in his definitive study Land Use in Central
Boston, published in 1946,47 however presented a different
argument from the competition and conflict assumption of the
Chicago Human Ecology School. Competition is the process in
which "Community" is based, and conflict or accomodation and
assimilation is what "Society" is based on.46 He argued that
values played a very important role in determining the pat¬
tern of land uses.
There were a number of empirical theories that
emerged following the classical theories in urban ecology:
the Concentric-Zone Theory by Burgess (1925); and the Sector
Theory by Hoyt (1939), the Multiple-Nuclei Theory by Harris
itself not only with problems of society but also in
seeking means to solve them. See J.H.Abraham, Origins and
Growth of Sociology. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973,
p. 326, see also John C. McKinney, Constructive Typology
and Social Theory. New York: Appleton-Century @ Crofts,
1966, p. 71.
47 See W. Firey, Land Use in Central Boston. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946.
48 Milla A. Alihan, Social Ecology: A Critical Analysis.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1938, p. 71.
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and Ullman (1945), the Rank Size Rule by Zipf (1949), Cen¬
tral Place Theory by Christaller (1933), The Law of Retail
Gravitation by Reilly (1931), the Location Theory by von
Thunen (1826), and later by Webber (1900) and Losch (1929),
Social Area Analysis by Bell (1959), Shevky and Williams
(1949), Land Rent Theory by Alonso (1964), and the more in¬
tegrative models of urban systems by Lowry (1964) and For¬
rester (1969). They were all attempts at explaining the
spatial organization of the urban phenomenon, urban hierar¬
chies, locational patterns, factorial ecology and the sys¬
tems-based urban dynamic models.
These were, however, all classical equilibrium theo¬
ries and were based on restrictive and often unrealistic as¬
sumptions. They were attempts at identifying regularities in
spatial patterns as determined by socio- economic-demograph¬
ic characteristics.
Following these various directions, there emerged a
whole range of new theories and urban models grounded in the
social and economic sciences. They were mostly methodologi¬
cal, technique-oriented and eclectic in nature. They
emerged partly as a result of the emerging computer technol¬
ogy in the 60s that facilitated analysis and manipulation of
large amounts of data, partly as a result of growing pres¬
sures to deal with the problems of urban growth, housing,
transportation etc., and partly as a matter of urgency and
efficiency. The models also provided needed predictive tools
and the empirical basis for policy and planning decisions.
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On the whole, Empiricism provided a powerful tool
for planning because of its method of working with factual
data derived purely from observations. It represented a
strong belief in the power of observation and faith in its
explanatory and predictive capabilities.49 It legitimized
planner's activities, absolved them of any human errors and
reinforced the myth that these theories and models could in
fact provide solutions to the planning problems.
The shift from theory to more methodological orien¬
tation was partly as a result of the work of the Human Ecol¬
ogy School and partly due to new myth created by techno¬
logical sophistication and new techniques such as social
area analysis, factorial ecology, systems analysis, linear
programming, et cetera. Most importantly, it was the avail¬
ability and the possibility of acquiring and analyzing large
amounts of data that fired the quest for more and more data,
on the fallacious belief that more data meant better solu¬
tions.
The problem however was not so much of collecting
and interpreting the data but in understanding and drawing
inferences that challenged the planners. In essence, most
of the theories in planning amounted to "post factum" inter¬
pretations of some observed phenomenon translated into some
generalized empirical statement. Although such empirical
49 John C.McKinney, Constructive Typology and Social Theory.
New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1966, pp. 68-77.
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generalizations are necessary they are not sufficient for
proper forumulation of a theory, nor are they a prime compo¬
nent of effective solutions.
In practice, however the methodological approach be¬
came more tenable. Practice simply became application of
data analysis and synthesis with little semblance to its
theoretical formulations. Solutions were determined by the
techniques and methodologies used and sometimes resulted in
the application of intuitive knowledge which was later jus¬
tified a posteriori through empirical analysis. As a re¬
sult, normative and functional theories tended to be inter¬
spersed and the difference became more and more tenuous.
Social scientists maintain that empirical theories
are directed towards the description and explanation of what
'is'; whereas normative theories are directed at clarifica¬
tion and justification of what 'ought to be'.50 However
planning has neither successfully resolved the 'is" aspect
nor the 'ought' aspect. In other words, planning has neither
adequately determined the causal relationships to adequately
explain urban problems nor has it adequately provided the
solutions that could bring about desired changes.
50 Richard J.Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Po¬




The shift from strict design determinism to behav¬
ioral design determinism represented a rather minor influ¬
ence and perhaps a hesitant recognition that beautiful de¬
signs do not necessarily produce liveable cities. Cities
are not simply extensions of geometry but manifestations of
human behaviour.
Such a school of thought could be traced back to
Darwin's evolutionary theories (1869), from which human
ecology and concern for design in city planning emerged, the
concerns now having shifted to studying the influences of
human behaviour on the physical and environmental setting.
This movement was called ecological psychology, behavioural
design, or environmental psychology enunciated by Craik
(1920), Barker (1968), Sommer (1969), Michelson (1970), and
Proshansky (1971). Collectively, this thrust came to be
known as Human Ecology. The "Human Ecology" school per se
had its roots in the theories of the Chicago School of Soci¬
ology (1920s to '30s) primarily through the works of Robert
E. Park, The City (1915).51
This School viewed the city as an ecological system
made up of physical environment and the social phenomenon.
It attempted to analyse human interaction with the environ¬
ments. Human ecology was defined as the "study of relations
51 Robert E. Park. "The City". The American Journal of So¬
ciology, Vol. XX, No. 1, 1915.
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between men and the environment", and was concerned with
growth of cities, distribution of population, utilities and
services, land use patterns, and transportation networks -
in other words, with the life and morphology of the city.
The fervour of this school of thought led to intensive stud¬
ies directed mainly at surveying and analysing varied commu¬
nity structures, conducting social area analysis and neighb¬
ourhood studies, as well as studying other social phenomenon
in the urban milieu. It represented an anti-materialistic
view point inasmuch as it was an ecological approach to the
sociology of the cities.
Central to the Chicago School of Sociology and the
Human Ecology School was the belief that environmental re¬
sources were distributed on a competetive basis. This be¬
lief was based on two principles: the "community" and "so¬
ciety" as two fundamental aspects of human organization.
The former representing a "symbiotic relationship" or the
relationship that determine social behaviour the natural or¬
der and the latter, the "society" as the cultural and moral
order determined by the physical and economic aspects of
life. This process, they argued, was grounded in the com¬
petetive mechanism following the natural tendencies of liv¬
ing organisms - the spirit of competition and struggle for
existence.52 This philosophy however was rejected by J.A.
Quinn (1939) and others who favoured the study of the rela-
52 Milla A. Alihan, Social Ecology: A Critical Analysis.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1938. pp. 11-49.
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tionship of 'man to man' as of greater significance than the
direct relationship of 'man' to his 'environment'.
In the late 60's social and behaviour based design
came to be recognized by planners. The pattern of human be¬
haviour, they argued, should determine the urban form. C.
Alexander, in his book Notes on the Synthesis of Form
(1964), and in a later article "A City is not a Tree"
(1965), argued for the philosophy of "goodness of fit".
"The ultimate object of design is form" according to Alexan¬
der, and the form is determined by the context. In other
words, the form is the end product, or the solution, while
the context is the problem - and it is the fit between the
two that matters.53 It is analogous to saying that human be¬
haviour patterns are the context that should in the end de¬
termine the form. The City, he argued in another article,
is a fabric designed to sustain human life, a "Mechanism for
sustaining deeper social contacts" and should be designed as
such. Kevin Lynch in his book The Image of The City (1960)
and W. Michelson in Man and His Urban Environment (1970),
postulated theories relating man's behaviour to his immedi¬
ate environment. Lynch argued for "imageability", of city
form and city image, while Michelson was concerned with the
interrelationships of social activities and the physical en¬
vironments.
53 C. Alexander, Notes on the Synthesis of Form. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964. p. 15.
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Behaviour-contingent planning, or the study of how
people adjust to the various urban spatial variations is re¬
ceiving increasing attention. For example studies in "prox-
emics", the anthropology of the social and personal percep¬
tion of space, is now being intensively pursued. Research
in Proxemics, a term coined by E. Hall and defined as "the
interrelated observations and theories of man's use of space
as a specialized elaboration of culture",54 points to a num¬
ber of areas that need to be examined. The study of proxem¬
ics suggests that experience as it is perceived by individu¬
als differs from culture to culture or even within the same
culture. In other words, human behaviour, particularly so¬
cial behaviour should be understood in terms of the needs
and drives of the human organism, evolved through biological
evolution.55 Patrick Geddes, as early as 1915 in his book
Cities in Evolution had also emphasized the living environ¬
ments, that need, he said, to be learned by living in them
and understanding their social and spatial dimensions.56
54 E. Hall, The Hidden Dimension. New York: Doubleday @
Co.,Inc., 1966. p. 1.
55 Raymond Studers article "The Dynamics of Behaviour-Con¬
tingent Physical System" published in Design Methods in
Architecture (p. 55-70), ed., G. Broadbent & A. Ward.
Architectural Association Papers No. 4, London: Lund
Humphries, 1969. The paper was originally presented in
1967 to the Design Methods in Architecture Symposium in
Portsworth discusses the aspects behaviour studies in de¬
sign.
56 See Patrick Geddes, Cities in Evolution. New York: How¬
ard Fertig, 1968.
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Thus, spatial separations become meaningful factors
in the design of cities. This is not to suggest that spatial
determinism is the only criteria but that it constitutes an
important new perspective.
3.4.2 ENVIRONMENTAL! SM
Although of more recent vintage, the roots of envi-
ronmentalism go back to biblical times. In its current form
it is a reflection of scientific determinism that is based
on the belief that science through its rationality and
knowledge of cause and effect can improve human conditions.
By understanding the environment in its causal relationship
to man, it is assumed that a more effective relationship
could be established.
Two theories have emerged: one maintains that human
behaviour is determined by the biological nature of man; the
other holds that the environment moulds human behaviour.
Although both schools of thought have attempted to justify
their theories through scientific paradigms, both have been
influenced by religious, ethical, and political convictions.
The first position is more strongly advocated, by more con¬
servative and authoritarian-minded people while the latter
has been associated with more liberal thinking.57
57 Anatol Rapoport, Conflict in Man-Made Environment. Har-
mondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1964. pp. 123-126.
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There are scores of examples in the literature ex¬
pounding one theory or the other, but the central factor,
however, is that of man and the conflict he continuously
faces - whether it is biologically determined or environmen¬
tally moulded. The conflict, however, fails to recognize
that postulating a theory in an either/or construct only
complicates the matter. Many be'naviouralists are now de¬
parting from the classical behaviouralism, postulated by
John Watson (1924) and B.F.Skinner (1948), and argue that
one needs to go deeper into human understanding to assess
the behaviour, the inner processes, such as attitudes ,
feelings and beliefs which are important in determining be¬
haviour. Such an approach, of course attempts to bridge the
gap between pure behaviouralists and the environmentalists.
Called "Cognitive Behaviour Theory", it emphasises "learn¬
ing" to respond to the environment and "cognitions" such as
attitudes, values and feelings. The Social Learning Theories
discussed in a later section had their origins in this
school of thought. Sociobiologists, although not denying
that learning and socialization do affect human behaviour
have nonetheless argued that human behaviour to a great ex¬
tent is a result of genetically determined traits.
Robert Owen, the social reformer mentioned earlier,
rejected the self-made man theory generally postulated by
economists. Instead he argued that the environment deter¬
mines his destiny. In order to alter this condition, one
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alters the environment. His 'Institution for the Formation
of Character'(1916), was an attempt at recreating the envi¬
ronment to make it more conducive to cooperative human liv¬
ing, and therefore to mould the human character.58
3.5 THE CHOICE THEORY AND ADVOCACY PLANNING
Historically the planning process attempted to re¬
flect the 'public good', - the unitary public interest con¬
cept of 1950s often called the Elitist Model. It dominated
North American social thinking in the 50s and 60s, and was
directed at studying the preferences and the value systems
of the governing elite. Originally postulated by V.Pareto
in The Mind of Society (1935), G. Mosca in The Ruling Class
(1939), J. Schumpeter in Capitalism Socialism and Democracy
(1943) and C.Wright Mill, in The Power Elite (1956), the
model assumes that the real power in a community is highly
centralized and highly dominated by the elite of the socie¬
ty.
It is the elites that make or influence decisions,
and the authors argue that by studying the preferences and
values of governing elites, it is possible to understand the
nature of the decisions. Essentially, they attempt to ana¬
lyze decisions from the point of view of who governs and who
makes decisions - as opposed to what makes decision. The
58 Leonardo Benevolo, The Origins of Modern Town Planning.
Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1971, pp. 39-54.
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difference is important, the former reflects a unitary
interest and is easily discernable while the latter, is an
analysis at determining the nature of decision-making in a
pluralistic society reflecting the so-called public inter¬
est. Planning presumably advocates a consensus and seeks to
achieve the illusive public interest; in reality, it simply
reflects the elite's interest or the interest of the plan¬
ner. A single comprehensive plan is usually the outcome and
following the tenets of the rational comprehensive model,
the plan appears to be both neutral and objective, and in
the interest of the public good.
Davidoff and Reiner in their article "A Choice Theo¬
ry of Planning" published in 1962, and in a later article by
Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning" (1965), they
argued against this unitary model. Following Dahl, Banfield
and Polsley (1960) who introduced the 'pluralist theory',
Davidoff and Reiner argued that given the pluralistic nature
of contemporary society - the diversity of interest groups
variously endowed, and competing for the limited resources
available - it stands to reason that no common or public in¬
terest is possible. "Choice" they felt was central to plan¬
ning and saw the planning process as consisting of a) value
formation, b) means identification and c) implementation.
The important aspect they argued was 'ends' and their imple¬
mentation; the means was of secondary importance.
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What is needed, they contended, was a plurality of
plans and resolutions of conflicts through debate, bargain¬
ing and influence. The idea is based on the argument that
prevailing pluralistic social and economic conditions re¬
quire a pluralistic planning structure to articulate the va¬
riety of interests and values. The right policy they argued
is always a matter of choice and not of fact. The planner
should be involved in the political process as advocates of
the various interest groups other than the authority produc¬
ing the official city plan.59
Meaningful public participation, no doubt, consti¬
tutes an important element in planning. Many planning is¬
sues can only be dealt with adequately in a public arena, in
a political milieu, because they are not susceptible to
technical solutions, nor any objective answers. An advocate
planner assumes under this model a much broader role, moving
from the traditional role of technician to a proponent or
advocate of specific courses of action or plans. Such a
process according to the authors would produce superior
plans as a result of the competition and would offer a bet¬
ter chance of being implemented. Their arguments are based
on two beliefs:
59 P. Davidoff and T. Reyner, "A Choice Theory of Plan¬
ning". JAIP VOL. 28, MAY 62. PP. 103-115, and P. Davi¬
doff "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning", JAIP. Vol. 31,
Nov. 1965. pp. 331-228.
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1. Only the public have the right to make the decisions
that affect their lives, and
2. The role of the planner is mainly advisory, and
should be to represent interest groups or a community
in advocating their plans.
The opponents of advocacy planning, however, have
argued that it is basically impossible to prevent personal
values from intervening in plan making process. Also they
state that the planner has powers to manipulate and control
to seek his own ends, because of his special role as an ad¬
visor and an exponent of the interests of the community he
represents, and because of the technical sophistication he
possesses. His powers to activate and mobilize the resources
of the community or interest group he represents, could eas¬
ily end up being powers to manipulate and control to seek
his own ends. Such a possibility cannot easily be discount¬
ed given that knowledge can indeed mean power.
It is also interesting to note that advocacy tends
to mobilize resources more for negative issues, preventing
something undesirable from happening, rather than for pursu¬
ing a purposeful objective or good. It responds better in a
reactive role - rather than in any innovative forward look¬
ing capacity. It requires that planning become value-laden,
but the planner be value-free - a construct that is diffi¬
cult to reconcile. It attempts to seek consensus through
debate and compromise, and provides alternatives by widening
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the range of choices and goals, and by opting for a multipl¬
icity of plans rather than a single end-product from the
city hall planners.
J. S. Mill (1806-1873), observed that whatever the
predisposition and benevolence of the representative towards
the interest group he represents, he is rarely capable of an
accurate representation because each man only knows his own
interest best.60 If this be true then the whole concept of
advocacy planning becomes questionable by the mere fact that
its basic tenet is accurate representation of the community
interest clearly distinguished from his own interests or bi¬
ases. The planner it is believed in such circumstances
would express or make known before hand his biases and pro¬
ceed to identify and articulate the interests of the commu¬
nity he represents through consensus and debate. The ques¬
tion that arises however is whether it is in fact possible
to be neutral particularly in the advocacy position that the
theory posits. City planning in an advocacy role becomes
simply a means for determining policy, - the goal identifi¬
cation becomes an activity central to planning and more im¬
portant than the means, or choices of instruments. Besides
an advocates avowed interest is simply to advocate and argue
his point of view, even at the cost of negating the opposing
position whether right or wrong. Such an approach would at
best constrict full discourse in the planning process, that
60 See J.S.Mill, Considerations on Representative Govern¬
ment. London: G. Routledge, 1861.
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attempts to seek a synthesis or a consensus for the plan of
action.
3.6 ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES IN PLANNING
The role of organizations in planning is becoming
increasingly important. The works of March and Simon,
(1958), Bennis (1959), Bennis and Chin (1961) and Cyert &
March (1963), were to an extent responsible for this new di¬
rection in planning. Their basic premise states that since
human behaviour is affected by organizations, it stands to
reason that organizations in turn can be adapted to produce
desirable behaviour. The main purpose of an organization it
is argued is to advance the common interests of the organi¬
zation, through collective rationality, and consensus build¬
ing within the membership.
Talcott Parsons (1960), defines organizations as a
social unit, "deliberately constructed and reconstructed to
seek specific goals".61 It suggests deliberate planning of
organizations as instruments to seek common goals or to fur¬
ther the common interests of their members. Organizations,
therefore, can perform functions most effectively where
there are common purposes and interests to be pursued. In
planning, such a model offers very good possibilities. But
there are a number of conditions that need to be satisfied.
61 See Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern So¬
cieties. Illinois: Glencoe Publishers, 1960.
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An organizational theory will have to be able to define the
most appropriate structure of the organization necessary to
achieve a desired end. As well it will have to determine the
necessary ingredients in the organization "under which be¬
haviour inside organizations becomes standardized and pre¬
dictable" .6 2
The decision-making process in organizations however
differs markedly from individual decision-making. This is
so because in an organizational structure there are diverse
view points and plural interests - requiring therefore, an
apparatus for consensus building and internal communication
networks. The process is based on understanding collective
behaviour and in the abdication of individual welfare to or¬
ganizational goals. The individual interests in organiza¬
tions are simply subsumed in the common goals of the organi¬
zation and the individual thus concentrates on the process
involved in reaching consensus based on organizational
goals. The process of decision-making in an organization,
seeks internal integration between the membership as a
strategy to avoid conflicts and schisms, or to avoid working
at cross purposes. The formal structure of the organization
legitimizes function and gives a mandate to define goals and
the means for achieving them - it provides a logic for col¬
lective action.
62 Joan Woodward, Industrial Organization: Theory and Prac¬
tice. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 248.
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One of the important characteristics of an organiza¬
tion, is that it is there for a definite purpose. The organ¬
ization always assumes an interventionist role in institut¬
ing any change and it does so in a rigid and mechanistic
way. It is ideological inasmuch as its beliefs are shared
by its membership as a criterion for membership. It also
self destructs if it does nothing to further the interests
of its membership or if its objectives have been achieved.
Although Plato noted that by changing human institu¬
tions, human nature could also be changed, Rousseau argued
the contrary: that only by abolishing human institutions,
could human nature resort to its natural instincts following
natural laws, and free itself from the bondage of institu¬
tional structures. These two views do not, however, detract
from the validity of oganizational theories particularly as
they apply to planning. Given the fact that Institutions in
contemporary society are almost a way of life, and that
planning calls for collective action in seeking collective
goals, such a model has potential applicability to planning.
3.7 THEORIES OF SOCIAL PRACTICE
Attempts at reconstructing society and theories in
this direction have made their mark on planning thought more
in explaining society than in postulating any set solutions.
Karl Mannheim (1893-1947) was one of the earliest to expound
the theory of social reconstruction in which he sought to
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reconstruct society through the process of re-education.This
represents a strong and very relevant dictum for planning.
Although education as a pursuit of human happiness dates
back to the Platonic era, its reformulation according to
Mannheim in the early 1900s saw the planner as a social sci¬
entist, and an active participant in social change. He felt
that, 'to work in the social sciences one must participate
in the social process'.
Social theorists link knowledge to action. In es¬
sence they develop a symbiotic relationship between thinking
and doing, between knowledge development and knowledge use,
between knowledge and society, and between ideas and social
action. Thinking always takes place, according to Mannheim,
within societal context; it is not a free activity. These
linkages are not only relevant to our ideas but they deter¬
mine the nature and content of our experiences and observa¬
tions. Such a thesis presents many implications for plan¬
ning, particularly regarding the way in which problems are
formulated and defined, and in the way in which they are
solved.
In his sociology of planned reconstruction Mannheim
argued about the crisis in society caused by "fundamental
democratization". In this process the elite have lost con¬
trol, and power now rests in the hands of the masses, most
of whom, either by design or otherwise are kept at low in¬
tellectual level. As such, their decisions tend to be guid-
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ed by non-rational or emotional urges, and thus present a
threat to civilization. Hence, he believes there is a need
to reconstruct society to provide more intellectual insights
by what he calls "substantive rationality". This would oc¬
cur through conscious rational planning for a new planned
order through "planned thinking". Thus planning would be a
means of working towards social reconstruction.63
Karl Marx (1818-1883) likewise saw social change as
an inevitable phenomenon directed towards human liberation,
and towards a classless society. For Marx, society was al¬
ways in a state of tension and it is this tension that gen¬
erates change. Struggle is, therefore, a necessary condition
for change and social conflict the essence of historical ev¬
olution. All social relations are rooted in historical
fact, including ideas, values and material conditions. Like
Mannheim, Marx saw thinking as a social activity, necessary
to bring about social change. The classless society, he ar¬
gued, was inevitable and would come as a consequence of the
struggle. In the end, he maintained, it is the unity of
theory and practice, (the praxis, the philosophy of action),
and the re-establishment of the social order and social re¬
lations between the masses and the ruling elite that mat¬
ters. The masses, he said, need to gain knowledge and the
eventual dictatorship of the proletariat.
63 See Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Recon¬
struction . New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.,
1 940.
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Rousseau (1712-1778) in Emile (1762), had also
argued for the need to re-educate society in the pursuit of
individual natural rights, and to free man from the re¬
straints of society. By re-educating, however, he meant a
return to the stage of naturalness, to the basic nature of
man not as an instrument of change but as an instrument of
freedom.
These theories have their roots in psychology, biol¬
ogy, education, and cybernetics, at least in the way in
which the social learning theories are interpreted in plan¬
ning discourse. These disciplines generally suggest that
morality has a culturally defined meaning and that it is
from parents and other socializing agents that children be¬
gin to learn rules and codes of behaviour in society.
A problem, however, arises with the dilemma of rec¬
onciling human "feelings" with human "thinking". The psy¬
choanalyst maintains that people behave in the way they
feel, 'people are what they feel', while the cognitive theo¬
rists hold that 'people are what they think'. This differ¬
entiation is at the crux of social learning theories.
Should social learning be a mutual activity - a pro¬
cess of mediation in re-education or should it be an activi¬
ty of a deterministic nature directed at changing the feel¬
ings and the concomitant thinking process? A number of
authors have attempted to explore these ideas - A. Etzioni
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(1968); E. Dunn (1971); D. Schon (1971); J. Friedmann (1969
and 1973); C. Hampden-Turner (1971); Dennis Goulet (1971)
Ivan Illich (1970), and Paulo Freire (1975).
Etzioni believes that active participation is the
key to societal change. To achieve societal goals and pre¬
serve societal values, a mobilization of human resources is
necessary. The Planner as a consensus/conscience builder
should be involved as an active member of the team seeking
changes. An active society is one which is master of its
own destiny.64 Dunn maintains that the evolution of society
could be achieved through the transformation of the individ¬
ual inertia or motives. He calls this a "social evolution"
by change in social behaviour through organismic adaptabili¬
ty. The planner, a component of this change, is a member of
the social milieu seeking social evolution through the pro¬
cess of individual growth. Using the biological metaphor,
he subscribes to the competitive system of Social Darwinism,
that is the survival of the fittest. He also argues that
the biological evolution differentiates from the social evo¬
lution because of the inherent nature of human capacity for
purposeful behaviour.65
54 See Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society. New York: The
Free Press, 1968.
65 See Edgar Dunn, Economic and Social Development: A Pro¬
cess of Social Learning. Baltimore: The John Hopkins
University Press, 1971.
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Schon, (1971) believes that a more effective learn¬
ing system will create, although gradually, permanent chang¬
es. His concept of 'Dynamic Conservatism' of institutions,
explains his argument contra small gradual incremental
change, which he feels is ineffective and incapable of deal¬
ing with changes adequately.66
Friedmann sees planning as a form of social learn¬
ing, which attempts to mediate between knowledge and action
in what he calls "Transactive Planning". That is sharing
and engaging in mutual growth and development through trans¬
action of knowledge - a kind of "learning society" evolving
through dialogue. The role of the planner becomes very sig¬
nificant in directing change. Transactive planning, assumes
that the planner acts or will act in the best interest of
the community in seeking the desired changes. Friedmann
suggests that social practice needs to incorporate social
values, that determine the nature of the problem. It also
needs to understand a theory of reality that can assist in
defining the problem situations, and in developing a de¬
tailed plan of action which is politically viable and able
to mobilize social action and the necessary resources.67
66 See Donald Schon, Beyond the Stable State. New York:
W.W.Norton and Co. Inc. 1971.
67 See John Friedmann, Retrackinq America: A Theory of
Transactive Planning. New York: Doubleday Books, 1973.
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Hampden-Turner, using a psycho-social model, empha¬
sizes the role of the individual in an existential state as
the fulcrum of change: it is at the level of the individual
that change should be initiated, he maintains, because man
as an existential being is responsible for his own actions
and destiny.6 8
Ivan Illich, in Deschoolinq Society argues that the
present educational system is not only inefficient in terms
of education it provides, but it is also very divisive. He
contends that the need is not only transacting knowledge,
but also re-education to promote the ideal of conviviality
in ways that they themselves devise, as the key for social
change. Not, Illich argues, through planned institutional¬
ized learning systems, but through mobilization of the whole
population that, education for all can be realized,- "educa¬
tion for all, means education by all". Contemporary man at¬
tempts to modify the world to suit his image, to create a
world that is entirely man-made, but at the end discovers
that it is himself that has to adapt and readapt to fit in
the world that he attempted to create.69
68 See C. Hampden-Turner, Radical Man: The Process of Psy-
cho-Social Development. Garden City, New York: Anchor
Books, 1971. See also Dennis Goulet, The Cruel Choice.
New York: Atheneum Books, 1971.
69 Ivan Illich, Deschoolinq Society. Harmondsworth: Penguin
Books, 1976. p.29 and 108.
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Similar arguments are also put forward by many oth¬
ers. There is general agreement on the need for the re-edu¬
cation of man, but great differences in the proposed means
of achieving it.
Paulo Freire sees education as an instrument by
which man can understand the problems of society and the
living environment and thus use it as a tool for social
change. Education becomes the means by which the masses can
perceive, critically understand, and intervene as desired.
This gives man the ability to be creative, to share and to
solve problems in his own terms. It makes man more fully
human and more responsible for his actions. What is needed,
he says, is dialogue and exchange of knowledge for the re¬
alization of freedom. Freire states,
"I repeat: the investigation of thematics in¬
volves the investigation of the people's thinking
thinking which occurs only in and among men
seeking out reality together. I cannot think 'for
others' or 'without others' nor can others think
for me. Even if the people's thinking is super¬
stitious or naive, it is only as they rethink
their assumptions in action that they can change.
Producing and acting upon their own ideas - not
absorbing those of others - must constitute that
process".7 0
On critical examination one finds that the social
learning theories are essentially common-sense concepts,
which are in turn based on experience. It derives its raison
d'etre from life experiences and calls for dialogue and par-
70 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed. London: Penguin
Books, 1975, pp. 80.
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ticipation in bringing about desired changes. Given that the
pursuit of freedom is almost an impossibility in an disor¬
dered society, the need for planning becomes much more cru¬
cial in a democratic society. But this can only be achieved
according to the proponents of social learning theories,
through the development of moral consensus, through re-edu¬
cation of man. Active involvement and transaction of knowl¬
edge towards mutual re-education can become the goal and the
means at the same time. Planning can thus become a social
learning process rather than a deterministic, end-oriented
mechanistic activity. Man becomes the focus of the system
and it is either through individual or collective change
that societal change is achieved.
3.8 CRITICAL THEORIES
The "Critical School" of thought maintains that
planning should direct its efforts at critically examining
social change with a view to ultimately 'restructuring' it
based on the critical findings. It was a point of view that
was advocated by the Frankfurt School's "Institute fur Sozi-
alforschung" founded in 1923. It was associated with such
names as Max Horkeimer ( 1895-1 973 ), 7 1 Theodore Adorno
(1903-1969), Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979) Eric Fromm (b.
1900), and later Jurgen Haberman (b. 1929).
71 See Max Hokheimer, Critical Theory. Trans.,Mathew J. 0'-
Connel et al. New York: Herder and Herder, 1972.
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Not unlike the Phenomenologist E. Husserl
(1859-1938), the Critical Theorists were skeptical of the
positivistic tendencies that were increasingly dominating
intellectual thought in the early 1900's. The traditional
theory, they argued, is unable to make distintion between
reality and appearance. It is this particular characteris¬
tic, of differentiating between knowledge and beliefs or
opinions, that distinguishes critical theory.
In essence their major premises are as follows:
1. That our ideas emanate from the environment in which
we live.
2. That the pursuit of knowledge should not be directed
at objectively seeking a synthesis between theory and
praxis, but towards a critical analysis of society,
with a view to achieving desired social changes,
through the political practice.
'Reason' they asserted was the 'critical tribunal'
and the critical determinant in judging the criteria of
freedom and pleasure, would be the workings of existing so¬
cieties.
They rejected the "technique -dominated" society,
claiming that it generated a technocratic society, whose
ideology and workings precluded human freedom and pleasure.
Technique, they maintained, imposes a rationale of its own
on human behaviour; it creates a "false consciousness" as a
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mechanism to control society. The whole of scientific and
technological rationality needs to be de-mystified and its
true purpose understood. Mass culture, thus, becomes a
means to free society from the clutches of efficiency and
technological rationality resulting in a technocratic con¬
sciousness. Critical theory has a fundamental practical
bias towards human improvement and in fostering self-con¬
sciousness that is reality-based. They argue that it is
through a critical approach to society that mankind will be
able to design and guide its own future.
A variation on the theme appears in the Hermeneutic
school of thought. Hermeneutics is a Greek word meaning to
understand. The philosophy of Hermeneutics is not interested
in theories or systems per se, but in their role towards un¬
derstanding the meaning of the nature of the system; that is
understanding the language, understanding the environment,
understanding the man. By understanding in this particular
context is meant to know, the "what" rather than the "how",
in the propositional sense of its use or activity, - a kind
of practical philosophy that seeks an ethical guide in un¬
derstanding the meaning achieved through self-reflection.
It is a kind of relationship between discourse and action.72
72 See Richard J. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and
Political Theory. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1975.
pp. 179-225. See also R. Keat and J. Urry, Social Theory
as Science. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,1975.
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3.9 THE SOCIALISTS AND THE EVANGELICALS
While positivism and utilitarianism discussed earli¬
er had very significant influence on planning movement gen¬
erally, socialists and evangelicals raised some very criti¬
cal issues in the planning discourse. It shifted the focus
from purely scientific endeavours of planning and its empha¬
sis on utility functions as measures of success or failure,
to more humanitarian concerns; concerns regarding the nature
of social change, class inequalities, deprivation and the
living conditions of the urban poor. Socialists were criti¬
cal of the new forces of urbanism and contended that the ur¬
ban environment was in fact shaped by political ideology,
which in turn gave form to the physical plan of the city.
Socialists thinkers like Henry Lefebvre (1971), Da¬
vid Harvey (1973), and Manuel Castells (1977) argued in
their writings that it was important first to understand how
the capitalist system operates in terms of social, economic
and political process in order to recognize the workings of
urbanism. Castells for example in his book The Urban Ques¬
tion ( 1 979) 7 3 maintains that the urban space is indeed an
expression of the social structure generated by the econom¬
ic, political and ideological forces that manifest them¬
selves in social practices and class conflicts. The city,
according to Castells, is a place of consumption more than
73 See Manuel Castells, The Urban Question. Trans., Alan
Sheridan. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 1979.
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of production dominated by the strong political force of the
new middle class. Harvey in Social Justice and the City
(1976)74 points out that urban spaces are controlled by the
different social classes and by the redistribution of income
that such divisions generate as an organizing principle.
Evangelicals on the other hand, as David Eversley75 points
out, moved even beyond the need to eliminate social injus¬
tices in the city, to pleading for a more selfless living
and for human dignity. While such movements influenced
thinking of many planners they had very little success in
realizing their idealistic objectives.
3.10 ANARCHIST THOUGHTS IN PLANNING
Rather interesting polemic works introduced by
D.L.Phillips in Abandoning Method (1973), and more recently
by P. Feyerabend in Against Method, (1975), seem to present
an alternative to the dilemmas posed by the scientific meth¬
odology. These polemics move full circle from the pure ob¬
jectivity of true knowledge to the complete freedom of "any¬
thing goes". They hold that no perfect knowledge of anything
is possible or even desirable, and this view is called "ep-
istemological anarchism". 76
74 See David Harvey, Social Justice and the City. London:
Edwin Arnold Publishers, Ltd., 1975.
75 See David Eversley. The Planner in Society. London:
Faber and Faber, 1973.
76 Some of the important men in the anarchist school of
thought include Tolstoy, Gandhi, Kroptkin, Schumacher,
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D.L.Phillips presents a somewhat different approach
to Feyerabend's. Phillips emphasizes play as the principal
activity in advancing knowledge and what he calls "playful
theorising" as a legitimate and effective activity. Playful
activities, according to Phillips, would be activities
"not guided by formal rule or methods but engaged
in for themselves. Play is existence centered in
itself. Both play in the usual sense and prolif¬
eration as a kind of play - form, help to assure
our freedom so that we car, decide (if initially
only in fantasy) the way we want to live our lives
and develop our talents, rather than adopting by
habit or following proper methods".77
Play, according to Phillips, thus becomes a viable
alternative to method, provided of course it is pursued on
an individual basis and played for its own sake rather than
for the sake of others. In other words, play should have
freedom and not be governed by rules and regulations or be
methodical.
A playful attitude, says Phillips, "is a necessary
precondition for 'experiencing' the world". 78 We should
not use method to guide our thought, but create the world or
look at the world through our own eyes rather than through
the instruments of science or methodologies. In other
words, we need to play "the game of the world" in its own
terms in an attitude of freedom and open inquiry.
Roszak, Freire and Illich.
77 D.L.Phillips, Abandoning Method. San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass Publishers, 1973. pp. 158-159.
78 D.L. Phillips, ibid. pp. 160-163.
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Theorizing, he maintains, is like raising
consciousness and is more of a reflexive activity. It is
Pre-Socratic in concept, and thus not only restrictive but
also often false.
The theory of play comes from Huizinga, who first
enunciated it in his critical book Homo Luaens (1938). Huiz¬
inga maintained that civilizations cannot exist without the
play element, the "play spirit" as he calls it. Play is the
force that generates new cultural forms and seeks new
synthesis in an evolving pattern accomodating the new as
well as the old, but always creating new experiences. Play,
he contends, is freedom; it is a free activity pursued for
its own sake. It is not real or ordinary life, it is like
experiencing another world, a world of pretence lived for a
limited time. Being a cultural phenomena rather than a biol¬
ogical phenomena, play reflects society's mores and codes of
life. 79 Phillips uses a similar metaphor as his alterna¬
tive method to traditional science based activity.
Play, these theorists contend, is a goal oriented
activity that attempts to achieve an end objective through
inefficient means, by often introducing unwarranted obsta¬
cles. One of the important characteristic of play is that
both the ends and means are interdependent and both are
limited and a priori determined. Planning on the other hand
79 Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens. A Study of Play Element in
Culture. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955. p. 211.
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attempts to achieve the ends through most efficient and
rational means. Introduction of obstacles for example in
planning would constitute irrational behaviour.
E. Erikson (1950) believes that reeducation of man
is essentially a force mobilized through play and playful
integration. As Huizinga noted, "Inside playground an abso¬
lute order and peculiar order reigns... it creates order, is
order. Into an imperfect world and into the confusion of
life, it brings a temporary,a limited perfection... play
has a tendency to be beautiful." 80 In other words play is
an activity that is more natural to human behaviour and more
effective in guiding human actions. Its rules are the game
itself, and these rules are binding upon the players for the
duration of the game only. It recognizes its limitations and
seeks to achieve its ends within these set limits. Caillois
remarks that play involves the totality of human behaviour
and interests, and can provide useful indications as to the
societies preferences, weaknesses and strengths at a given
stage of its evolution. 81 82
80 Huizinga, op cit. p.10.
81 Roger Caillois, Man, Play and Games. Trans., Meyer Bar-
ash. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe Inc. 1961.
p. 175 & 83.
82 E. Erikson, Childhood and Society. New York: W.W.Norton
& Co., 1963, p.240.
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Feyerabend suggests that science is essentially an
anarchist activity for two reasons:63
1. The world we inhabit is relatively an unknown entity;
2. Science cannot reconcile itself with moral issues
that guide human behaviour.
Science, he argues, is constantly at conflict with
freedom of thought and freedom of critical thinking. Abso¬
lute truth, Feyerabend contends, leads to absolute confor-
mism and uniformity; it endangers critical thought processes
and individual development.
According to Feyerabend ,theory is not best evaluat¬
ed by reference to facts or observations as the scientific
method ordains, but to other theories, that provide a world
view, and that can act as standards of criticism. It is
through a comparison of ideas with other ideas that new
knowledge develops best. This, of course, implies that the
more theories, the better, as there is more challenge for
more theories to develop and improve each other. Truth he
contends is relative to a model and there is no neutral van¬
tage point from which to adjudicate among the various models
of the world.
83 P. Feyerabend, Against Method. London: NLB Publishers,
1975, pp.17-22.
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The condition of consistency that is inherent in
traditional methods which demand new hypotheses be based on
accepted theories, is unreasonable because it tends to sanc¬
tify and preserve older theories which may not necessarily
be good. Simply adding new theories based on equally unsa¬
tisfactory kinds of knowledge, does not advance knowledge.
Knowledge is best advanced by proceeding counterinductively,
because "observational reports experimental results, factual
statements either contain theoretical assumptions or assert
them in the manner in which they are used".84
Feyerabend argues for "Methodological Pluralism":
that we must keep our options open and not restrict our¬
selves to any single methodology or epistemological pre¬
scription. His purpose is to understand the natural system
and increase human happiness rather than to defend a partic¬
ular paradigm or a set of procedural rules. The anarchist
employs a plurality of methodologies to attain objectives;
thus witchcraft, sorcery, secondsight, astrology, can all
provide potentially valuable resources or insights for un¬
derstanding the natural system.85 A kind of approach used by
the Dadaist, whose favourite past time was to confuse the
rationalist by simply inventing compelling reasons for un¬
reasonable doctrines in order to emphasize the cognitive do¬
main of human intellect.86
84 P. Feyerabend, op.cit. p.31.
85 P. Feyerabend, op. cit. pp.35-53.
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Feyerabend's thesis is simply that there are no
eternal or universal intellectual standards. If science is
to progress it must develop as an anarchist activity - that
is "anything goes" including "intellectual dishonesty". The
options must, of necessity, be kept open, and not be re¬
stricted in advance to some artificial standards that in
fact inhibit progress. He suggests the use of persuasion,
and rhetoric, rather than purely reason or logic. It is, he
concludes, an opportunistic activity. In fact, a strong
clash between facts and theories could result in progress.
Feyerabend maintains that "Science is an essentially
anarchistic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more hu¬
manitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its
law-and-order alternatives".87 Knowledge development re¬
quires some kind of a spark, insight, a flash of genius like
Galileo, Newton or Einstein, that cause great leaps in human
86 Dadaism was a reactionary movement in art that originated
in Zurich (1916). It was a reaction against the sense¬
lessness of the War and against the rationalistic mater¬
ialistic society. Although not too well known, Dadaism
rejected the rigid canons of art and pure formality as
simply irrelevant and purposeless. It was essentially an
anti-art movement and emphasized the irrational aspects,
the human consciousness, as being much more relevant and
reflective of reality.
87 P. Feyerabend, Against Method. London: NLB Publications,
1975. p. 17. Much of this material is taken from three
good critiques in Philosophy of the Social Sciences.
Vol.7,Vol.1,2 & 3, 1977. pp 265-302.,by Paul Tib-
betts.'Feyerabend's Against Method: The Case for Methodo¬
logical Pluralism'; Thomas Kulka. 'How Far Does Anything
Go? Comments on Feyerabend's Epistemological Anarchism';
and J.N.Hattiangadi. 'The Crisis in Methodology: Feyera¬
bend' .
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knowledge and constitutes what Kuhn calls a new paradigm, a
new synthesis that is then accepted as knowledge. That is in
essence what Feyerabend is advocating and his "anything
goes" theory is perhaps what will create conditions for such
giant leaps to happen.
Chapter IV
THE PROCESS AND PRACTICE OF PLANNING
"Knowledge of everyday life is structured in terms
of relevances".
Berger & Luckrnann
4.1 THEORY AND PRACTICE
The dichotomy between theory and practice has been
at the core of controversy in planning. Planning is be¬
lieved to be an empirically based discipline, deriving its
corpus of knowledge primarily from the faculty of observa¬
tion and experience, rather than from pure reason alone. It
is this characteristic that has led planning to its emphasis
on methodology and procedural theories.
Although not the originator of the idea of Empiri¬
cism, it was David Hume, the 18th century philosopher who
gave the empirical school of thought its more contemporary
meaning. According to Hume, the true source of both scien¬
tific and non-scientific knowledge lies in the "science of
man" based on experience and observation. The science of
man is the way in which the human mind processes knowledge
and formulates views, impressions and ideas, about things
- 159 -
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they believe in. Hume's principle is derived from his con¬
cept that every human idea is a representation of previous
experiences, observation or impressions. The more complex
ideas are derived from the simpler ones which in turn have
their roots in past experience.1
It is this particular principle of empiricism that
becomes the 'sine qua non' in planning and provides the in¬
gredients for man's reasoning processes. Hume does, how¬
ever, differentiate between knowledge gained through obser¬
vation and knowledge gained through the use of reason. The
former he contends is 'a posteriori' and encompasses all
knowledge about the world gained through observation. The
later is 'a priori knowledge', a mental logical process (an
operation of thought process) internalized to gain knowledge
of the ideas emanating from the mind and directed at the
pursuit of truth. Hume goes on to differentiate between
"analytical knowledge" and "synthetic knowledge". Analyt¬
ical knowledge, that can claim to be true by definition and
is based on the principle that the relations between ideas,
cannot be changed without altering the ideas or introducing
contradiction. Synthetic knowledge is based on extensive
generalizations. It can be derived through intuition, in¬
trospection or observation and it is in essence based on the
relationship between ideas. Planning knowledge, similar to
social science knowledge, falls into the latter category,
1 See David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
Oxford: Claredon Press, 1962.
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and planning theories are better derived from the powers of
intuition and creativity than purely from results of obser¬
vation alone.
Kuhn argues that what we call 'facts', 'problems',
'solutions', et cetera are a function of our presuppositions
and constitute part of the dominant paradigm, a set of as¬
sumptions derived from the dominant scientific work or as¬
sertions. These presuppositions may be either theoretical
or metaphysical, explicit or implicit. Such paradigms, Kuhn
argues, attempt to force nature into predetermined conceptu¬
al boxes, and thus restrict fuller understanding of the
problem in its intrinsic nature. Paradigms, he contends,
"insulate the community from those socially important prob¬
lems that are not reducible to the puzzle form".2
Popper maintains that theories must have explanatory
power and must seek discourses in practice. That planning
theory needs to be informed by practice as much as practice
needs to be quided by theory is the argument that is often
made. But it is also argued that it must be testable. The
reason according to Popper is that when theories are couched
in testable form they enable one to speak in a common lan¬
guage and thus avoid arguments that tend to be at cross pur¬
poses, but more importantly, testability criterion allow a
theory to be falsified.3
2 See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962.
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It has also been questioned whether theory
represents full truth, whether it represents a convention or
an instrument, or simply an operational metaphor. In other
words, are theories only tools or are they more than tools
or instruments? In this context there are a number of
schools of thought, the most important ones are Convention¬
alism, Instrumentalism and Operationalism. Conventionalism
(Poincare) assumes theories to be simply conventions,(that
is units in models need not correspond to the elements in
the world and the test of the model is pragmatic) formulated
for specific purpose and concerned with concepts as they
contribute to truth or fallacy. The question of reality in
conventionalism remains of secondary consideration, while
Instrumentalism (Dewey, Popper) assumes theory as an instru¬
ment designed to calculate or predict a phenomenon but says
nothing of reality. Its validity is determined by its util¬
ity and not by its reflection of reality. Operationalism
(Bridgman) assumes that theory has no meaning in itself, but
gains meaning only in context of its application. Its main
concern is with meaning and reality.4
In planning, theories fall in the category of In¬
strumentalism, that is planning theories become simply in¬
struments or tools for supposedly perceiving and understand-
3 See Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Lon¬
don: Hutchinson Co. Ltd., 1975.
4 Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of
Scientific Knowledge. New York: Harper & Row, Publish¬
ers, 1963, pp. 59-65.
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ing the planning problem in its real nature. But what plan¬
ning theories in fact do, is distort the real problem to fit
the theoretical model. In other words, problems become re¬
flections of the theory through which it is perceived - that
is it ignores reality at the cost of an ideal. Instrumen-
talism is held to reflect reality, but there is no attempt
to explain it. John Dewey( 1859-1952) used the term "instru-
mentalism" for his version of pragmatism, as a philosophy of
action, education and social reform. Scientific knowledge
according to Dewey should be instrumental in problem solv¬
ing. Popper suggests that data manipulate observations ei¬
ther by means of instrumentation theory or pattern theory.
In other words theory is simply an instrument to calculate
and predict. Instrumental knowledge assumes that knowledge
represents power and truth, and that these are useful con¬
cepts, since they provide the necessary powers to control
and predict social phenomena. Further more, Popper contends
that since all theories are statements describing behaviour,
they must all therefore be stated in terms of possible be¬
haviour patterns. These very characteristics, observations
and manipulations of data represent the functional approach
of science and scientific theories. This is, as can be
seen, a direct derivation from 'Quantum Mechanics' theory,
where it is believed that theory said nothing about reality,
but simply predicted the outcome. As Popper states, "our
propensity to look out for regularities, and to impose laws
upon nature, leads to psychological phenomena of dogmatic
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thinking or, more generally, dogmatic behaviour; we expect
regularities everywhere and attempt to find them even where
there are none".5
Planning theories, however, need to satisfy the fol¬
lowing criteria:6
1. They must be causally adequate (simple correlations
are not adequate enough to explain social facts).
2. They must be useful/workable (generalizations are not
adequate to explain human actions).
3. They must be grounded in practical experience (theo¬
ries that can be collaborated by experience).
4. They should possess explanatory and predictive pow¬
ers.
5. They should be stated in the context of a clearly
identifiable institutional framework, and be descrip¬
tive of behaviour.
6. They must be stated in common language understandable
to the public (They must be understood by others,
even though they need not necessarily be accepted.
It is generally agreed that any research in urban
problems must be based on a sound theory to be valid. But
city planning theory of necessity has to be interdiscipli¬
nary and has to seek its paradigm in interdisciplinary work.
5 Karl. Popper, op cit. pp 107-119 and 49-62.
5 See Karl Popper, op.cit.
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During the last two decades or so a lot of interdisciplinary
work has taken place in planning, bridging the gap between
social sciences and planning, more particularly bridging the
gap between theory and method. Interdisciplinary research
work and theoretical constructs are put forward, and methods
are freely interrelated, and interchanged. The danger in
such pursuits is that the distinctiveness of the individual
discipline, in this case planning may be lost, and the con¬
struct may be reduced to its lowest common denominator and
dominated by one discipline. By seeking consensus, there
may be losses in the depth of inquiry and understanding, and
these constraints must be very carefully assessed prior to
integrating disciplines and pursuing interdisciplinary work.
In essence what is required is a theory that can re¬
spond to the needs of pluralistic societies with the rigour,
coherence and the needed explanatory and predictive power.
Most importantly there is a need for theories that are eth¬
ic-based, and practice-informed, and conducive to interdis¬
ciplinary research, to provide the needed holistic perspec¬
tive. Planning theories of necessity must reflect social
patterns and behaviour. Dewey noted that theories particu¬
larly social theories need constantly to be subjected to
public scrutiny in order to clarify, refine and justify
them.
4.2 PRACTICE OF PLANNING
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The state of the art of current planning practice
continues to suffer schizophrenic tendencies, caught in what
Gregory Bateson calls the "double-bind theory". You advo¬
cate a certain direction but through your actions produce
quite different results and in the process the subject loses
and withdraws from reality. While the practice of planning
continued to aspire for grand visions and ideal cities,
their actions however, led to different or no results and in
the process urban problems proceeded to multiply with no ad¬
equate solutions.
If a label can be atached to the philosophy, or
principles guiding the current practice of planning, it
would unquestionably be the "rational comprehensive" plan¬
ning model that most distinctly marked planning practice.
Rooted in positivisim and doctrine of ultilitarianism, plan¬
ning continued to produce technical solutions for organizing
urban spaces, rearranging land uses and designing systems of
transportation networks. The unending quest for efficiency,
regularity and aesthetics in a rational comprehensive manner
was justified in the name of a unitary public interest. The
credo that "more planning is always better than less" plan¬
ning, generated grandiose plans emulating the Baroque pat¬
terns of boulevards, parks and grand vistas. Planners, for
all practical purposes, became suppliers of visions and so¬
lutions, extrapolating the present to a static future.
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In a recent study in Canada7 the authors found that
while the majority of professional planners agreed that a
philosophy or theory did guide the plan making process, very
few were able to define what specifically were these guiding
principles or theories. Likewise an earlier study by Page
and Lang6 found that while most practicing planners stated
that the comprehensive planning model was the most commonly
used model, there was little agreement defining the nature
of this model. A study of American planning practitioners
undertaken recently by Baum9 also found that the majority of
the respondents could not specifically identify a theory as
underlying their practical work. Neither does any coherent
definition of what planning is emerges in the academic or
professional planning community. Whether this is a desira¬
ble feature or not is of course debatable.
Given such a discord it is difficult to classify
plans into any specific categories except to note their un¬
derlying principles and examine the resultant product. Un¬
til recently and with very few exceptions the same princi¬
ples of rationality, order efficiency and aesthetics were
applied, irrespective of whether the plans were for re-
7 See Anne Westhues. "Towards a Positive Theory of Plan¬
ning" Plan Canada. No. 23:3, Sept. 85. pp. 97-103.
8 See John Page and Reg Lang. Canadian Planners in Profile.
Faculty of Environmental Studies: York University, 1977.
9 See H.A. Baum, "The uncertain consciousness of planners
and the professional enterprise". Plan Canada. No. 20,
1980. pp. 39-53.
168
building existing cities or building new cities or towns.
While no single school of thought or text on plan¬
ning dominated planning discourse or practice neither for
any sustained period of time, nor with any significant im¬
pact on the urban morphology, there were a number of intel¬
lectual works that served as guides in the practice of plan¬
ning. In a way planning practice was an amalgam of ideas
that reflected the ideology of the time; the dominant theme
be it city beautiful or city functional, or rational; the
idiosincracies of the client and of course of the master
planner; and the prevailing social economic and physical
conditions. Lack of a coherent definition of the nature of
planning served to generate a diversity of means and ends as
plans for development, with no uniform criteria to compare
or evaluate their successes or failures.
Of significance, we have the two texts referred to
earlier, namely, City Planning According to Artistic Princi¬
ples by Camillo Sitte, originally published in German in
1889 and Raymond Unwin's, Town Planning in Practice: subti¬
tled, An Introduction to the Art of Designing Cities, pub¬
lished in 1909 both served as guides in planning practice.
Sitte's book advocated systematic analysis based on purely
artistic and technical criterias - it was a simplistic ap¬
proach, for inspite of the added considerations of physical
and psychological needs of the people, design principles
still dominated. Sitte's model while it served as a guide
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for the expansion and planning of Vienna, Dessau and Munich,
failed to recognize the complexity that urban living gener¬
ates in the process of change and growth. At best, the
ideas Sitte proposes could help in neighbourhood planning
rather than in the planning of large urban centers. Unwin,
likewise in the great tradition of architecture, was con¬
cerned with the principles of design aesthetics in, as he
says "finding a beautiful form of expression for the life of
the community", to serve as guiding principles for town
planning. This architectural conception of town planning
persisted and influenced the planning of new towns, in par¬
ticular Letchworth (1902) and Welwyn (1919) discussed later,
and a number of other new towns in the U.K. and the U.S.A.
Planning thought, theories and ideas, including the
Utopian visions discussed earlier, also made their imprint
in varying degrees on planning practice. Two important con¬
tributions in moulding planning though came from social re¬
former Ebenezer Howard, with his book Garden Cities of To¬
morrow (1898) and biologist Patrick Geddes with Cities in
Evolution (1915). Howard's ideas were essentially for de¬
signing self sufficient communities of fixed size, integrat¬
ing the best the city and the country had to offer. The
dominating criteria were aesthetics, health and efficiency.
A number of new towns were built on this conception of de¬
sign, two of which are discussed later in this Chapter.
Geddes' influence was of significance in introducing the no-
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tion of the city as a living organism, evolving and growing.
He maintained that the proper study of the city should in¬
clude, a survey of the existing conditions, an analysis and
finally the preparation of the plan for development - what
he called synoptic planning. This was the beginning of the
survey-analysis-plan method that planning practice currently
uses. The idea of comprehensive planning had its origins in
the works of Patrick Geddes.
The works of Herbert Simon, Braybrooke and Lindbloom
on decision theories saw the birth of the "rational planning
model", which later incorporated the Geddesian "synoptic
plan" to produce the composite "rational comprehensive"
planning model, that served and continues to serve as the
predominant theory for planning. Variations emerged such as
"incrementalism", "middle-range", "mixed-scanning" and even
"transactive planning" discussed earlier in Chapter III.
These interjections served only to cause a brief respite and
some rethinking among planners but had no significant effect
in practice. They served to generate dialogue mostly among
academics and to further the existing schism between theore¬
ticians and the practitioners who saw no real value in their
application to their daily practice nor knew the means to
translate these theories into practice.
Perhaps the first radical approach to planning came
from Paul Davidoff who in his short paper entitled "Advocacy
and Pluralism in Planning" (1965) argued against the "uni-
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tary public interest" approach and the idea of a single
"master plan". Davidoff advocated the recognition of plural
interests of society, the recognition of the various inter¬
est groups and their input in plan making. Alternatives and
choices, he argued, were critical to effective planning,
what he called plural planning. While it generated a lot of
academic dialogue and professional interest, it could not be
implemented in practice. It lacked institutional structure
and any clear direction as to how advocacy planning would
generate public dialogue, while serving individual interest
groups. The plan for the City of Cleveland (1969) discussed
later in this Chapter is perhaps the nearest model, where
some of the ideas of advocacy planning emerge.
One of the classic examples of rational comprehen¬
sive planning model with aesthetic embodiment, is the plan
for the City of Paris (1853-68), created by Georges Eugene
Hausmann (1809-91). It was Hausmann's dream to transform
Paris into the first great city of the industrial era. The
principles guiding his ambitious plan were to reorganise the
old City of Paris to new demands of the Second Empire, to
meet the needs of accessibility for the great days of cele¬
brations and to be easily controlled in days of violence and
riots, both common occurrences of the era; to eliminate in¬
fested and unhealthy areas of the city, essentially the poor
tenements, and to cause a more efficient system of circula¬
tion of air, light and troops. Aesthetics in the grand
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ideal of the baroque city were superimposed on the existing
medieval core of the city of Paris. The city was seen by
Hausmann in purely utilitarian terms, as a technical problem
with technical solutions.10 All decisions were based on
analysis of existing situations. The two coordinates or
factors used were time and space. These were considered
necessary to achieve unity and efficiency. According to
Haussmann's own description of the plan, he wanted "to cut a
cross, north to south and east to west, through the centre
of Paris, bringing the city's cardinal points into direct
communication".11 Rarely was a city plan so comprehensively
conceived and so systematically and precisely organized to
military exigencies, efficiencies and monumentality. The
factories and the working poor were removed from the centre
of the city and relegated to lower costs suburban areas,
fearing their invasion in large numbers into the core of the
city. The radiating network of straight and wide roads were
dominant features, and were designed to form a coherent sys¬
tem of communications between the centre and the railway
stations as an interrelated system. The plans were carried
out to absolute regularity, often with monotonous repetition
and symmetry, with uniform frontages in the belief that Par¬
is could be planned once and for all to serve its present
and future needs.
10 See Sigfried Gideon. Space, Time and Architecture. Cam¬
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1959. pp. 641-679.
11 See Memoires, V Vols., Paris: Harvard, 1890-1893.
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Hausmanns' plans worked well for many decades no
doubt but eventually proved inadequate to meet the changing
neeeds of the growing city. The plan was authoritative, in¬
flexible and static, designed to serve the whims of essen¬
tially one man whose vision excluded the interest of the
large populace, the poor and the working classes. The plan
however, did serve as a model for a number of other cities.
With few exceptions, the creation of new towns and
cities faired no better. The same design principles contin¬
ued to be applied. Howards' "Garden City" ideas, referred
to in earlier Chapters, produced the two new towns of Letch-
worth (1902) and Welwyn (1919). The only variation in the
theme was the idea of self sufficiency and the production of
a synthesis between town and country, "rus in urbe" - an
ideal community that avoids the ills of both the town and
the country while enjoying the benefits proferred by both.
Letchworth was an experimental town designed by Parker and
Unwin following Howards "Garden City" ideal of harmonious
balance between industry and agriculture, and separation be¬
tween living and working environments. Designed to house
35,000 people, the plan was conceived as a complete urban
unit to accomodate all forms of human activity within a
fixed space and size. It set strict zoning regulations gov¬
erning the sizes of the houses, their location and gardens
and an agricultural belt. Welwyn was likewise designed on
the same principles of order, uniformity in layout and el¬
egance of design.
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Both the Letchworth and Welwyn development plans
were a product of the traditional master plan, rooted in the
belief that all human activities could be rigidly delineated
and concentrated in a single and fixed space; and that the
diverse habits and needs of the community could indeed be
caused to operate within a given pattern and structure.
While the authoritative tenor of the plan and the paternal¬
istic approach served the formative period of the town de¬
velopment well, it soon proved inadequate to meet the grow¬
ing and changing needs of the people. The plan did not
correspond to social realities, for a living city could not
be so rigidly contained in a physical receptacle. Lack of
opportunity and choices soon became evident. The physical
layout made public transportation impossible. The plans
succeeded in some ways not because of deliberate planning
action but for lack of it, particularly in areas that plan¬
ners did not foresee. The "Garden City" idea served as a
model for many of the New Towns both in the U.K. and the
U.S.A. However, some of the latter new towns like Milton
Keynes (1970) in the U.K., were planned to allow for greater
public participation, and for more choices and opportunities
for its residents.
The Milton Keynes Board together with the consult¬
ants and the public input, formulated a set of goals that
came close to addressing the real needs of the people.
Goals enunciated were:
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1. opportunity and freedom of choice
2. - easy movement and access, and good communications
3. - balance and variety
4. - an attractive city
5. - public awareness and participation
6. - efficiency and imaginative use of resources"12
This represents one of the earliest attempts at planning
that while consistent with the rational comprehensive plan¬
ning theory in terms of formulating goals, analysis and
preparation of plans, positively expands its scope to deal
with social, institutional, physical and aethetic aspects of
the living city. Public participation, growth, change and
provision of choices are critical components of the plan.
The new capital City of Chandigargh (1951) in India
and the new capital city of Brazilia (1958) in Brazil are
the two more contemporary examples of city building from in¬
ception, or to use Bacons' term "Painting on a Clean Can¬
vas". Both these plans, no doubt, meet all the tenets of
the rational comprehensive planning model, and reflect per¬
haps, what planning would really like to be if given such a
clean slate. It was an ideal opportunity for testing and
implementing the best of theories that guide planning prac¬
tice not only what planning i_s but much more importantly
12 See Milton Keynes Development Corporation "The Natyure of
the Plans" in The Future of Cities. ed Andrew Blowers,
Chris Hamnett and Philip Sarre. London: Hutchinson
Ltd., 1974. pp. 236-244.
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what planning ought to be. The latter was no doubt
interpreted as an Utopia - the ideal city for the people but
not by the people.
Both these plans are designs in abstract, conceived
in idealism that reflect a quest for monumentality and
aesthetic frivolity. While given "carte blanche", to ex¬
press the best that the great masters Le Corbusier and Lucio
Costa with Oscar Niemeyer respectively could create, out
came plans grounded in the same worn out principles of or¬
der, efficiency, regularity, and aesthetic. Irrespective of
the location, culture or time, the principles of positivism
and utilitarianism seem to permeate the thinking. Couched
in some philosophical exegesis as if divinely enshrined, the
plans reflect very little of local needs and aspirations.
The plan of Chandigarh conceived in the form of an
enormous open hand, according to the designer, whatever mys¬
tic or religious connotations are attributed to the idea,
fails to articulate the real needs of the people. The open
hand concept is superimposed by a grid or sectors each of
about 100 hectares, divided among thirteen social classes
that make up the population of the city of about half a mil¬
lion people. While the plan does take climate into consid¬
eration, it fails to meet the needs of social community re¬
lations. The whole city is served by a commercial centre
linked to an administrative centre at the top. For monumen¬
tality and aesthetic vision, it would be a fit example but,
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as a living city, one fails to see how such cold technical
solutions can either sense the pulse of the people, or serve
their living and working environment. As one author put it,
the plan for Chandigarh, hangs beautifully on the wall, but
fails on the ground to serve the needs of the people.
Brazilia fares no better - in the mould of great vi¬
sionaries, the architects conceived the city "ipso facto" as
a bird in flight. To quote from Holford's article it "was
born of that initial gesture which anyone would make when
pointing to a given place, or taking possession of it: the
drawings of two axes crossing at right angles, in the sign
of the cross. This sign was then adapted to the topography,
the natural drainage of the land, and the best possible ori¬
entation: the extremities of one axial line were curved so
as to make the sign fit into the equilateral triangle which
outlines the area to be urbanized."13 The North-South axis
was planned for residential development and the East-West
formed the monumental radial artery linking the commercial
with the political centre. It is hard to conceive anything
more rational and mathematical as justification for a living
city.
13 As quoted in Leonardo Benevolo. History of Modern Archi¬
tecture. Vol. II. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1977, pp.
758. Holford's article referred is W. Holford. "Brazil¬
ia" in Architectural Review. Vol. 122. 1957. p.399.
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The plans discussed so far followed traditional
theories and practices grounded in both positivism and util¬
itarian doctrines. The rational comprehensive planning con¬
tinued to serve as the formula for organizing urban spaces
in the orthodox fashion of rearranging land uses and trans¬
portation networks. A linear extrapolation of present situ¬
ations to some long range future of an ideal city form.
The Cleveland Planning Report (1969) was perhaps the
first planning document to shift the emphasis from the tra¬
ditional planning approaches to a more dynamic process - to
address some of the more pressing issues affecting the peo¬
ple in the city. The Plan no doubt signifies a radical ap¬
proach to planning, its main objective being to address the
needs of those most in need. For example,the report found
that the problems the people of the City of Cleveland faced,
had more to do with poverty, crime, neighbourhood deteriora¬
tion, and inadequate mobility than with the traditional, al¬
most ubiquitous, concerns of planning, land uses zoning and
urban design.14
The Cleveland Plan ushered in a new era in planning.
The emphasis now shifted to root problems facing the cities
of today, problems of equality, poverty and mobility. The
Plan was called the Policy Plan with no pretension of being
either ideal or comprehensive but simply functional and re-
14 See Norman Krumholz, J.M. Cogger, J.H. Linner. The
Cleveland Planning Policy Report. JAIP. Vol. 41, No. 5,
Sept. 1975. pp 298-304.
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alistic - more of a progress report addressing some of the
very critical issues confronting the people of Cleveland.
The single most important goal of the plan is stated
as "Equity requires that government institutions give prior¬
ity attention to the goal of promoting a wider range of
choices for those Cleveland residents who have few if any
choices."15 The redistributive approach the plan takes, al¬
lows greater opportunity and choices for its citizens, spe¬
cially those most disadvantaged, giving them a wider range
of alternatives to identify priorites. The plan offers pol¬
icy recommendation to assit decision makers, emphasizing
conservation and rehabilitation of existing housing stock,
over construction of new housing. Public participation is a
central element of the plan and has been very effective.
Herbert Gans and eminent urban sociologist, comment¬
ed that the Cleveland Plan "may signify a radical change in
American planning thought and practice "and that it is both
a sensitive and a sensible document which ought to be a mod¬
el for planning by other cities.16 Davidoff, author of "ad¬
vocacy planning" likewise noted that the "Cleveland Plan
does for intelligence and judgement what the Burnham Plan
did for aesthetics." He goes on to say that "this plan is
the model that will guide all planning that aims to deal ef-
15 Norman Krumholz, op.cit., p. 299.
16 See Herbert Gans, "Planning for Declining and Poor Cit¬
ies". JAIP. Vol. 41, No. 5, Sept. 1975, pp. 305-307.
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fectively with the root causes of urban problems."17
The Cleveland plan while not ignoring the tradition¬
al concerns of planning, such as the land uses for example,
goes on to examine them in light of their contribution to
the improvement of living conditions of the people. Second¬
ly as Gans points out, the plan avoids the arrogance of the
previous plans of grand and ideal but static futures. It is
less Utopian and more realistic, responding to the needs of
contemporary cities and advocating positively the interests
of its less fortunate residents.
The plan seeks no concensus nor does it advocate a
single supposedly public interest - it recognizes multiplic¬
ity of interests, and the advocacy role of the planner in
providing information and making policy recommendations.
This new direction in planning no doubt calls for
changes to the traditional role of the planner by expanding
its concerns and seeking idealism in the reality of the
situations facing contemporary cities. It is a new direc¬
tion towards more relevance and results that will positively
improve the living condition of people, and most importantly
of those most in need.
17 See Paul Davidoff. "Working Toward Redistributive Jus¬
tice". JAIP. Vol. 41, No. 5, Sept. 1975, pp. 317-307.
Chapter V
CONFLICTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PLANNING
"If a man will begin with certainties he shall end
in doubt; but if he be content to begin with
doubts, he shall end in certainties".
Francis Bacon.
5.1 PERCEPTION AND REALITY
One of the perennial challenges that the planner
faces is identifying and defining planning problems. What
constitutes a problem is very much a function of the defi-
ner's perception of reality, as well, as a function of the
planner's cultural milieu.
To perceive is to see what exists. What exists is
to some extent describable and endowed with certain recogni¬
zable characteristics. This is the meaning of perception to
the common man, and to him it may also be reality. In phi¬
losophy, perception and reality are both metaphysical propo¬
sitions and as such are rooted in the theories of existence.
In planning, however, the notion of perception and reality
do not necessarily resemble either the common man's view nor
the philosophical point of view. In fact the word percep-
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tion is not even a term generally used in planning. There
is the belief that what 'is' is indeed 'reality'. "Reality"
in planning may largely be an image imposed and defined by
the observer as a construct of what he wishes, rather than
what 'is'. The observer perceives a problem in light of
possible solutions and techniques available to him. Plan¬
ning problems are thus indentified and defined in terms of
what resolutions are necessary to achieve the objectives.
Planning problems as a result become an affirmation of a de¬
sired end-state as perceived by the planner.
Planning is generally based on the assumption that
the planner has a complete and true understanding of the na¬
ture of the problem. This assumption is seldom true. This
in turn presents a conundrum; the philosophical pursuit of
completeness could lead to a road of no return, while prob¬
lems in the real world await to be resolved.
If, however, one approaches a problem cognizant of
the fact that it represents only one or a partial aspect of
reality, or that it is only a perception; then the nature of
a solution takes a different form. Further, the approach
recognizes human limitations and it is specific in terms of
time, location and a cultural milieu. Unfortunately, plan¬
ners may approach problems not only with preconceived ideas
of the problem and in some cases even solutions; but more
importantly, convinced that their ideas represent the whole
problem arrived at with a full and comprehensive understand-
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ing. Even if such a posture is required by the planning
methodologies in use, it does not make the posture valid or
right. The initial problem formulation reflects at best
only a partial understanding. The dilemma is the dichotomy
between perception and reality. Perception is easily
grasped but reality continues to elude us. Kierkegaard had
argued that it is not moving from reason to belief but from
doubt to belief that is more relevant; doubt, that comes not
from the belief that human understanding is limited or is
incapable of understanding everything, but because the human
mind or intellect does not in itself constitute truth, in as
much as everything that we see, does not constitute proof of
reality.
Paul Watzlawick suggests that "Man has an apparently
very deep seated propensity to hypostatize reality, to make
of it a friend or an antagonist with whom he has to come to
terms".1 He goes on to postulate three levels of abstraction
that take place in experiencing reality. At the first lev¬
el, knowledge represents sensory knowledge, wherein neither
the past nor the present provide any clue. The second level
is based on the first level knowledge, but also is concerned
with "meta-knowledge". The third order of knowledge repre¬
sents the synthesis of the first two. In other words, "re¬
ality is what we make of it".2
1 Paul Watzlawick, et al., Pragmatics of Human Communica¬
tions. New York: W.W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1967. p.
259.
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Berger and Luckmann contend that humans, unlike
other higher mammals have no species-specific environment.
They argue that there is no such thing as a man-world in the
same way we speak for example of a "mundo canis".3 This is a
very important construct, as we tend to believe that the
world is only what we see and that it is a man-world. Ber¬
ger and Luckman argue that the everyday reality is in fact
only a social construction of reality, that is people give
phenomena a certain category or reality which is both sub¬
jective and objective. They contend that our perception
represents a socially constructed knowledge, and that is
what reality is all about.
The problem of conceptualizing how we conceptualize
reality has plagued many a great mind and it might be appro¬
priate to seek insight from some historical wisdom. What is
discussed in the following section, represents a cross-cul¬
tural perspective and is presented with a view to approach¬
ing our understanding of the reality perception.
Without venturing into the metaphysical domain of
inquiry, an attempt is made to gain a cursory understanding
of several distinct schools of thought. The choice of
schools is determined not by comprehensibility but by their
relevance to the problems in planning.
2 Paul Watzlawick, et al. op.cit. pp. 260-261.
3 Peter L.Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construc¬
tion of Reality. Harmonsdworth: Penguin Books Ltd.,
1971. pp. 47-128.
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The crux of our question is twofold: first, is a
problem we perceive real in the sense of being absolute
truth? secondly, is it perceived the same by others? In
contextual terms, it amounts to the prime question: how
does one formulate a conception of the universe? Heisenberg
noted that "what we observe is not nature in itself but na¬
ture exposed to our method of questioning".4
According to Hegel, everything in this universe can
be comprehended in terms of an absolute or objective mind,
and that the question can be represented as a series of dia¬
lectical arguments that goes on in the universe until the
achievement of complete understanding or truth.5 Hegel main¬
tains that since the world is ruled by principles of contra¬
diction, it is through the ongoing resolutions of these con¬
tradictions in form of thesis - antithesis and synthesis,
that the objective or absolute understanding of the universe
could be achieved.
"In every distinguishing situation each pole is
for itself that which it is, it also is not for
itself what it is, but only in contrasting rela¬
tion to that which is not".6
Hegel's solution is presented by three laws:
4 See Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy. London:
Allen and Unwin, 1959.
5 See G.W.F.Hegel, Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Trans.,
Gustav Emil Muelle New York: Philosophical Library, 1959.
6 See G.W.F.Hegel, op cit.
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1. The law of unity of opposites.
2. The law of negation of negation.
3. The law of quantity transformation into quality and
vice-versa.
The first law represents the thesis-antithesis-
synthesis proposition - wherein he contends that for every
attempt at formulating a thesis about the universe there is
always another formulation contrary to the first thesis
which is antithesis. This reconciliation between the thesis
and the antithesis produces a synthesis - incorporating the
partial truths of both the thesis and the antithesis, and
which itself becomes a new thesis. This dialectic is based
on the premise that both thesis and antithesis only repre¬
sent partial truths of the absolute phenomena. It is a pro¬
cess Hegel notes, that resolves conflicts in society and di¬
rects all historical change. In the second law of negation
of negations, the processes of nature begin and end in life-
death sequences, though not necessarily in a continuum. The
third law of transformation of quantity into quality and
vice-versa represents the changing nature, the refining pro¬
cess of achieving or approaching absolute 'truth', the quin¬
tessential state. To Hegel, therefore, reality represents a
dialectical process beginning with thesis and culminating
eventually in absolute truth or reality. It is this princi¬
ple of conflict resolution that represents the evolutionary
process of growth to a more absolute state. It is what He-
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gel calls the basic law of nature, it is historical reali¬
ty.7
On the other hand in Vedantic6 philosophy of India,
which is based on ancient scripture of Hinduism, the concept
of reality is seen in the unity of the ultimate "Brahman" -
the creator, supreme being or godhead.
The Vedantic dialectics are also based on three axi¬
oms, not too dissimilar to those of Hegel. They are as fol¬
lows: 9
1. The doctrine of "Maya"..
2. The doctrine of involution and evolution.
3. the doctrine of immanent change.
The doctrine of Maya essentially reflects a multipl¬
icity of existences. It holds that reality is an illusion,
a changing perception, based on "airdya" or unknowing. Maya
always remains a perception sometimes also called delusion
"moha" because we fail to recognize the oneness of the "Re¬
ality". Absolute reality would thus be somewhere between the
7
See G.W.F.Hegel, op cit.
6 The word Veda in Sanskrit means knowledge and is associat¬
ed with the teachings of Samkara in the 8th Century A.D.,
although Vedantic philosophy is of much greater ancestry.
9 Swami Ranganathananda, The Scientific Approach to Relig¬
ion. and also his book Science and Religion. Bangalore:
Bangalore University, 1977. See also T.R.V.Murti. The
Central Philosophy of Buddhism. London: George Allen &
Unwin Ltd. 1970. p 302.
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cosmic illusion "maya" and beyond human experiences as
conditioned by "karma" the creative force of life. Existence
thus becomes an illusion.
The doctrine of involution and evolution is a theory
of birth and rebirth rather than life-death. It is the natu¬
ral order of all life, a cyclical and recurring phenomenon,
representing a continuing process of change, the universal
causality which is the law of "karma". "Karma" essentially
determines the moral order and both the fact and the nature
of incarnation and reincarnation of life. This process is
signified by the syncretic triad of Gods in Hinduism: God
the Creator (Brahma); God the Preserver (Visnu); and God the
Destroyer (Siva), representing the beginning, the middle and
the end of the cosmic cycle. The doctrine of immanent
change remains basically the same as Hegel's third law. It
is a progression towards "Nirvana", or "Moksa" or "Samadhi"
or even "Satori" which represents the transcedental state,10
a concept similar to that postulated by Teilhard de Chardin
(1881-1955) of the evolving cosmos, an ongoing process - the
"noosphere" as eventually supplementing the biosphere.11 Ev¬
olutionism in his case, was held as a principal factor of
change in the universe, affecting both organic and inorganic
matter.
10 Swami Ranganathananda, op.cit.
11 See Teilhard de Chardin, Phenomenon of Man. London: 3a-
lins Publishers, 1959.
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In Vedantic philosophy, reality as we perceive it,
represents not only a multiplicity of existences, but also a
series of contradictions. "If we affirm that anything is,
we must at the same time admit that it is not".12
The philosophy of Tao (attributed to philosopher Lao
Tzu author of Lao Tzu or Tao Te Ching, circa sixth century
B.C. translated as the Canon of the Way and its Attain¬
ment.), in Chinese thought, deals with contradictions and
problems of reality in the dialectics of "unity of oppo-
sites", but not as a progression. It is directed at the in¬
tuitive (as distinct to rational) wisdom of man, and seeks
human liberation through human knowledge. The whole of the
natural system represents an interplay of opposing forces
that act in unison in seeking the "Tao" - the way to the
"absolute". Virtue is in nature; the right and the wrong,
and the good and the bad coexist and are necessary precondi¬
tions to knowledge and existence.
"When beauty is universally affirmed as beauty,
herein is ugliness. When goodness is univer¬
sally affirmed as goodness,
therein is evil; Therefore: being and non-be¬
ing are mutually posited
in their emergence. Difficult and easy are
mutually posited in their
complementariness. Long and short are mutual¬
ly posited in their positions.13
12 Swami Ranganathananda, op.cit.
13 See Chang Chung-Yuan, Tao: A New Way of Thinking. New
York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1975. p. 7.
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It is a concept of relationship rather than of things that
is important to Tao.14 Taoism sees all change in natural
systems as manifestations of dynamic interplay between two
cosmic forces, the passive 'Yin' and the active 'Yang'.
These two forces always exist in harmony rather than in dis¬
cord as "The yang having reached its climax retreats in fav¬
our of the yin; the yin having reached its climax retreats
in favour of the yang". The "Yin" and the "Yang", the pas¬
sive or weak "Yin" and the active and aggressive "Yang",
represent the integrative nature of man, constricting each
other and maintaining the natural balance. Taoism in essence
suggests that all knowledge comes ultimately from Tao, and
that any human knowledge and action not derived therefrom,
is to be avoided.15
Zen, one of the main schools of thought in Buddhism,
is an integrated philosophy as well, derived from the Indian
mysticism, the pragmatism of Confucianism, Chinese natural¬
ism and Japanese ethos. It is experience-based in seeking
enlightenment and in achieving "satori" or awareness, which
is realizing union with reality or the higher state of con¬
sciousness.
"When the mind rests serene, in the oneness of
things...dualism vanishes by itself".16
14 Quoted by Chang Chung-Yuan, in Tao: A New Way of Think¬
ing . New York: Harper and Row, 1975.
15 See Fritjof Capri, The Tao of Physics. London: Fontana
Books, 1976, pp.107-123.
16 See quote in Nancy Wilson Ross, Three Ways of Asian Wis-
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In Zen art, for example, chance and control do not
exist in oppositions, but in relationship to each other.
Art created by chance or by deliberate effort both represent
spontaneous creations. It is the 'material', the human hand
as much as the human 'mind' that creates art. As Watts
states: "The insight which lies at the root of Far Eastern
culture is that opposites are relational and so fundamental¬
ly harmonious".17
Unlike Hegelian dialectics, Eastern thought does not
proceed through the process of thesis-antithesis-synthesis
or through the juxtaposition of opposites to a higher state
of being. Rather it remains in a state of self-identity in
a unity of opposites representing a state of selflessness.16
If one were to compare the four dialectical argu¬
ments as they explain reality, one recognizes that there is
as much similarity in the totality of their individual argu¬
ments as there are dissimilarities in their individual
parts.
dom. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966. p. 137.
17 Alan W. Watts, The Way of Zen. Harmondsworth: Penguin
Books, Ltd., 1975, pp. 193-194.
16 For a good discussion and comparative analysis see T.R.V.
Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. London:
George Allen A. Unwinn, Ltd., 1970, p. 302; see also
Chang Chung-Uan, Tap: A New Way of Thinking. New York:
Harper and Row, 1975.
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The Hegelian dialectic represents an evolutionary
process of growth from its simplistic form to a more complex
and absolute state. Vedantic philosophy claims a multiplic¬
ity of existences always in a state of contradictions. Tao¬
ism, although it recognizes the states of opposites, does
not subscribe to the evolutionary process that leads to a
higher state, but contends that the next stage is simply a
stage of self-identity in selfless existence. Zen claims
that reality does not exist outside oneself - it is a belief
in basic oneness of the universe. Enlightenment is not
achieved through withdrawal from the world but by partici¬
pating in it, by unison with it.
Where does this all lead us to? If like Hegel one
seeks a unification of opposites through the process of in¬
tellectual synthesis one could still err in dealing with the
real world. The major problem is that one could construct a
model, based on intellectual abstraction, which by defini¬
tion will not depict reality, but only a perception of real¬
ity. If on the other hand one subscribes to the Vedantic
philosophy one accepts multiplicity of existences. This may
be a logical method of indexing observations as changing
subsystems of the total system. If however one follows the
Tao dialectic, and pursues a stasis in unity of opposites,
seeking self-realization through a selfless process, one
would still not be able to deal effectively with the problem
of understanding physical and everyday reality.
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What one is seeking perhaps is to stay our beliefs
as an open-ended system. Zen offers a better synthesis be¬
tween reality and perception; neither reality, nor percep¬
tion needs to be sought but simple recognition of our own
existence in nature or with nature.
If planning problems are, in effect, their own solu¬
tions, and solutions are constructs of an end state, then
the question of reality remains in suspension and need not
enter planning dialogue. To subscribe to such a paradigm
would be to deny reality and planning cannot afford to deny
reality. Planning needs to understand the harmonious rela¬
tionship between problem and solutions not just in explain¬
ing them but also by experiencing them. As is stated in Ash-
vaghosha "All things in their fundamental nature are not
namable or explicable. They cannot be adequately expressed
in any form of language".19 The best way to learn is to ex¬
perience - planning should experience, planning is experi¬
encing.
19 See quote in Fritjof Capri, The Tao of Physics. London:
Fontana Books, 1976, p. 307.
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5.2 FACTS AND VALUES
The dichotomy between the world of facts and the
world of values represents one of the more critical debates,
and has been at the root of the schism between the means and
ends in planning. It is a schism between those who empha¬
size pure objectivity and those who see issues of subjective
nature that are most often ignored as crucial to the plan¬
ning process.
Value-free planning was and is still considered the
ideal, because of the prevailing belief in its objectivity
and neutrality to any value or ideological postulates. Max
Webber (1864-1920) often associated with the conception of
value freedom (wertfreiheit) in social sciences, maintains
that value-judgements which he describes as "practical eval¬
uations of the unsatisfactory or satisfactory character of
phenomena subject to our influence",20 are not logically de-
ducible from factual statements. That social sciences which
deal with factual descriptions of phenomena, cannot estab¬
lish the truth or falsity of any value-judgement. While
value-relevance may intervene in the selection of subjects
for study it does not however constitute making a value-
judgement. He maintains that it is possible to carry out
analyses devoid of value relevance and/or value judgement -
that in fact analysis can be carried out independently of
20 See Max Webber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences
trans. E. Shils and H. Finch. Chicago: Free Press,
1949, p.1.
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these factors, simply on the basis of objective criteria of
scientific method. In other words values become relevant
only in the selection process of the object for the study,
but not in the explanatory phase. He also advocates knowl¬
edge based on understanding (verstehen), understanding from
within, through intuition or empathy as opposed to knowledge
from without, the empirical knowledge.
Of principal concern to planners are the 'moral val¬
ues' whose standards categorize objects according to moral
principles. Tolman21 distinguishes three kinds of value
standards: the cognitive, which are determined by individual
beliefs; the appreciative value standards, which are deter¬
mined by the nature of immediate gratification and aesthetic
appeal; and moral standards, which represent values or con¬
duct that have been socially accepted and are represented by
such statements as "this is good" or "this is bad". Accord¬
ing to Tolman all these value standards in the end represent
the human instincts of "discriminating, generalizing and be¬
lieving and are all culturally determined".22
Given these beliefs, it would appear that values
should be endogenous to planning activity and to planners.
If an individual acquires these standards in his upbringing
21 Edward C. Tolman, "A Psychological Model" in Towards a
General Theory of Action. Eds.,Talcott Parsons and Ed¬
ward A. Shills. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1951, pp. 343-344.
22 Edward C. Tolman, op.cit. p. 344.
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from his cultural milieu education, and from sanctions
imposed by a culture, they do indeed become intrinsic to his
behaviour. It could therefore be argued whether it is jus¬
tifiable to impose these value standards and moral codes
which invariably manifest themselves in most planning activ¬
ities, upon others. Although it could also be argued that
an individual may know what is good or bad without necessar¬
ily imposing them on others, and that it is in fact possible
to act value neutral, such conflicting situations place
planners in serious predicaments.
This brings us to the question of choice, because
values become effective only when an individual makes a de¬
cision as to the best course of action in planning. If
ethics or values guide the actions or choice one makes, then
this value criterion needs to be explained.
Planning as an activity is grounded in values and
ethics and it is impossible to ignore their intervention
into planning. Words such as ideal, good, are value-laden
and constantly appear in planning reports. Most of the ob¬
jectives or goals in planning are value-laden, which is the
reason perhaps why no specific or all-encompassing defini¬
tion can be attributed to these words. Nonetheless the need
to formalize or operationalize their use in planning becomes
a necessity. When planners resort to such terms as "good of
society", "or good of a community", they have in mind spe¬
cific interests of the parties concerned and they in fact
represent a desired end state.
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The realm of moral philosophy is vast and complex
but nonetheless pertinent to the proper pursuits of plan¬
ning. The term 'Guide to Action' is often used to imply the
moral forces that determine our actions. In other words it
is a guide that distinguishes between the "judgements of
facts" and "judgements of values". The more fundamental
distinctions are between the "self" and "others"; between
the faculty of intellect ana the faculty of will; between
the ethic of pleasure and pain; and between the ethic of
duty and utility. If one subscribes to medieval Christian
theology, all things and all actions that man seeks are in¬
herently good because man is good. It can be debated wheth¬
er it is the things that we seek that are good or whether we
seek only those things that are good. Utility is often
equated with happiness meaning free of suffering and is de¬
fined as the highest good or the supreme value that accrues
to all men. The three intrinsic and perennial values often
stated are "truth", "beauty" and "goodness", and these have
from time to time entered planning discourse mostly as a
means of justification. But what must be recognized is that
these values are not absolutes but relative concepts and
have no conceptual meaning but only emotive meaning. In oth¬
er words they are different from facts in as much as they
have no objectivity and are neither true or false. They are
in the human nature.
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Whatever the nature of man, what in the end matters
is the effect his actions have on others, and on the society
as a whole. Imperfection in men is not a crime, Comte for
example saw virtue in the fact that human nature is imper¬
fect and varied.23 Jeremy Bentham (1748-1833), the leader of
English Utilitarians recognizing this imperfection, main¬
tained that man's actions were motivated by his desire to
secure his own pleasures, albeit for selfish reasons, and
avoid his own pain, and noted that "Nature has placed man¬
kind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and
pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought
to do as well as to determine what we should do".24 But sci¬
ence somehow managed to ignore this very important factor,
particularly in dealing with sciences of society. It con¬
tinued to emphasize facts at the cost of values.
Roszak contends that the impersonality of science is
a way to distort social ethics and is indeed a myth designed
to manipulate the value system and control the public inter¬
est in the name of neutrality.25 Facts and values are often
transposed and both are often couched in scientific idiom.
In other words, the logic of rationality becomes the final
23 Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte.
Vol.,II., Trans., Harriet Martineau. London: George Bell
Sc Sons, 1896. p.282.
24 See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principle of
Morals and Legislation. Oxford: The Claredon Press,
1 907 .
25 See Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture.
New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc. 1969.
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tribunal in determining the nature of objective and subjec¬
tive inferences in planning processes. What has to be
guarded against is the deification of objectivity at the
cost of subjectivity which in a way represents our emotive
nature. Even facts are not simply givens, they are a result
of selective interpretations which means interpretation
based on value system. Value therefore precedes facts and
determines facts. It is in this context that the present di¬
chotomy between facts and values need to be understood.
5.3 FREEWILL AND DETERMINISM
Man's thought process and his behaviour pattern can¬
not be determined mechanistically, for man is endowed with
free will and is governed by his conscience. He is thus
free to choose any course of action to achieve his desired
ends. He is free to choose both the ends and the means to
achieve them, being responsible only to his conscience.
This represents the exercise of free will.26
The theory of "Determinism" contends that man's be¬
haviour pattern is very much determined by his upbringing,
his social milieu and generally the environment that he in¬
habits. He thus behaves according to the dictates or attri¬
butes of that environment. Determinism postulates a rigid
world, structured, and fixed to a mathematical precision,
26 Murray N. Rothbard, "The Mantle of Science" in Helmut
Schoeck & James Wiggins, eds., Scientism and Values. New
York: D.Van Nostrand & Co. Inc., 1969, pp. 159-180.
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and determinate. It also includes human behaviour since man
and his behaviour is simply a manifestation of natural or
physical laws of nature and is as such, susceptible to meas¬
urement and determination. It represents a closed system
and it is a position held, for example by some Socio-biolo-
gists. On the other hand, the theory of "Indeterminism" as¬
sumes that the universe cannot be precisely determined due
to chance and probability factors inherent in the natural
system.
But all this, it is argued, does not deny man's free
will. Although he is influenced by his environment, he re¬
mains free to choose. For the constraints only represent re¬
strictions on his freedom, which is different from his in¬
herent right to exercise free will27 freedom not only to
intellectualize but also freedom to act.
The theory of Determinism is of long ancestry. The
universe was regarded as rational and deterministic and sub¬
servient to an ordered cosmos that governed all phenomena on
this earth. Such was the preoccupation in search of the
natural order and the structure and functioning of the uni¬
verse, that the inquiry, that began with the pre-Socratic
philosophers, persisted to almost the twentieth century.
27 Murray N. Rothbard, Ibid. pp. 159-180.
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The Stoics that followed Plato and Aristotle, be¬
lieved that all happenings in the world, including human be¬
haviour were rigidly predetermined. It is the Universal Or¬
der, that rules supreme in the world. It is the reason, the
'Logos' that determines all the phenomena in the world, in¬
cluding human behaviour.28 Given such beliefs, very little
would appear left to human free will. The Scholastics, the
great precursor of which are St. Augustine and St. Thomas
Aquinas, preached the doctrine of "Divine Will" as the over¬
powering force of determinism. At the same time they held
to the belief that God endowed man with a free will and that
man was responsible for his deeds. That is, they believed
man chooses both his ends and the means.
St.Thomas Aquinas distinguished between Divine Law
and Natural Law - the former being revealed to man by God,
while the latter being evolved out of man's rational reason¬
ing.29 Although Scholasticism was highly rationalistic in
its philosophy, basing its premises on deductive logic as
the only means of searching for truth; it did, however, in¬
sert a caveat to the effect that the premises, as an origi¬
nal construct, were derived not through rational reasoning
but from the beliefs of Christianity.30 With such a caveat,
28 Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy. London:
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1975, p. 261.
29 See Dennis Lloyd, The Idea of Law. Harmondsworth: Pen¬
guin Books, 1974, pp. 77-94.
30 Dennis Lloyd, Ibid. p.180.
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it is hard to proceed beyond the strict realms of faith;
with faith of course, anything can be proven whether verifi¬
able or not. Faith according to Kant is neither a matter of
knowledge nor of opinion but "wholly a matter of morality".
Some psychologists take a different point of view.
They argue that environment and past experiences are the
factors that primarily govern the thinking process and be¬
haviour pattern of man.31 Although this represents a dis¬
tinct departure from the accepted norm of determinism, it
does not reject the previous hypothesis, for surely past ex¬
periences, in a way, represent the constraints of the social
milieu as well. The emphasis, however, is on both the past
experiences and the environment in which we live, which to¬
gether formulate our perceptual and conceptual biases.
It would seem that none of these concepts disagree
with the notion that man possesses some degree of free will.
The point of contention, it would appear, rests in the ex¬
tent to which one exercises this free will, and not what de¬
termines human behaviour. It is this free will, its nature
and its characteristic, that is influenced by the environ¬
ment of man's upbringing, his social milieu, his past ex¬
periences, and his systems of communication.
31 Bertrand Russell, op.cit., p.261.
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Science fostered a different perspective about the
theory of determinism and uncertainty. Although Newton him¬
self did not fully subscribe to the deterministic theory
that the Newtonian Revolution, helped establish; his Revolu¬
tion did usher in the theory of 'physical determinism'. As
Popper says this theory became the dogma of all the men of
Enlightenment and anybody who deviated from this faith was
held 'to be an obscurantist or a revolutionary.32
It was assumed that this theory would, in the end,
not only explain all phenomena of the physical sciences, but
even the behaviour of all the living organisms including
man. Such was the faith in scientific theory, that Newton
had so successfully formulated, that it was believed, he
even saw order in infinity. The idea that science can com¬
pletely understand and thereby explain the world, became an
anathema to many.
If such was the case, all human actions could be
precisely determined, irrespective of free will, and freedom
to act. In fact, the theory represents complete rejection
of the concept of free will as even existing. Chance has no
place in the universe, uncertainty is non-existent; contrar¬
ies and opposing positions are to be discarded. This indeed
presents a very mechanical universe programmed to behave in
a fixed pattern which can, a priori, be determined.
32 Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. Oxford: The Clare-
don Press, 1975, p. 212.
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Among the great minds there were a few, fortunately,
who did not fully subscribe to this dogma of determinism and
an unquestioned faith in science. C.S.Peirce (1839-1914),
for example, stated that the world was ruled by not only
Newtonian physical laws but also by laws of chance and prob¬
abilities33 In other words, Peirce held that there was no
such thing as perfect determinism and that some degree of
indeterminism rules the 'clocks' as much as the 'clouds'.
Popper says that
"So far as I know Peirce was the first Post-Newto¬
nian physicist and philosopher who thus dared to
adopt the view that to some degree 'all clocks are
clouds'; or in other words, that 'only clouds ex¬
ist', though clouds of very different degrees of
cloudiness".3 4
Popper himself could be counted among the ones who
rejected the theory of physical determinism. As Popper put
it very succinctly, "In other words I am an Indeterminist"35
There was no doubt that there were other great minds like
Compton, Heisenberg and Schrodinger who also rejected the
theory of determinism. 36 Heisenberg's (1901-1976), "Uncer¬
tainty Principle" is perhaps the best known injunction
against determinism. Likewise, the "Identification Problem"
33 See Charles Harlsborne and Paul Weiss, eds., Collected
Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Cambridge, Mass.: Har¬
vard University Press, 1935.
34 Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. Oxford: The Clare-
don Press, 1975. p. 213.
35 Karl R. Popper, ibid. p. 215.
35 Karl R. Popper, ibid., pp. 212-215.
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in Econometric sciences is also a recognition of the nature
of uncertainties. It questions the correspondence between a
model of reality and reality itself and attempts to account
for the discrepancies on a hypothetical basis.
In his book, The Freedom of Man, Compton argues
against the strictly deterministic world,
If...the atoms of our body follow physical laws as
immutable as the motions of the planet, why try?
What difference can it make how great the effort
if our actions are already predetermined by me¬
chanical laws...?37
If all our actions and movements are predetermined and fixed
to absolute mathematical precision, little indeed is left to
our free will. Even if we attest to the existence of the
free will, its function is basically meaningless under det¬
erministic theory. The system stands closed and, as such,
is not amenable to outside intervention and is not subject
to laws of chance or probabilities. This, if at all, would
represent a very limited view of the world and attest more
to our limited understanding of the workings of the Universe
and the human mind than the truth it purports to expound.
Hume, the great empirical philosopher, saw determi¬
nism in the context of cause/effect relationship; "This a
general maxim of philosophy, that what ever begins to exist,
must have a cause of existence."38 Hume contends that per-
37 A.H.Compton, The Freedom of Man. New Haven: Yale Univer¬
sity Press, 1935. p. 1.
36 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford
university Press, 1968, p. 78.
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feet chance is the only alternative to perfect determinism.
If the belief rests in intuition, Hume rejects it because he
contends that intuitive belief is not valid.39
The Nyaya - Vaisesika epistemology, in Indian phi¬
losophy, holds that the Universe is a system of physical
phenomena of living beings and these exist in close interac¬
tion with one another in time, space and 'akasa'. The order
of the world is believed to be a moral order in which human
destiny is governed not only by physical laws of nature but
by moral laws of 'karman', the law of universal causality
that connects man with the cosmos leading to indefinite
transmigration.4 0
39 Hume, Ibid., pp. 73-82. See also A.N. Whitehead, Modes
of Thought. New York: The Free Press, 1968, p.165, he
notes that "the only intelligible doctrine of causation
is founded on the doctrine of immanence. Each occasion
presupposes the antecedent world as active in its own na¬
ture".
40 The Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophy are really two Indian
schools of thought dating back to circa third century
B.C. The Nyaya is basically logic and epistemology,
while Vaisesika represents physics and metaphysics. Both
are aimed at the liberation of the individual self and as
such are closely interrelated. The term 'akasa' means,
one eternal, all-pervading physical substance, which has
the quality of sound similar to "OM" in Vedantic Philoso¬
phy. The word 'karman' stands for action, physical move¬
ment. For an interesting discussion on The Nyaya-Vaise-
sika philosophy, see the two articles by Satischandra
Chatergee on 'Early Nyaya-Vaisesika' and by V.B. Bhat-
tacharya Nyayacarya and A. Basu on 'Later Nyana-Vaisesi-
ka' in S. Radhakrishnan, ed., History of Philosophy
Eastern and Western. Vol.1., London: George Allen & Un-
win Ltd., 1967, pp. 219-241.
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The whole problem of physical determinism created
what Popper calls 'a nightmare' because he says "it asserts
that the whole world with everything in it is a huge automa¬
tion, and that we are nothing but little cogwheels, or at
best sub-automata within it".41
Popper suggests that it is not determinism versus
indeterminism which is the crux of the problem, it is nei¬
ther the clocklike precision nor cloudlike chance that de¬
termines all the events.
'What we need, for understanding rational human
behaviour - and indeed animal behaviour - is some¬
thing intermediate in character between perfect
chance and perfect determinism - something inter¬
mediate between perfect clouds and perfect
clocks'.4 2
He goes on in defence of his intermediate posture to
say that "what we want is to understand how such non physi¬
cal things as purposes, deliberations, plans, decisions,
theories, intentions, and values, can play a part in bring¬
ing about physical changes in the physical world."43 This is
the crux of the problem that planners face when trying to
deal with problems of social behaviour within deterministic
mathematical constructs.
41 Karl R.Popper, Objective Knowledge. Oxford: The Claredon
Press, p.222.
42 Popper, Ibid. p.228.
43 Popper, Ibid., p. 229.
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Heisenberg's uncertainty principle together with the
indeterminacy of quantum mechanics helped reformulate epis-
temology in the West. A more viable probability metaphor,
suggesting chance rather than determinism, slowly gained
credence and replaced the deterministic belief.44
5.4 TELEOLOGICAL VIEW VERSUS SCIENTIFIC TRUTH
Teleology tends to identify the behaviour of an in¬
dividual or society with the purposes of the universe as a
whole. It is a study of ends or goals and is based on the
belief that ends or purposes in life determine the means to¬
wards its fulfillment. In other words it is a belief that
everything has a "purpose" and therefore a "cause". Cause
is not relevant in either directing or understanding change,
but relevant where the goal also becomes the cause.
Mechanistic theory is based on scientific laws, and
scientific laws, presumably, determine the workings of the
universe. Thus if the workings of the universe are deter¬
mined or understood through the workings of component parts
and relationships to the whole, then it stands to reason
that our understanding of the universe is made up of our un¬
derstanding of the parts. This view is contrary, of course,
to the teleological teachings or the teachings of faith and
morality. While teleological explanations answer the ques-
44 David Miller @ Martin Starr, The Structure of Human Deci¬
sions. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1967, p. 23.
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tion why, for what purpose, the mechanistic explanations
attempt to answer the question of how. But neither, it
would seem, can answer both, therefore, neither science or
teleology can fully explain the workings of human behaviour.
While science fails to acknowledge the uniqueness and free
choice of the individual, teleology fails to adequately es¬
tablish cause and effect on a rational basis within the
realm and purposes of the Universe.
This debate between teleology and mechanistic theory
has been going on for over two centuries, resulting in di-
chotomous cultural and social viewpoints. Kant, to an ex¬
tent, sought reconciliation of the conflict between the con¬
cept of free will and Humes law of causality. He did so by
teleological argument, that ends determine the means. He
also tried to reconcile the demands of scientific determi¬
nism with the essence of man's moral obligations and the
role of his intuition, by directing inquiry, not towards the
"nature of being", but towards the "nature of knowing".
This is a very important distinction. Kant's synthetic ap¬
proach to the theory of knowledge utilized "a posteriori"
justifications of "a priori" theses as a prerequisite for
knowledge and knowing. This method changed the whole ap¬
proach, of philosophical inquiry to that point. It now
meant performing synthesis then analysis, rather than per¬
forming analysis then synthesis. Accordingly, all a priori
knowledge would be regarded as synthetic, and all the a pos-
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teriori knowledge was regarded as analytic.45
Although Kant admitted the limits of the scientific
method, he also, advocated the universality of science and a
pragmatic approach to the theory of knowledge. Kant distin¬
guished between matters of fact, matters of opinion and mat¬
ters of faith. Under such classification the statement that
man is free becomes a statement of fact, but moral freedom
is not a matter of fact, but falls in the realm of faith.
There is no doubt that all these are critical issues
not only for philosophy, but for planning. Is it free will
or is it determinism that in the end guide human action? Is
it the ends or the means that matter in guiding social and
physical change? Teleological perpectives of the universe
presents a more adequate model for planning, for it directs
its inquiry to determining the purpose a goal-directed ac¬
tivity, rather than cause alone.
45 Humayun Kabir, 'Immanuel Kant', in S. Radhakrishnan, ed.,
History of Philosophy Eastern and Western. London:
George Allen @ Unwinn Ltd., Vol. 2, 1967, pp. 238-262.
Kant develops these ideas in his books, The Critique of
Pure Reason and The Critique of Practical Reason.
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5.5 FREEDOM AND PLANNING
"Freedom", said Jean Paul Sartre, "is what you do
with what's been done to you". The concept of freedom has
been subjected to a plethora of definitions ranging from
strict legal definitions to very subjective moral concep¬
tions of freedom. It has been construed as freedom from re¬
strictions or freedom to liberty. It has become as much a
cry against domination, slavery, injustices, inequities and
oppression, as for, rights, liberties and pursuit of happi¬
ness.
The issues of freedom and self-determination have
entered the planning arena where, for example, the powers of
emminent domain of expropriation, of resource use and devel¬
opment are contested, with equal zeal as the rights against
nuisance, noise and aesthetic zoning, are disputed.
One of the most powerful enigma to change and devel¬
opment has centered around the ideological conflict of free¬
dom from planning versus freedom to plan.
The mid 1900s saw the split manifested by the great
debate that raged between Friedrich Hayek and Barbara Woo-
ton. The protagonists in the debate were Friedrich A. Hay-
46 See Friedrich A.Hayek, The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1944.
47 See Karl Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Plan¬
ning . London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1951.
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ek,46 Karl Mannheim,47 Barbara Wooton,48 Ludwig von Mise,
Rexford G. Tugwell, Herman Finer,49 and others. Primarily,
it centered on the question of reconciliation between 'plan¬
ning' and 'democracy'. In other words, can planning be rec¬
onciled with democratic ideology?
Hayek, a political economist, titled his book Road
to Serfdom. Planning, he contended, was a centralist activ¬
ity designed inevitably to lead to suppression of individual
liberties, to dictatorial control and to eventual serfdom.
Wooton, an economist presented an opposing view in her book
Freedom under Planning. She rejected the argument put for¬
ward by Hayek and contended that planning indeed "may be de¬
fined as the conscious and deliberate choice of economic
priorities by some public authorities". She went on to em¬
phasize the nature of democratic administration of economic
affairs, which according to Wooton leads to freedom of
choice, freedom to produce ,to spend, freedom of enterprise,
and to consumer sovereignty.
The basic premise of Wooton's argument is the belief
in some harmonious good in line with utilitarian ideology.
What she is arguing is for economic freedom that can be re¬
alized through planning.50 But such a posture does not nec-
48 See Barbara Wooton, Freedom Under Planning. Raleigh:
University of North Carolina Press, 1945.
49 See Herman Finer, Road to Reaction. New York: Little
Brown @ Co., 1946.
50 Barbara Wooton. Op. cit. pp.6-8.
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essarily guarantee individual freedom according to Hayek.
The debate in essence amounted to who would benefit from the
economic gains that could be derived through planning, and
how the resources could be distributed among the various
competing users.51
Sociologist Karl Mannheim argued in favour of plan¬
ning. Rational Planning he maintained was "planning for
freedom" and the proper pursuits of man's subjective impul¬
ses, thus providing greater freedom for cultural creativity.
He opposed an unregulated society of Liberal ideology which
he felt was producing just the opposite - a totalitarian
dictatorship.
According to J.R. Lucas , "The central sense of
freedom is that in which a rational agent is free when he is
able to act as seems best to him without being subject to
external constraint on his action".52 But such a tenet pres¬
ents difficulties when viewed in the context of a community.
While trying to strengthen individual freedom, it weakens
the total freedom of the community and in fact it might even
work against it. Such a definition of freedom is, in a
sense, atomistic in not recognizing the difference between
individual freedom and community freedom. It is not to ar-
51 John Friedmann, "From Polemics to Disspassionate Analy¬
sis", International Social Science Journal, Vol. 11, No.
3, 1959, pp. 327-339.
52 J.R.Lucas, The Principles of Politics. Oxford: Claredon
Press, 1966, p. 144.
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gue against freedom, but to emphasize the notion of
responsibility that goes with individual freedom. In es¬
sence freedom places very heavy responsibility on the indi¬
vidual.
Pursuit of freedom can also mean pursuit of aliena¬
tion - the more an individual removes himself from the com¬
munity in seeking his individual freedom, the more he dif¬
ferentiates and isolates himself from the larger community.
It is a dilemma that the present economic system tends to
perpetuate. On the one hand, there is development towards
larger and larger economic units that seek aggregate good.
On the other hand, there is pressure to pursue and seek in¬
dividual good and individual freedom, developing individual¬
ity and the right for self-determination. Such ideas are
also expressed by philosophers and sociologists like Marcuse
(1964), Goodman (1960) and Laing (1975).
Planning, on the one hand, seeks the public good and
on the other, individuality, by attempting to safeguard in¬
dividual rights through design, spatial differentiation,
zoning and other regulatory measures, but in the process
suffers from ineffectiveness, indifference and in the end
satisfies neither objectives. Whatever the purpose of plan¬
ning may be, it can easily be transformed into indiference
and whatever the cause for action may be, it could easily be
translated as an inevitable consequence.
215
In actuality, 'freedom to' and 'freedom from' repre¬
sent two sides of the same coin. Full freedom is con¬
strained by actual possibility. 'Freedom to' is a concept
akin to liberty, while 'freedom from' is akin to immunity or
security.53 Both liberty and immunity are also interrelated
- to be at liberty or free to take a certain action could
also imply immunity from arbitrary interference. Thus the
two concepts of freedom are strongly interrelated. If one
is not 'free from' punishment, one is not generally 'free
to' act or take action. This represents freedom of an indi¬
vidual vis-a-vis the law (legal freedom), and not to his
fellow man, and constitutes the most basic form of freedom.
"The combination of immunity from coercion for the
law-abiding subject with liberty to do anything
that has not been prohibited by law, we may call
Constitutional Freedom or Freedom under the
Law."5 4
But freedom under the law guarantees liberty "free¬
dom to"; but "freedom from" negates the very concept it
guarantees. It, thus, presents a conditional clause similar
to a contractual arrangement that one is free to do anything
53 Freedom from represents a negative form, while Freedom to
represents a more positive and creative concept. In
Buddhist philosophy the concept of freedom from is best
exemplified by the idea of "Nirvana" which means freedom
from earthly suffering, specifically it means freedom
from ignorance, selfishness and suffering, and in the po¬
sitive sense it means attainment of wisdom (prajna) and
compassion 'karuna', while freedom to, could be described
by the idea of "Ahimsa" the liberty to be born again. In
Hinduism a similar belief also exists, freedom from sig¬
nifies release from the cosmic laws of "karma" to posi¬
tively achieve "Moksa" meaning deliverance.
54 J.R. Lucas, op.cit. 1956, pp. 144-242.
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one wishes provided it is legal. It is this latter con¬
straint "freedom from" that poses most of the problems in
planning, and it is the specification of these limitations
that constitute the crux of the problem.
In planning, the pursuit of freedom is a very tenu¬
ous guest. Popper contends that "freedom defeats itself if
it is unlimited",55 It is for this purpose of control that
laws exist both to curtail the abuse of freedom and protect
the freedom of the individual. Thus if the public are to
enjoy freedom they must likewise be controlled by law in the
pursuit of this freedom - protection is necessary if freedom
is to be effectively enjoyed by all people equally.
Freedom, says Lucas, is a basis of rationality of
action of achievement; freedom is a good. Freedom permits
one to "actualise one's potentials as a person" and deter¬
mine one's future, while not to be free would constitute not
being human, and not being able to realize the full meaning
of man's purposes in life.56
Surely, it can be argued that man is neither wholly
rational nor is he wholly free. Rousseau said "Man is born
free, and everywhere he is in chains".57 Freedom and democ-
55 Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies. Vol.11.,
London: Routledge and Kegan, Paul. 1974. p. 124.
56 J.R. Lucas, op.cit., 1966, p. 144.
57 See Jean Jacque Rousseau, The Social Contract. Trans.,
Maurice Cranston. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977
(1762).
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racy are products of reason. They exist because man believes
that it is rational to be free and to be democratic. Like R.
Niebuhr noted, democracy was necessary because of man's ca¬
pacity for injustices, and that democracy exists because of
man's capacity for justice. The same could be said of free¬
dom. 5 6
Every system of Law is in contradiction
with the principle of absolute licence for
very good reasons the most important
rights and authorities are conferred in
the form of accountable offices, not legal
privileges with absolute discretion.59
From the foregoing quote one could surmise that one's ac¬
tions are limited and freedom is curtailed, and that freedom
implies responsibility. But at the same time one is not
prevented from criticising the institutions that were devel¬
oped by people in pursuit of freedom. This is so because
freedom represents a recognition of existing structure, in¬
stitutions and moral codes that regulate our lives and per¬
mit us to be free, or permit us to exercise our freedom.
The danger in planning is that as planners we recog¬
nize our freedom but fail to recognize freedom of those for
whom we plan - we do in fact restrict freedom in the very
act of seeking freedom, supposedly through planning.
56 See R. Niebuhr, Man's Nature and His Communities. New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965.
59 J.R. Lucas, op.cit. p. 353.
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It is easy for planners, particularly, to believe
themselves to be morally and intellectually superior in
seeking public welfare. It is similarly easy to create gran¬
diose plans for others, in the name of freedom, but diffi¬
cult to accept that by planning we have also imposed re¬
strictions on the freedoms of others, all in the name of
"good".
Incomplete control and imperfect intelligibility,
says Lucas are the inevitable corollaries of freedom and are
often seen as blemishes. But he goes on to say, to have
complete mastery over the world as one has over one's
thoughts is to be God. But if one is not prepared and can¬
not be God, then one must accept human fallabilities includ¬
ing our inability to have everything rationally justified to
one's full satisfaction.60
Sartre argued that freedom to man, meant condemna¬
tion of man. This quite opposite belief he put succinctly
in his famous statement "condemned to be free".61 True moral
freedom, Sartre argues can only be realized when all the hu¬
man antagonism has dissipated and man recognizes the cause
and effect of his own destiny and freedom.
60 J.R. Lucas, op.cit., 1966, p.
61 Walter Kaufman, Without Guilt
ter H. Wyden,Inc., 1973, pp.
354 .
and Justice. New York: Pe-
2-34, and p. 218.
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The major constriction of the concept of freedom -
whether from or for - is the scientific attitude with which
we attempt to define it. By its very nature, the concept of
freedom is of little value to science since science is inca¬
pable of dealing with social diversities, but performs well
when common or general behaviour is manifest. Waddington's
assessment that science is best qualified and designed to
run a totalitarian state is indeed valid.52 If freedom means
control and planning means control, the problem that arises
is how to reconcile the two, especially if both are neces¬
sary to fulfill a want.
5.6 METHODOLOGY IN PLANNING
5.6.1 INTRODUCTION
It is important to distinguish between two terms
that appear ubiquitously in planning literature and are the
cause of considerable confusion. The terms are Process and
Method.
A Process could be described as a continuum of
changes brought about by a series of considered actions. It
may or may not be end oriented, but is definitely concerned
with means. Process also denotes being in motion, being in a
state of dynamic change. It may involve the design and im¬
plementation of a course of action or strategy of choices to
seek desired ends. A process may also be a kind of "happen-
62 C.H. Waddington, The Scientific Attitudes, (an article).
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ing" or "letting it happen" according to the diverse wishes
of the people.
A Method on the other hand, is a mechanism incorpo-
ratated in a process to organize or bring about change. A
method offers procedures for conducting research and enquiry
in a systematic and logical way using techniques that empha¬
size rationality, order and efficiency of the thought pro¬
cess. It is a tool of science.
Planning discourse has defined methodology with an
emphasis on method and procedural rules, rather than on the
normative issues and effective results. The question of how
has dominated the planning enquiry at the cost of what and
why. This has been so pronounced, that we have been com¬
pelled to design and plan according to a body of rules and
regulations and to think within the given modes and styles
endemic to the scientific paradigm.
The restrictive and rigorous nature of scientific
method, presents formidable problems in its application to
planning. Scientific method is hampered by mechanistic char¬
acteristics, its linear dimensions, its insensitivity to the
subjective aspects and its causal and deterministic assump¬
tions.
It pursues objectivity, for example, by simply asso¬
ciating the process with an independent observer as an in¬
strument and by working through the process of analogous
221
models. Both means may not represent objectivity, and may
in fact falsify reality. Objectivity presupposes the exis¬
tence of absolutes and agreement amongst all concerned, even
in a pluralistic society. Indeed science and its methods
seek perfection not by studying a problem in its native
state, but by reducing it to precise measurements within
controlled parameters. In other words, by dealing with gen¬
eralities by the use of specifics.
Scientific method is a method for formulating con¬
cepts, testing hypothesis and constructing theories. It
cannot help either to identify problems nor to construct hy¬
potheses. It is concerned with form and validity and how
the hypothesis is derived. In fact Bacon, Descartes and
Hobbes all believed that "method" was the key to attainment
of knowledge.
If we look at concepts we find that they are based
either on things which are factual and static or on things
called events, which are dynamic. But to extract these con¬
cepts from things, whether static or dynamic, calls for in¬
ductive and deductive processes according to scientific dic¬
tum. But we also know that the process also relies on some
"a priori" conception of things that one wishes to conceptu¬
alize or hypothesize.
Bertrand Russell, maintained that it takes a lot
more than mere organization of data to generate concepts.
222
Concepts are merely ideas without description and it is im¬
portant to distinguish between conceptions and perceptions.
We must first be able to perceive the same things in order
to have the same conception of the thing. Poincare consid¬
ers it impossible to carry out an experiment without a pre¬
conceived idea. Popper contends that it is from conjecture
that hypotheses are generally formulated, and in fact he
says without such conjectural or intuitive concepts however
vague, it would be hard to know what exactly to observe in
the first place. Hobbes in his opening remarks to Leviathan
notes that:
"The Original of them all is that which we call
SENSE: (for there is no conception of a man's
mind which hath not at first, totally or in part,
been begotten upon organs of sense). The rest are
derived from the original".63
It is also argued that all sciences depend to some
extent at some stages of their inquiry on commonsense and
intuition at least in their preliminary classification
stage. If so it would appear that intuition does play a
very important role in the scientific method and knowledge
development.
Going through the various stages of scientific meth¬
od one finds that scientific method is inherently an intui¬
tive process rationally systematized and validated. The ob¬
servation stage is based on guess work, intuition and
63 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. London: Basil Blackwell,
1976.
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commonsense. It is an attempt at simple descriptions and
comparisons of things observed. The classification stage of
the scientific method consists of identifying groups that
have the greatest communality and will provide the most in¬
formation. It is principally a reductionist process, and
leaves out those aspects ouside the fixed parameters of sci¬
ence whether relevant or not. The causality stage is funda¬
mental to the scientific method; but it is a discriminating
process. It differentiates regular and reliable aspects
from irregular and the unreliable ones. Those aspects that
are unique and those that do not conform are excluded. Ver-
ifiability is provided by experimentation and observed data
and, according to Popper, it is based on the theory of fals-
ability. All that can be done is to prove that a theory is
false, since it cannot be proven that it is right.
Further if concepts are derived by intuition, if
logic is applied to deduce theorems, and if empirically val¬
idated theorems become laws or theory; than it would follow
that if the theory is true than the axiom would be true. By
definition, concepts are evolved by a process of intuition
or conjecture and as such cannot be proven true or false.
Therefore, it would follow that theory cannot be stated as
true or false but can only remain simply as a proposition.
Truth resides in the meaning of the word rather than in the
facts, and as such only tautological statements could claim
to be true or false.
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Scientific method was not designed to establish
truth but rather to invent truths. This particular charac¬
teristic reduces the relevance of scientific method to plan¬
ning. Truth of "a priori" nature cannot be proven nor dis-
proven by experience, particularly in the ethical domain.
One knows that happiness is better than misery and that
knowledge is better than ignorance, but no conclusive proof
can be derived for either assertion.
The central question is; do we need facts or do we
need purpose? Is it the cause we are seeking or is it the
purpose? It is evident that while deductive method will not
add new knowledge, the inductive method will not provide
conclusive proof. Thus the scientific method may not in all
cases be a relevant means of approaching planning problems.
Urban problems are perhaps empirically discernable
but they can hardly be ordered rationally to fit a mathemat¬
ical formulation. The residual problem-solving nature of
planning inquiry; that is, defining problems in terms of
what it is not, negates many methodological formulations.
Social theorists like Durkheim (1858-1917), Weber
(1864-1920), Simmel (1858-1918), Mead (1863-1931) and others
saw the danger of over emphasis on method, particularly in
social sciences. They argued that distinction needs to be
made in sociological methods of analysis, between those ele¬
ments that are value-laden and those that are not. They
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further argued that one needs to go beyond the statics, to
understanding the workings of society, the social processes,
and the conflicts and cooperations that are endemic to soci¬
ety. Weber notes that "there is no absolute objective scien¬
tific analysis of culture or ...of social phenomena indepen¬
dent of a special and "one-sided" view-point according to
which expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously -
they are selected, analyzed and organized for expository
purposes".64
Lonergan, distinguishes between two forms of scien¬
tific methods, or two forms of knowing as he calls it. These
are the "common-sense method" and the "empirical method".
The former method is descriptive in the way in which it
deals with things as they relate to man, and the latter, the
empirical method is explanatory of the way in which things
relate to each other. Lonergan goes on to note that " method
consists in ordering means to achieve an end". But how, he
questions, "can means be ordered when the end is knowledge
and the knowledge is not yet acquired?".65 What is suggested
is need for a different method for directing planning in¬
quiry; a different approach that can explain and determine
the purposes of planning, rather than simply reducing and
analysing component parts in isolation, devoid of a synthe-
64 Edward Shils and Henry Finch eds., Max Webber on the
Methodology of Social Sciences. New York: The Free
Press, 1949, p. 72.
65 J.F. Lonergan, op.cit,. p.44.
sis or a synoptic approach.
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5.6.2 METHODOLOGICAL ECLECTICISM
Eclecticism is imbued with a number of definitions,
each representing a cluster of thoughts rather than any sin¬
gle exclusive or specific definition. A search for synonym
would not be fruitful given the nature of the idea it repre¬
sents. Theoretically, eclecticism can co-exist with the
search for a single goal or multiple goals - and it can leg¬
itimize various satisficing levels that planners seek to
achieve. Eclecticism would imply borrowing without adhering
to any single principle. Methodologically, the science of
"Muddling Through" or "Incrementalism" postulated by Lind-
blom and others recognize the inherent nature of eclecticsm
without making it explicit. Many of the planning methods
and techniques currently in use are inherently eclectic in
their methodologies.
Eclecticism in architecture, for example, is credit¬
ed with embodying diversity of styles focussing on a purpose
and a coherent design. Eclecticism is an approach that rec¬
ognizes creation of diversity as a legitimate activity while
not seeking in the process to foster or impose any single
idiom. Neither does it accept or recognize one. It
achieves unity through a purposeful, and meaningful, borrow¬
ing .
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Theoretically, eclecticism presents a method of dis¬
course that permits a selection and inclusion of methods
that fit best, without seeking to impose any fixed design
form. It is not a philosophical science but a paradigm to
deal with diversity and complexity, at the same time.
Planning does not have its own methodology as we
have argued at length in previous chapters, primarily be¬
cause of its transdisciplinary and interdisciplinary nature.
It borrows freely from other related and at times not-so-re-
lated disciplines or fields of study, seeking always to
adapt to the problems at hand.
The reasons for eclecticism are primarily a result
of a number of constraints inherent in planning theory and
practice, namely:
1. The inherent inability to discriminate between the
perception and reality of urban problems.
2. A lack of consensus regarding the nature of the urban
phenomena, and the parameters of its operations.
3. The lack of sound theoretical foundation that is ex¬
perience based.
4. Unnecessary constrictions and irrelevancies imposed
by the scientific methodologies.
5. The inability to confirm through experimentation the
basic assumptions and conclusions.
228
In as much as these concepts are derived from stud¬
ies on planning topology and homology theory, they are
equally applicable to planning theories and methodologies.66
The need to be able to select from a whole spectrum
of theoretical and epistemological theories on the basis of
its appropriateness to the problem at hand, appears to be a
valid position. The alternative is strict adherence to a
particular theoretical or methodological strategy, but this
has frustrated planning objectives. The need for methodolo¬
gical pluralism or ecclecticism and for more open ended ap¬
proaches, have been advocated by many, more importantly by
Feyerabend in his theory of "methodological anarchism" dis¬
cussed earlier. Kuhn talks of "revolutionary sciences" that
might be able to look anew, generate new methods, plural
models in our search for a new paradigm.
Although it is not scientifically prudent nor accep¬
table to pick and choose to suit convenience, it is nonethe¬
less a valid proposition. But Kuhn also criticises such
approaches as what he calls "weak sciences", because they
lack any agreed upon theoretical base, and are essentially
made up of intuitive generalizations that lack parsimony and
coherence.67 It is not only the vast range of problems that
66 Some of the above five points are taken from Atkin's
"Homology Theory". See R.H. Atkins, "From Co-Homology in
Physics to Q-Connectivity in Social Science". Interna¬
tional Journal of Man-Machine Studies No. 4, 1972, pp.
139-167.
67 See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution.
229
are considered within the legitimate ambit of planning do¬
main, but the range of principles that are used to solve
them that inhibits any single theoretical base. The need to
integrate theory and practice in any method becomes critical
even if it is based on intuitive generalizations. This would
not be unique to planning since disciplines like medicine,
engineering etc., have in fact institutionalized practice in
their educational models. Eclecticism would thus appear to
be an indeed a legitimate activity in planning theory and
pract ice.
5.6.3 TECHNIQUE
It has been said that the main preoccupation or
function of science has been to enable us to know things and
to enable us to do things. But with the rise of technology,
technique has become the means in the determination of the
ends be they social, economic, or physial. It has become
the final arbiter of what we experience or the way we ex¬
perience and observe the external world. The magic of tech¬
nology has reformulated our world view. Problems and solu¬
tions are cast in purely technical terms devoid of any value
judgements or political exigencies. Two of the greatest ar¬
chitects and urbanists of this century, Walter Gropius and
Le Corbusier, were so enamored by technology that they in¬
troduced the "International Style", as a product of technol-
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970.
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ogy dominated machine age. The 'Bauhaus' (1919), founded by
Gropius was a machine shop, that became the fountainhead of
industrial design and influenced much of the architecture
and planning in this century. It was an attempt to fuse art
and industry/technology as a new medium of design. The be¬
lief that technology can solve all human problems is, at
best, a delusion. Our obsession with technology in search
of power and control over things and people could well al¬
ienate us and cause greater conflicts and confusion.
Technology has been critically examined by such au¬
thors as Hannah Arendt (1958), Lewis Mumford (1963), Jacques
Ellul (1964), Herbert Marcuse (1964) and others. They have
drawn our attention to the dangers that await a society
wholly dependent on technology. The technological society,
they warn us, will dissipate humanness, and its pervasive
influence will transform man into a machine.
Technology is defined in a broader context as 'the
organization of knowledge for the achievement of practical
purposes'.68 Even in this broad context, its dangers if pur¬
sued exclusive of human values remain a threat as much as a
blessing. Inasmuch as it provides new opportunities, it
also restricts men to the means which technology offers.
Technical decisions or solutions have come in direct con¬
flict with the real social and economic choices.
68 Emmanuel Mesthene, Technological Change. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970 , p. 25.
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But this flirtation with technology is evident in
more and more human activities. Governments in the mid 60s'
to mid 70s' in particular, were favouring technical deci¬
sions to replace the forces of the free market system. This
posed very serious problems, given the fact that governments
were increasingly involved in planning in almost all aspects
of life. While since then, there has been a growing disenc¬
hantment with such public intervention and a growing demand
particularly in the Western Industrial democracies to return
to the freemarket system; most of the developing countries
of the world however, continue to be enamored by technology,
and continue to seek technical solutions to problems of even
social nature.
The principal danger is that technical decisions
are, by their very nature, technique-oriented. They use
techniques to produce technical solutions that are, in turn,
technique-dependent. John K.Galbraith in the New Industrial
State (1967), speaks of "Technostructure" the organized in¬
telligence he says that is becoming more and more responsi¬
ble for planning. It attempts to serve its own ends, and
often at the cost of majority good, or the welfare of the
society it purports to serve.69
69 See John K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State. New
York: Signet Books, 1968.
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Kenneth Boulding also alerts us to the technological
trap; specifically the inability "to develop a genuinely
stable high level technology which is independent of ex¬
haustible resources". In other words technology has the
tendency to grow at the cost of resource depletion.70 Barry
Commoner in the Closing Circle (1972), likewise holds tech¬
nology responsible for environmental degradation. The pro¬
cess could lead, he claims to eventual catastrophy if not
checked. Jacques Ellul in The Technological Society (1964)
argues, that technology has posited itself to being an au¬
tonomous force capable of destroying human values. It will
lead, he claims, to the eventual domination of man by ma¬
chine and, in the process becomes self perpetuating, leading
to the danger of rendering man, in the end, incapable of
controlling his own creation.
Technology's infinite capabilities have been glori¬
fied not because of its benefits to man, but because of its
sheer potential and its innate beauty that schools such as
the Bauhaus71 dogmatized as epitomizing architectural purity
and expression. The danger of creating a 'Technopolis' as
Nigel Calder describes it, is indeed real. A society mould¬
ed and manipulated by scientific and technical innovations
would simply reduce man to machines - to tools in the ser-
70 See Kenneth Boulding, The Meaning of the 20th Century:
The Great Transition. New York: Harper and Row, 1964.
71 Bauhaus was a school of architecture founded by Walter
Gropius in 1919, and emphasized machine aesthetic.
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vice of the machine he helped in the first place to
create.72 The "City Efficient" movement that dominated plan¬
ning in the early 20th century, discussed earlier, was as
much a product of technology as of rationality. The design
of the road system and the physical layout of the city con¬
formed strictly to the needs of technology, and machine de¬
sign. A city as a machine for living was the belief that
guided planning design and does so in many cases even today.
It is not that technology per se is the destructive
force, it is the irresponsible use of it and over dependence
on it as the judge of social behaviour, that is at the root
of much of the discontent associated with the so called
"technological solutions". Technology can be a blessing as
much as a curse depending how it is used. Hegel noted that
the conflicts in life were not between good and bad but be¬
tween good with good.
5.7 HOLISM AND ATOMISM
The principle of Holism dates back to Roman times
and has persisted since, but only recently has it come to
the prominence as an important theory in understanding com¬
plex systems. Atomism goes back to the Greeks and was first
articulated by Leucippos and later developed by Democritus
and Lucretius in his poem De Rerum Natura (c.55 B.C.).
72 See Nigel Calder, Technopolis. New York: Simon @ Schus¬
ter, 1970.
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The most recent debate centers on the question of
whether social phenomena is an aggregate of individual ac¬
tions or is it a collective behaviour. Adherents of the for¬
mer school of thought are classified under the theory of
"Methodological Individualism", while the later school of
thought is known as "Methodological Holism".
The term "Methodological Individualism" was origi¬
nally coined by F.A.Hayek and K.Popper who posited the theo¬
ry as a safeguard against the dangers of planned society
that is controlling and reconstructing society as a whole,
that Holism was to an extent advocating. "Methodological In¬
dividualism" was advanced by J.W.Watkins, one of its strong¬
est advocates. He maintained that social processes must be
determined by two principles; 1) the behaviour of partici¬
pating individuals and 2) their operational situations. The
Individualist maintain that society is made up of individu¬
als and that social phenomena is created by the individuals,
by their attitudes and actions and not by society as a col¬
lective whole. Its roots are in the theory of "Atomism" (Re-
ductionism) which is based on theory of nature and states
that the universe is made up of individual atomic facts.
Their basic premise is that:
1. The whole is equal to the sum of the individual
parts.
2. The individual parts determine the whole.
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3. The whole can be reduced into component parts without
serious loss of meaning.
Watkins describes "Methodological Individualism" as
a method of sociological explanation, a kind of methodologi¬
cal rule, by which the conditions and circumstances of indi¬
viduals in society determine the meaning of social behav¬
iour .7 3
"Methodological Holism" presents a rival thesis and
maintains that social phenomena must be understood holisti-
cally. The concept of Holism is also of long ancestry dat¬
ing back not only to the Romans but also to the roots of
Hindu and Buddhist philosophies that conceived of cosmos as
unity - one divine reality. Its more recent version evolved
from biology and was first expounded by J.C. Smuts (1926),
and the Gestalt school of psychology. Smut's theory was
based on the theory of evolution as a creative process that
successively brings into existence new wholes. The holistic
approach maintains that social events and all their manifes¬
tations should be studied as wholes. It is social wholes
and not individual elements that constitute social phenome¬
na.74 Holism is generic of the nature system as it evolves
into greater and greater wholes and in process becomming
more and more complex. It is he says "fundamental, synthet-
73 J.W.N. Watkins, "The Alleged Inadequacy of Methodological
Individualism". Journal of Philosophy. Vol. LV, 1958.
74 See J.C.Smuts, Holism and Evolution. London: Macmillan @
Co., Ltd., 1926.
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ic, ordering, organizing and regulating activity in the uni¬
verse" .7 5
B. Pascal (1623-1662) perhaps stated the concept of
'Holism' best in his book Pensees, in which he notes " Je
tiens impossible de connaitre le tout, non plus que de con-
naitre le tout sans connaitre particulierement le parties."
Holism is based on the assumption that whole patterns 'can¬
not' be reduced into parts without serious loss of meaning.
Holists also maintain that a whole is not equal to the sum
of its parts. Further they believe that although social
phenomena are ontologically derived from actions and atti¬
tudes of individuals, the two are not identical. It does
not, they contend, mean that society is not made up of indi¬
viduals or that society can exist without them. Rather,
they suggest that the actions of society as a whole cannot
be imputed to the individual.
Individualists maintain, however, that change can
only come from individuals; social wholes cannot do anything
independent of individuals. In an epistemological sense,
Individualists hold that one can observe the behaviour of
individuals but not of social wholes. Watkins maintains
that even if we managed to describe, predict and control so¬
cial behaviour, we could not claim to understand such behav¬
iour without treating it as a collection of individual re¬
sponses. Social wholes are not like mechanical wholes that
75 Smuts, Ibid. p.319.
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can be studied by reducing them into their smallest constit¬
uent parts. Rather social wholes are organic in nature and
are significant only as wholes. Durkheim said "Society is
not the mere sum of individuals", but a collective represen¬
tation with a "collective conscience".
Popper refutes the theory of holism as nothing
unique to social sciences and contends that even physical
structures can be explained as mere constellation. He be¬
lieves that there are other forces at play such as what he
calls the "conspiracy theory" which is one of the forces
that influence social change and can affect the constella¬
tion or the concept of holism.76 That a part cannot be stud¬
ied and understood independent from the whole is the basic
premise of Holism. In essence Holism implies the following
four conditions:
1. The whole is more than the sum of its parts.
2. The whole determines the character of its parts.
3. Parts of a whole cannot be studied independent from
the whole.
4. Parts of a whole are in a dynamic state and are in¬
terrelated and interdependent.77
76 See Karl Popper, Poverty of Historicism. London: Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul, 1957.
77 D.C.Phillips, Holistic Thought in Social Sciences. Lon¬
don: The Macmillan Pres Ltd., 1977, p. 6.
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Holism as a theory can contribute significantly to
the planning process, but needs further development to be
more than a peripheral focus of concern. Atomism, in es¬
sence, is a belief that justified analytic (Reductionist)
rather than holistic methods. Atomism promotes the pursuit
of knowledge through the taking apart and then putting to¬
gether of information on the 'atomistic' assumption that the
whole is equal to the sum of its component parts. The Hol¬
istic approach rejected this notion, arguing that the whole
is more than the sum of its parts, or that the whole must be
understood holistically. That it is inherently an organiz¬
ing and regulating activity and that it is both a directive
and creative force of the natural system. The argument goes
further in debating whether Holism refers to actual parts or
a typical part of a constituent whole, or whether as Popper
contends is it "the totality of all the properties or
aspects of a thing, and especially of all the relations
holding between its constituent parts" or whether it is
"certain special properties or aspects of the thing in ques¬
tion, namely those which make it appear an organizing struc¬
ture, rather than a mere heap".76 But such a debate only di¬
gresses from the central issue - determining the most useful
and functional approach to planning problems - whether it be
an individualistic or holistic approach.79 But what is sig-
78 Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism. London:
Routledge @ Kegan Paul, 1957, p.76.
79 G.C. Homans,"Bringing Men Back In", American Sociological
Review. 1964, pp. 808-18.
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nificant is that Holism presents greater potentials for
gaining a synoptic view of society and its purposes.
5.8 SYSTEMS AND PLANNING
Another approach that was formulated to deal with
complexities and wholes, is General Systems Theory and the
related field of Operations Research. One of the founders
of a General Systems Theory was Ludwig von Bertallanfy
(1928). The theory was developed from the "organismic biol¬
ogy" and "the systems theory of organism".60
The roots of systems theory lie in the "Gestaltian
Psychology" which originated in Germany around 1910. The
earliest intellectual fervour came from Max Wertheimer, Kurt
Koffka and Wolfgang Kohler. The word "Gestalt" means the
configuration, pattern or way in which a thing is organized
or put together, whereby the organized whole possesses qual¬
ities which are different from those of its component parts.
The principal belief is that any inquiry should proceed from
the whole to its component parts; the whole should be exam¬
ined in its complexity and the natural parts should be dis¬
covered thereafter.
A system, is a control mechanism which modifies or
controls the various systems of the input in order to
produce a desired output, and since a system is simply a
60 See Ludwig von Bertallanfy, General System Theory. New
York: George Braziller, 1968.
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part of a larger system, it is necessary to understand its
component parts in order to understand the whole. In order
to study the component parts and the relationships among the
parts, it is necessary to use "cybernetics" and "information
theory".
The principal law of cybernetics is the "Law of Req¬
uisite Variety". The law of Requisite Variety is based on
the assumption that analytic rational method is not adequate
to deal with organized complexities, nor is it capable of
dealing with wholes or systems as concepts in an integrated
manner. It also maintains that complex methods are needed to
understand complex systems - because such systems have a
logic of their own and are characterized by "requisite vari¬
eties". This theory also known as Ashby's Law, suggests that
only variety can create, absorb or destroy variety - complex
systems are therefore needed to deal with complexities. In
other words, it is the way in which things behave that needs
to be understood and is important in planning. Gestaltism,
Systems Theory and Cybernetics, all purport to be based on
reality - on the way in which all complex living systems,
including humans, behave.
All organisms till now were, perceived in mechanical
terms and represented visible mechanical structures. It was
based on mechanistic-rational world view. This mechanistic
theory was applied to both animals and machines alike. Even
the human body was equated to a machine in terms of its
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structure and function. But such explanations could only be
derived from external properties. The internal components of
these living organisms, the cells and life giving proper¬
ties, were ignored.
By the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of
the nineteenth century, the nature of empirical knowledge
changed. Distinction was now made between things and be¬
ings. The need to understand the phenomena of living organ¬
isms, and as a counter to the tendencies of mechanistic mod¬
els, a new theory emerged called "Vitalism" to explain this
mystic force in living beings. This mysterious agent was
known by different names, "anima", "intelligence", "plastic
nature", but by the end of the eighteenth century it became
known as the "vital force", hence the school of Vitalism.
The two rival theories that emerged were the theory of Vi¬
talism and the theory of Rationalism.81
Vitalism (19th.cent.) was concerned with the systems
in terms of their innate properties, and Rationalism
(17th.cent.) was concerned with the relationships and con¬
nectedness of parts in the system and was akin to the Darwi¬
nian mechanistic model. The Vitalists were concerned with
the overemphasis and domination of the Rationalistic/Mechan¬
istic model, and attempted to infuse as noted earlier, new
thinking into these rigid mathematical and materialistic be-
81 See Francois Jacob, The Logic of Life. Trans.,
B.Spillmann. New York: Pantheon Books, 1973.
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liefs. The Vitalist wanted life, the "elan vital" to be the
core, the essence, the vital force in the evolutionary pro¬
cesses of growth. They believed that each part of the body
possessed something called sentiment, instinct, intuitive
perception.
The pioneers of Vitalism were Hans Driesch, whose
work on "entelechy" provided the central idea, that evolu¬
tion occurs as a result of entelechy in very discreet and
identifiable steps. Lloyd Morgan (1852-1936), pursuing simi¬
lar study, termed the process as the "emergent evolution", a
force that generates new forms at new and different stages
in the evolutionary process. Henri Bergson (1859-1941)
termed the process the "creative evolution".62
Vitalism, suggests that there is more than physical
and chemical forces underlying change in nature - that life
in living organisms are caused and sustained by a vital
force called "entelechy", that provides it with a creative
urge, and a coordinating function in which individual parts
are adapted and maintained for the functioning of the whole
phenomenon. This entelechy is a kind of life force that by
its very nature is both self-evolving and self-determining.
It is a kind of creative evolution, whose cause lies within
the organisms themselves. This force, they argue, is beyond
the bounds of reason and is inherent in all life processes.
62 See Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution. Trans., Arthur
Mitchell. New York: Modern Library, 1944. (1907).
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Patrick Geddes in Cities in Evolution (1915) and
Lloyd Morgan in Emergent Evolution (1923), among others were
the earliest proponents of this school of thought in the
city planning movement. Geddes was perhaps the most influen¬
tial in relating the city to a living organism. Geddes be¬
lieved that understanding of the vital force was necessary
to understanding and directing society's future. Planning,
he argued, was human development towards higher evolutionary
goals. This whole movement was, in a way, an attempt at in¬
jecting some humanism into hereto for materialistic world
philosophy.
Rationalistic or the Mechanistic school of thought
as noted earlier, was dominated by the cause-effect model.
It postulated the theory that the forces that cause change
lie outside the organisms and that they are externally de¬
termined. It is this school of thought that influenced
planning very strongly, and it is also from this theory that
such principles as utility, efficiency and equity evolved
and entered city planning discourse.83
The introduction of these ideas in city planning
came by way of systems theories. General systems theory has
much in common with the mechanistic model, it is concerned
with cause and effects and it is concerned with the linkages
and the relationships between the various parts that make up
83 Joe Bailey, Social Theory for Planning. London: Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul, 1975. Ch. 4.
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the whole system.84
Morris Cohen (1931) defines systems as a complex of
elements logically interconnected.85 Systems, Cohen argues,
are also an inherent characteristic of scientific method.
Science he maintains, always endeavours to seek ideal ra¬
tional systems, which is one of the reasons why systems
method has appealed to planning. Much literature exits on
General Systems Theory and its applications to planning, and
of particiular importance are the works of Churchman, Ackoff
and Chadwick.8 6
Von Bertalanffy defines a system as a "complex of
elements in mutual interaction" and according to R.L. Ackoff
it is "any entity, conceptual or physical, which consists of
interdependent parts".87 This recognition of complexity and
interdependencies in a dynamic state begins to address some
of the concerns that planning has been experiencing. The
traditional approach to planning, the scientific method,
sought to simplify problems whatever their complexity, and
84 N.Wiener, Cybernetics. New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1948, and W.Ross Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics.
London: University Paperbacks, 1964.
85 Morris Cohen, Reason and Nature. New York: Harcourt
Brace @ Co., 1931. pp.106-114.
86 See for example, L. von Bertallanfy (1968), C. West
Churchman (1968), R. Ackoff (1971), K. Boulding (1956),
Y. Dror (1968), G.F.Chadwick (1971), and others.
87 See R.L.Ackoff. "Systems, Organizations and Interdisci¬
plinary Research" in General Systems Year Book, Vol. 5,
1960.
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seek an understanding of cause and effects relationships.
Systems approach on the other hand begins with the holistic
approach, recognizing the evolutionary nature of the human
and natural systems operating in an urban situation. It be¬
gins by understanding first, the nature and functioning of
the various systems and, second, by examining the means for
organizing these systems to seek desired changes. The in¬
terdisciplinary and the transdisciplinary nature of the sys¬
tems approach, adheres well to planning which has for dec¬
ades been trying to grapple with the inevitable fact that
planning by its very nature requires inputs of many disci¬
plines; and, that it also requires a methodology that recog¬
nizes and can operate in an interdisciplinary milieu and ac-
cross relevant disciplines. While increasing use of systems
approach in planning is envisaged, the actual effect of such
an approach has yet to be determined.
The appeal of systems approach to planning as stated
above comes from its interdisciplinary nature, its ability
to work across traditional disciplines and its attempts to
link and integrate relevant knowledge from various disci¬
plines. Its corpus of knowledge centers on two important
premises:
1. Nature as a holistic system.
2. Unity of the nature system.
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Its methodology is based on these two principles,
meaning it is holistic in its methodological inquiry; it
sees interdisciplinary work as most conducive and with
greater possibilities for realization; and sees humanism as
an important element in scientific inquiry.BB
General Systems Theory is capable according to its
exponents, Bertalanffy and others, of dealing with wholes as
manifest complexities and dealing with their relationships.
It is basically an explanatory tool multiplicative, rather
than additive, and has made a significant contribution in
the development of rational models, one of the offshoots of
which is Operations Research.
Operations Research, is an activity that attempts to
optimize the performance of a system. This is feasible as
long as goals are easily identifiable and the means avail¬
able are quantifiable, at least to the extent that its maxi¬
ma and minima levels can be a priori determined. Operations
Research, is a scientific method that promotes rational jus¬
tification for most efficient and economical actions. It
views organizations for example, as systems that can be sub¬
jected to the rules of Operations Research methods such as
simulation models and linear programming optimizing models.
Operations Research, however, inherits the same limitations
as the scientific method in its planning context, as neither
88 Erwin Laszlo, ed., The Relevance of General Systems Theo¬
ry. New York: George Braziller, 1972, pp. 5-7.
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the goals nor the means are easily identifiable - much less
quantifiable. In turn, the optimizing characteristics of
the model are both its strength and its restriction in plan¬
ning.
Systems planning in general (including both Cyber¬
netics and Operations Research), is a useful methodological
tool, but suffers from some inherent contradictions. There
is the assumption, for example that social problems can be
controlled and managed. Immaterial of the separatedness of
the systems designer from the phenomena itself; the design¬
ers personal value system does, of necessity, enter the
analysis, and thus distorts the real picture.
Systems Planning gains its credibility because it
purports to replicate the workings of the real world systems
and thus avoids the traps of Atomism. System theory, how¬
ever, ultimately says very little of human behaviour per se,
in dealing with social change, except that human behavioural
components are interrelated and exhibit properties different
from the sum of its parts.
The introduction of systems analysis in planning oc¬
curred mainly because of the felt need to improve the deci¬
sion-making skills of the executive branch of the govern¬
ment. With Governments assuming increasingly greater
reponsibility for economic and social planning and the re¬
lated implementing and distributing mechanisms, particularly
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after World War II, it became necessary to concentrate on
the more effective decision-making techniques.
In what came to be known generally as "governmental
sciences", systems analysis was first introduced in the So¬
viet Union and later spread to most of the industrialized
nations of the West, in the form of research and development
for war productions and military strategies. It became a
recognized discipline and branched into such fields as oper¬
ations research, strategic planning, etc., that eventually
found their way into urban planning lingua. Systems analy¬
sis thus became an important component of all the planning
programs, particularly the use of PPBS (Planning Programming
and Budget System). This particular technique of systems
analysis was the best known and was developed by the RAND
Corporation for the U.S. Dept.of Defense (The Pentagon) and
in 1965 on the orders of the President of the United States
it was introduced into almost all the executive departments
of the Government. The technique attempts to seek ways of
producing an output at the least cost in the most efficient
way. It seeks to assess all the costs with the output or the
utility factor, and it incorporates cost-benefit analysis
wherein the costs and the benefits are expressed in monetary
terms to provided a comparative assessment.
In sum the appeal of these techniques comes from
their technical sophistication and the great efficiency and
energy savings they purport to achieve, rather than from any
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great or different solutions they can generate. Nurtured by
the atomistic and mechanistic beliefs on the one hand, and
holistic principles on the other, systems planning is in¬
creasingly becoming a very important tool for planning de¬
spite its many shortcomings. The danger, however, as Illich
warned us is that very often the means becomes the end, we
confuse purposes and ends with the technique, or the pro¬
cess by which we do attempt to achieve it. Greater sophis¬
tication in the means is no guarantee of greater sophistica¬
tion of the ends.
Chapter VI
CONCLUSION
"Ah love! could you and I with Him conspire. To
grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire. Would
not We shatter it to bits - and then Re-mould it
nearer to the Heart's Desire!"
Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam.
6.1 A PERSPECTIVE
Man's consciousness transcends scientific laws - his
concepts of morality, beauty, truth, happiness go beyond the
realm of science, and from the dictum of 'is' to the con¬
cepts of 'ought'. But the world-view we hold is based on
the scientific model of nature, reason being supreme in the
conduct of human affairs. Great men have long advocated the
use of experience rather than reason alone as a quide to hu¬
man actions. We seek men of experience, for example, when
confronted with problems that lie outside mundane technical
solutions. Yet, in planning we have often adhered to strict
scientific dictums even at the cost of ineffectiveness, ig¬
noring common sense, wisdom or insight, inherent in experi¬
ence.
As planners we always seem to have to reconcile a
plural society and a singular reference point. In a plural
- 250 -
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society, there is a diversity of sub-cultures found for ex¬
ample in a typical urban community. As planners we have to
recognize and deal with conflicts and complexities. We also
have to be cognizant of the ethics that govern our actions,
and as planners we must recognize freedom and attempt to
provide it as best as possible.
The paradox of planning is that it evolved more as a
temporary curative rather than as a preventive tool, and
more in response to the crisis situations than to any pur¬
poseful design. A planner legitimizes his role through a
variety of myths and rationalizations. He even invents so¬
cial goals if needed, for example, to legitimize his inter¬
vention and control.
In order to understand the need for a new direction
in planning, it is necessary to consider briefly some of the
fundamental characteristics of the scientific paradigm, that
have hereto permeated planning thought. Three important
characteristics stand out: first, the entrenched belief in
a harmonious order of the physical, social, political and
economic life of a society; second (perhaps a corollary to
the first) the adherence to reason as the prime factor in
understanding and directing the universe; and the third is
the belief that man is universal rather than an individual.
Any planning theory, however, must recognize that
these sets of principles, concepts or beliefs are not neces-
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sarily historical invariants. It is not only possible but
critical that these beliefs or postulates be re-examined and
reformulated when it is appropriate to do so.
The unquestioned premises of Galileo, Bacon, Des¬
cartes, Leibniz, Newton, and the subsequent positivist phi¬
losophers need to be recognized for their limitations.
Planning methods need to be creative and pragmatic
rather than merely routine and mechanical. It is not only
testing the given hypothesis but the going beyond and seek¬
ing other ends, to free experience from routine, and to lib¬
erate our thought processes and actions, that, is what is
required. Any action directed at a given or fixed end, may
allow great technical sophistication and accuracy, but it
may also reflect its mechanical character and its inhumani¬
ty. What is most perturbing is that the scientific paradigm
is not able to accommodate our sense of values and it ex¬
cludes any feelings. Our ethical experience, appreciation
of beauty and truth, and ethos of caring, do not seem to
fit. It creates an artificial split between our emotional
part of being and intellectual part of acting.
T. Kuhn warned of the limitations of scientific
methods and their findings. Stereotyped methods, he said,
will generate stereotyped results, and indeed, that a deci¬
sion to use a certain method assures that certain sorts of
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results will ensue.1
Science builds methodological and conceptual catego¬
ries that will reject anything that does not fit into its
mould. Such restrictions impose drastic limitations on its
use in planning: firstly because planning problems elude
scientific definition; secondly planning problems cannot be
subjected to scientific measurements and analysis or test¬
ing; thirdly, solutions, so arrived at, lack rich, holistic
and contextual perspective (they are reductionist) and
fourthly, problems and solutions so processed, lack meaning
and value to satisfy human needs (that is they do not fit
the need system of the user). 2
The linear nature of scientific methods further exa¬
cerbates any planning inquiry. Linear methods argued Watz-
lawick, generate linear decisions. We are "wedged" says
Stafford Beer, in a rigid framework that perceives problems
and solutions in a stereotyped fashion, devoid of any new,
or fresh, approaches.3
At the extreme stands Alan Watts condemnation
"...laws and hypothesis of science are not so much discover¬
ies as instruments, like knives, and hammers, for bending
1 See T.Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chi¬
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
2 See T. Kuhn. op.cit.
3 See Stafford Beer, Decision and Control. New York: John
Wiley & Sons., 1966.
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nature to one's will". What is needed, he says, is not
simplification and generalizations of nature's rich and var¬
ied complexity, for the sake of scientific expedience, but
recognition of the very diversity and complexity as a meta¬
phor of nature and to act accordingly.4
The general problem in human understanding that we
face according to Toulmin is "to draw an epistemic self por¬
trait which is both well-founded and trustworthy; which is
effective because its theoretical basis is realistic, and
which is realistic because its practical implications are
effective."5 It is the recognition and affirmation of human
values rather than their denial. It is also the recognition
of unity in diversity, of mutual interrelationship or con¬
nectedness, and of the basic oneness of the indivisible re¬
alty of the universe.6 Sartre noted that "Man is nothing
else but that which he makes of himself."7 The potential ex¬
ists, the purposes are there, the will is manifest, but the
guide to our actions still remains to be resolved. Jonathan
Swift (1667-1745) believed that man was not inherently an
"animal rationale" but was "rationis capax" and as such al-
4 Alan Watts, Nature Man and Woman. London: Abacus Publish¬
ers, 1976. p. 67.
5 S.Toulmin, Human Understanding. Vol.1, Oxford: The Clare-
don Press, 1972, p. 3.
6 Fritjof Capra, The Tao of Physics. London: Fontana Books,
1975, pp. 133-166.
7 J.B.Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism. London: Methuen
@ Co.n 1970. p. 28.
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ways acted rationally and humanly, and that man has not only
a mind capable of discovering truth but also a will capable
of choosing and doing good.
It will never be possible to gain a complete world
picture. What is needed is a synoptic view (viu d'ensemble)
and an active commitment to at least a "limited ideal" that
Rousseau and others of the age of enlightenment were foster¬
ing. The moral question that could quide human action, is
the definition of the word "limited". In other words, how
much of this limited ideal world picture do we need, to make
morally justifiable decisions.8 We need to understand, what
is it that we desire to control or suppress if necessary,
and what is it that we need to liberate and free. Planning
is not simply a scientific technique of city building - it
is an expression of social consciousness.
8 Ernest Becker, The Structure of Evil. New York: The Free
Press, 1976. p. 362.
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GLOSSARY
Advocacy Planning: Planning in a neutral role express¬
ing the plural interests of a com¬
munity - planning that presents
choices and alternatives and high¬





Areas) A planning method that deals
in strategic choices, by reducing
uncertainties. (See Wedgwood - Op-
penheim).
A method that seeks to optimize
given ends - an incremental pro¬
cess, deals with known class of
problems and uses quantitative






Planning that involves distributing
scarce resources among the various
competing demands. (See Friedmann).
An inference depicting semblance
between relationships of things
rather than between things them¬
selves - appearance of overrall
phenomena is similar - superficial
(Contrast with Homology).
Resolution of a complex whole into
its component parts. (contrast
with Synthesis).
A logical method that emphasises
deductive and inductive inferences
- a method wherein truth and falsi¬
ty can be inferred from the state¬
ment itself - aimed at understand¬
ing in philosophical inquiries
method using formal reasoning.
(Contrast with Scientific Method)
(Associated with Descartes)
Anarchist Theory: A theory of knowledge that sub¬
scribes to the principle that "any¬
thing goes" - argues against method
of science, (see P.K. Feyerabend).
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Anthropocentric: A doctrine that views man as an en¬
tity apart and superior to nature -
an exclusionist approach. (Con¬
trast with Biocentric).
A Posteriori: From what comes after - based on




From what comes before - prior to
experience - rational. (Contrast
with A Posteriori)
A theory of nature that maintains
that the universe is made up of in¬
dividual atomic facts - the basic
premise is that the whole is equal
to the sum of the individual parts.
Maintains that the whole phenomena
can be reduced into parts without
serious loss of meaning. (Contrast
with Holism, Gestalt Concept and





A right that is explicitly deter¬
mined within a system to control
and bring about desired ends.
(Contrast with Power).
A theory of value, aesthetics or
ethics - deals with what matters.
(Contrast with Epistemology and On¬
tology ).
Propositions that are considered to





A doctrine that views man as part
of the nature system - an inclu-
sionist approach. (Contrast with
Anthropocentric).
Principle that states that a propo¬
sition can be either true or false,
but not both.
Economics that emphasise quality
rather than quantity and existence
rather than accretion. (See Schu¬
macher) .





organisms try to establish internal
consistency harmony or congruity,
among its opinions, attitudes,
knowledge and values. (see Leon
Festinger).
Experience based on intuitive per¬
ception, beliefs, common sense, or
conjecture.
A school of thought founded by
Thomas Reid (1710-96) which sub¬





A descriptive method -deals with
things as they relate to man.
(Contrast with Empirical Method
(See J.F. Lonergan)
Planning that is based on agreed
upon opinions or concepts, designed
to deliberately avoid conflicts in
opinions.
Issues in which there is disagree¬
ment between ideas or parties con¬
cerned. (Contrast with Contra¬
dictions and Controversies.)
Conflict Theory: A Theory based on the premise that
society exists in constant state of
conflicts between differing inter¬




Knowledge based on conviction.
Totality of a person's thoughts and
feelings, state of self awareness.
Constructs: Components that formulate theories.
Constructive Typology: A format designed to explain and
postulate relationships in social
phenomena - aimed at representing
expected rather than fixed behav¬
iour patterns. (See John C. McKin-
ney.)
Contraries: Distinguishes between being and
non-being, e.g. up-down, bitter¬
sweet.
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Contradictions: Issues or situations that are
incompatible with each other.
(Contrast with Conflicts and Con¬
troversies .)
Controversies: Issues that are contentious. (Con¬
trast with Conflicts and Contra¬
dictions. )
Contingency Planning: Planning that seeks to reduce prob¬
lems into those with obvious solu¬
tions and those whose solutions are
more difficult.
Conventions: Dictates of society - accepted
norms of the social fabric.
Conventionalism: A doctrine that assumes theories as
conventions developed for specific
purpose - primarily concerned with
truth or falsity and only secondar¬






Opinions based on guess, intuition
or feelings. (See Karl Popper.)
Planning within the framework of an
institutionalized system - a pro¬
cess of decentralized planning
among a number of administrative
(corporate) officers.
A theory that maintains that plan¬
ning should be directed towards the
critical examination of society, in
order to achieve desired social
changes. That our ideas eminate
from the environment in which we
live and reason being supreme in
the decision making process. (Asso¬
ciated with Frankfurt School).
Critique: Art of informed judgement - essen¬
tially an activity of reason.
Cybernetics: Science of communication and con¬
trol in man and machines - deals
with closed systems in information





A process wherein alternatives are
evaluated to select one that will
achieve the end objective.
A method of reasoning in which a
particular inference is derived or
deduced from a general statement.





Rationality that is based on a
reasonable belief in a course of
action to achieve desired ends - it
may pursue objective or subjective
rational plan. (See Sidgwick and
Rawls).
A decision making technique that
uses questionnaires to assist deci¬
sions. The underlying assumption
is that a best decision lies in the
collective wisdom of a number of
experts - its special feature is
its annonimity and feedback possi¬
bility.
A doctrine that maintains that all





Change in the fabric of society
structural change (contrast with
Growth and Planning).
A method of discourse - a means of




A method that effects a synthesis
or unity of opposites, as manifest¬
ed in the real processes of nature
and society.
Concerned with distributing among
its members both the benefits and
the costs accruing to a community.
(See John Rawls.)
DOSRAP Technique: A technique designed to generate
deliberate administrative action -
it is simultaneous, deliberate,
staged, recursive and administra¬
tive techniques (see Ruth Mack).
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Elitist Planning Model: A model that imposes, the values
and perferences of a small govern¬
ing elite group, as public policy.
Empirical Science: Pursuit of knowledge based on em¬
pirically observed data or experi-
ence-a posteriori. (Contrast with
Rational Science).
Empiricism: A philosophy that mantains that
knowledge of the world can only be
gained through sense-experience.
(Contrast with Rationalism.)
Empirical Method: An explanatory method - deals with
things as they relate to each other
- based on sense-experience and ex¬
perimentation. (Contrast with Com¬
mon Sense Method) (See J. F. Lon-
ergan).
Entropy: Measure of disorder, a state where¬
in neither the central purpose nor
the end state of society can be
clearly identified.
Epistemology: A theory of science and method of
knowledge for solving problems -
perceives the nature of change.
Deals with what can be known and
how it can be known. (Contrast with
Axiology and Ontology).
Ethic: Moral issues and value precepts -
conduct that mediates human living
- study that seeks to distinguish
the good and the bad - conformity
to a code (See Morals).
Ethology: Study of the innate behaviour pat¬
terns in animals. (See Konrad Lor-
enz and Niko Tinbergen).
Evaluative Process: A process of establishing value
frame to assess the various courses
of action to seek desired ends.
Existentialism: A philosophy that believes in human
freedom to make choices and in re¬
sponsibilities for its consequences
- human nature is what we believe
it to be - believes in the irra¬
tionality of natural phenomena -

















Implies immunity from restrictions
in pursuing one's wishes. (Con¬
trast with Freedom To.)
Absence of constraints.
Implies liberty to pursue one's
wishes. (Contrast with Freedom
From).
Pursuit of self interest.
(See Theories of Planning).
The art and science of making the
earth more habitable. (See Geddes).
A school in psychology that deals
in configurations and structures of
perceptions - emphasises holism
against atomism - basic doctrine is
that the whole is more than the sum
of its parts. (See Wertheimer).
Desired end state/ideals-normative
directions rather than end state -
the 'ought'. (Contrast with Objec¬
tives) .
A linear programming model designed
to optimize utility function or at¬
tainment of goals within set envi¬
ronmental contraints. (See A
Charnes and W. W. Cooper).
States that every logical system
must contain a premise which is not
definable without contradicting it¬
self .
Planning through a process of in¬
teraction among groups, by seeking
consensus.
Multiplicative change of the same
phenomena (Contrast with Develop¬
ment ).
Heisenbergs Uncertainty A principle that mantains that it
Principle: is impossible to achieve objectivi¬











The art of interpretation aimed at
understanding the essential meaning
of human actions - attempts at un¬
derstanding the parts in terms of
the whole. (Associated with Frank¬
furt School).
A Process of self discovery aimed
at seeking approximate or satisfac¬
tory solutions based on trade-offs
and not necessarily optimum solu¬
tions - method of discovering as
against proving - it is means ori¬
ented, rather than directed, uses
open ended procedure and deals with
fuzzy kinds of problems. (Contrast
with Algorithmic)
A belief that suggests that in or¬
der to gain adequate understanding
of the nature of things, it is im¬
portant to understand its develop¬
ment in historical perpective - un¬
derstanding an event in its larger
historical context, (see Popper).
A process of organic (creative)
synthesis as a whole - study of
functional relationships of a sys¬
tem as a whole - evolving wholes -
based on the principle that the
whole is more than the sum of its
parts - based on the assumption
that the whole phenomena cannot be
reduced into parts without serious
loss of meaning. (Contrast with
Atomism and Reductionism).
A mode of thought or action in
which human interests predominate.
A provisional proposal stating that
two or more things are causally re¬
lated - a tentative construct
supposition made as a basis of rea¬
soning without assumption of its
truth. (Contrast with Theory and
Law)







hypothesis is assumed to be hypo¬
thetical, conclusions are deduced
from it and tested against experi¬
ence - if false it is rejected -
helps confirm hypothesis but not to
formulate it. (First formulated by
Leibniz) (Contrast with Inductive-
Deductive Method).(See Popper).
A system of ideas defined in con¬
text of its role in society - a be¬
lief characteristic of an individu¬
al, group or culture.
Analysis of characteristics that
are unique. (Contrast with Nomoth¬
etic Analysis) (See Alfred Kuhn)
Planning for incremental modifica¬
tions of past policies - continua¬
tion by small increments.
A method of reasoning by which an
inference is derived from a partic¬
ular premise to a universal general







A cognitive activity specific
each individual.
to
A doctrine that maintains that not
all the events in the world can be
determined with absolute accuracy.
(Contrast with Determinism and
Heisenbergs Uncertainty Principle).
Planning by means of structural
changes in the institutional system
that guide society.
A doctrine that maintains that sci¬
entific theories are only instru¬
ments in predicting observable phe¬
nomena - judged on the basis of
their usefulness rather than if
true or false. (Contrast with Con¬
ventionalism and Operationalism).
(See Dewey).
Akin to common-sense - without use
of systematic reasoning - developd
from immediate insights or appre¬














Knowledge which is non-conceptual,
but not non-rational.
A theory of knowledge based on in¬
tuition - apprehension or insight
rather than reason.
Knowledge acquired by faculty of
mind other than reason - differs
from non-rational. (Contrast with
Rational).
Strategy that seeks to maximize the
average of utility rather than the
total of utility - a belief that
maintains that if one has complete
knowledge of all the facts one can
predict all the future events.
A statement of fact based on best
available knowledge. Social con¬
trol legislated by government.
(Contrast with Theory and Hypothe¬
sis).
Maintains that only variety can
create or destroy variety - complex
solutions are needed to deal with
complex systems. (See Ashby).
A doctrine that maintains that the
principle and rules of human con¬
duct can be determined by use of
reason alone. (See John Austin and
J. Bentham).
Reasoning based on established laws
and precedents.
A science of laws of thought
method of reasoning - used primari¬
ly for proving or confirming, but
not for discovering - a theory of
inference - deals in the way in
which statements are constructed or
make sense - dictates the rules of
rationality.
See Scientism.
A method designed to be both open-
ended and systematic - sees urban
systems as organic wholes and in¬
terrelated - does not pretend to be











A process of achieving the highest
possible state - not necessarily
the best. (Contrast with Optimiza¬
tion).
Principles and techniques that




Habits of life, modes of conduct,
accepted customs, study dealing in
principles of conduct, relating to
the principles of consideration of
right and wrong. (See Ethics).
Set of rules that seeks the great¬
est happiness for all.
An ethical philosophy that main¬
tains that the criterion for right
action is derived from the natural
laws and the empirical features of
the natural environment.
Physical laws that are incapable of
breach. (Contrast with Normative
Laws). (See G. E. G. Catlin).
Planning by perceiving changes -
creating new awareness on a lateral
and collegial level rather than on
the traditional hierarchial struc¬
ture - educating for planning to
seek new ways to choose within a
holistic and systemic frame. (See
James D. Carroll and Lionel J. Li-
vesey).
Defining meaning of a term - an ar¬
bitrary meaning assigned to a word
for purposes of explicating the in¬
tent regardless of is common usage
- use of new terms or symbols as an
abstraction of a complex expression
- defines the meaning of the term
itself - an abbreviational defini¬












Analysis of characteristics that
are common among different phenome¬
na. (Contrast with Ideographic
Analysis). (See Alfred Kuhn)
Laws made by man and enforced by
sanctions. (Contrast with Natural
Law). (See G.E.C. Catlin)
A theory that deals in abstract en¬
tities - a prescriptive and evalua¬
tive concept dealing in values and
aspects of 'ought'. (Contrast with
Procedural Theory) (See Theories in
Planning).
Desired end state - short range -
the 'is'. (Contrast with Goals).
Devoid of conscious inputs - exter¬
nal to the mind,neutral - associat¬
ed with reality. (Contrast with
Subjectivity).
A theory of knowledge based on a
prior demonstration of existence -
study of being - deals with what
exists. (Contrast with Axiology and
Epistemology).
An activity that seeks to optimize
the performance of a system.
A theory of knowledge that assumes
that a theory is meaningless out¬
side the context of its application
- concerned with meaning and reali¬
ty. (Contrast with Conventionalism
and Instrumentalism).
A process of achieving the best
desirable state. (Contrast with
Maximization).
Organizational Theories: Theories that concern the organiza¬
tion and management of institutions
that are involved in planning, em¬
phasis being on behaviour, values,
awareness and transformation of
perception - goal oriented and in¬
novative in nature.
Paradigm: A scientific model presenting prac¬
tical solution - accepted theory. A
system of belief. (See T.Kuhn).
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Pareto Optimality: A theory that maintains that an in¬
dividual cannot maximize his utili¬
ty function without minimizing
someone else's.
Phenomenology: A philosophy that attempts to de¬
scribe phenomena by means of direct
awareness - it is descriptive and
is concerned with getting to the
"things themselves" - experiencing.
(See Husserl).
Philosophy: Intellectual activity in pursuit of
knowledge, aims at understanding
phenomena in nature using the logic
of rationality. (Contrast with
Science).
Planning Balance Sheet: An accounting system designed to
generate better informed rational
decisions - provides the summary
advantage and disadvantages of var¬
ious proposed projects. (See N.
Lichfield).
Planning Science: Planning within the dictums of sci¬
ence - putting the whole of plan¬
ning activity in the domain of sci¬
ence and rejecting those that do
not conform to the scientific dic¬
tums - making science of planning.
(Contrast with Scientific Plan¬
ning) .
Planning: Planning in this thesis implies
town and country planning - an ac¬
tivity that seeks to organize and
direct changes towards desired ends
- it is selective, conscious and
deliberate activity - it is also
construed to be an activity that
seeks to ameliorate any negative
forces that preclude desired chang¬
es. (Contrast with Development
See Geotechnic).
Procedural Theories: Theories dealing in the is_ aspects,
methodology and means oriented, em¬
pirical/functional (Contrast with














A doctrine that asserts the posi¬
tive science - empirical science as
the only form of human knowledge -
rejects methaphysical claims - rep¬
resentation of facts devoid of val¬
ues. (Associated with Vienna Cir¬
cle).
(See Theories of planning).
Ability to control and achieve de¬
sired ends. (Contrast with Author¬
ity).
Study of relationship between the
signs and their users. (See Semi¬
otics).
A philosophy based on concrete ex¬
perience of the reality - pertain¬
ing to factual, realistic - a doc¬
trine that maintains that a theory
is right if it is useful - replaces
the concept of truth with value.
(Associated with William James and
John Dewey).
A philosophy of action - a theory
of practice.
Pursuit of knowledge through logic¬
al deduction. Starts with princi¬
ple accepted as self evident.
(Contrast with Empirical Science).
Argument based on reason - explic¬
itly reasoned. (Contrast with Ir¬
rational)
A philosophy that maintains that
knowledge can only be gained
through the use of pure reasoning
without appeal to any empirical
premises - deductive rather than
sensory. (Contrast with Empiri¬
cism).
Systematic use of reason - con¬
scious use of reason. (Contrast
with Intuition)
Defines the term itself - defini¬
tions with a fixed meaning - not
subject to change - an equating
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definition. (Contrast with Nominal






"Faculty of mind informed by Grace"
- justification - sensible or ade¬
quate conduct.
Thinking in logical form - connect¬
ing ideas in a systematic way -
drawing inferences by use of pure
reason - ordering concepts accord¬
ing to the rules of logic.
A process of reducing by extracting
common factors and rejecting others
method used in scientific in¬
quiry. Based on the assumption
that a whole phenomena can be re¬
duced into parts without loss of
meaning (see also Atomism).
Defining problems in terms of what




Or the Logic of Choice - a method
of reasoning alternative to the
scientific and analytic method -
reasoning according to the societal
rules. (See Gidon Gottlieb).





Knowledge based on proven theory -
aims at explaining - is not truth,
but pursuit of truth. (Contrast
with Philosophy).
Scientific doctrines and methods
used in planning to achieve an end.
(Contrast with Planning Sciences).
Addiction to the scientific theo¬
ries and methods.
Scientific Method: Systematic application of reason to
empirical data, using techniques of
experimentation and measurement - a
method based on observation, meas¬
urement and verification used in
scientific enquiries - aimed at ex¬
plaining phenomena - empirical -
deals with those aspects that are
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regular and reliable. (Contrast
with Analytic Method). (Associated
with Francis Bacon).
Semantics: Study of the relationship between
signs and things they designate -
science of meaning. (See Semiot¬
ics).
Semiotics: Study of signs in human communica¬
tion system - divided into three
parts: Semantics, Syntactics and
Pragmatics.
Semiology: Science concerned with signs of
communication in a society. (See
F. Saussure).
Sociobiology: A school of thought that believes
that social behaviour is genetical¬
ly determined - biologically deter¬
mined theory of culture. (See
E.O.Wilson).
Sociogenesis: Social learning process/ cognitive
learning theories emphasizes mutual
learning to respond to the environ¬
ment and cognitions such as values,
feelings etc.
Strategic Decision: Decision in which the influencing
factors are under control of more
than one operator and the decisions
affect the area outside its con¬
trol. (Contrast with Tactical De¬
cision).
Strategic Planning: Planning that seeks to identify ob¬
jectives and the resources needed
to achieve them and the policies
that are required to determine the
acquisition and disposition of the
resources - emphasises flexibility
and recognition of uncertainities -
managing uncertainties - (See
Friend and Jessop).
Structuralism: Study of deep structures and form
that cannot be directly perceived
by our senses. It emphasises form
over content. (See Levi-Strauss).
Structure: A pattern described in terms of its










Planning within the framework of
social, economic and physical
structure of an area, consonant
with the regional and national pol¬
icies - activity oriented.
Associated with perception and con¬
sciousness. (Contrast with Objec¬
tivity) .
A process of gaining permanent in¬
tegration between two or more in¬
terdependent organisms or entities.
Study of inter-relationships be¬
tween signs. (See Semiotics).
Construction of a whole out of its
component parts. (Contrast with
Analysis).
A set of inter-related parts called
components - structures consisting
of interdependent parts.
A method whose base premise is that
the study of the whole system of
society and the environment can
provide the necessary information
to guide planning. Seeks to re¬
solve problems rationaly, optimally
and efficiently.
An inference wherein the conclusion
states the same things as the prem¬
ise - literally saying the same
thing - akin to deductive infer¬
ence.
Technical Decisions: Decisions arrived at based on full
knowledge and complete control of
all the relevant facts - all those
outside are considered to be fixed
and not affected by the decision
made. (Contrast with Strategic De¬
cision).
Teleology: A theory that maintains that change
takes place for a set purpose
purposeful change - associates the
individual behaviour with the pur¬
poses of the universe as a whole.
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Theory: Abstraction of perceived reality -
a hypothesis that has been empiri¬
cally tested - a partially validat¬
ed hypothesis - a body of knowledge
- supposition explaining phenomena
- exposition of a principle of sci¬
ence. (Contrast with Hypothesis
and Law).
Theorems: Propositions or facts derived
through the process of reasoning -
deduced axioms. (Contrast with
Axioms).
Theories in Planning: Theories that are prescriptive in
nature, normative/substantive theo¬
ries - deals in the "ought" aspects
- goals and values oriented - end
state. (Same as Normative Theory -
See Faludi, Hightower & Friedmann).
Theories of Planning: Theories that are descriptive in
nature, - deals in the "is" aspects
- theories of techniques, methods
oriented - objective, empirical and
predictive in nature. (Same as
Procedural, Functional or Positive
Theories - See Faludi, Hightower
and Friedmann).
Transactive Planning: A planning style that employes the
mode of mutual learning as an evo¬
lutionary process. Translating
knowledge into action. (See Dunn &
Friedmann).
Typology: A set of interdependent classifica¬
tion of categories used to define a
phenomena - a device for ordering
concrete phenomena.
Utilitarianism: A school of thought that believes
that one should pursue the greatest
good or the greatest happiness of
the greatest number as the end ob¬
jective of society. (See J. Bent-
ham and J.S. Mill).
Value: Ordering of preferences - morally
based inference. (Contrast with
Facts).
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